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Abstract
This dissertation presents an ethnography of vulnerability in Shishmaref, Alaska. 
The village of Shishmaref, population 563, faces imminent threat from increasing erosion 
and flooding events -  linked to climatic changes and ecological shift -  making the 
relocation of residents off of the island necessary in the foreseeable future. In spite of 
ongoing conversations with government agencies since 1974, an organized relocation has 
yet to occur in Shishmaref.
While ecological shift and anthropogenic climate change are no doubt occurring 
in and around the island, the literature on vulnerability and disaster predicts that social 
systems contribute at least as much as ecological circumstances to disaster scenarios.
This research tests this theory and asks the question: what exactly is causing vulnerability 
in Shishmaref, Alaska?
The resulting dissertation is an exploration of the ecological, historical, social and 
cultural influences that contribute to vulnerability and risk in Shishmaref. Unlike 
common representations of climate change and disaster that present the natural 
environment as a sole driver of risk, this research finds complex systems of decision­
making, ideologies of development, and cultural assumptions about social life contribute 
to why Shishmaref residents are exposed to erosion and flooding and why government 
intervention and planning remains difficult.
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1Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Shishmaref is Everywhere
In recent years, there has been an explosion of awareness of environmental 
migrants and environmental migration linked to climate change in both popular and 
scientific dialogue. When I teach courses on climate change at Oregon State University 
today, Tuvalu, the Maldives, and ‘those villages in Alaska’ -  places that have been 
identified as communities of potential environmental migration linked to climate change 
-  are known and recognized by many of my students. Each month I receive emails from 
colleagues, friends, and family members about stories they’ve seen about Shishmaref or 
about Alaska and the migrations associated with climate change. I have been interviewed 
by multiple media outlets preparing stories on Shishmaref (USA Today, The UK 
Financial Times, The Munich Re Foundation Newsletter), and contacted by other 
graduate students and faculty, asking for assistance, literature review, and direction in 
studying environmental migration linked to climate change in general, and in Alaska 
specifically.
From my perspective as a researcher who was invested early in the topic of 
migration in Alaska driven by ecological change, I have witnessed the crest of interest in 
and enthusiasm for: (1) climate change outcomes; (2) migration linked to climate change; 
and (3) Shishmaref as a quintessential example of these two phenomena. In the summer 
of 2012, as one of my students was completing a research project on Evangelical
environmentalism, he exclaimed during an in-class presentation: “Shishmaref is 
everywhere!”
To be sure, Shishmaref appears omnipresent -  in my inbox, in my classroom, in 
the newspaper stories I read and the interviews I conduct -  because this is my field, the 
focal point of my research, and the center point of my attention for the last 5 years. But 
there is also something absurd about an outsider’s claim that this 600 person, primarily 
Inupiaq village in extremely rural, west coast Alaska is ‘everywhere.’ In comparison, 
other Seward Peninsula villages such as Wales, White Mountain, and Little Diomede, are 
not ‘everywhere,’ even if one is looking for them. The question becomes: 1) what is 
really happening in Shishmaref and, 2) why is it eliciting so much attention?
1.2 Migration and the Environment
To understand why and how Shishmaref came to be an important case study for 
researchers interested in environmental migration it is important to understand something 
about migration itself as a research topic. Throughout the greater part of the 20th century, 
social scientific research on human migration frequently failed to identify natural or 
environmental systems as driving factors for migration decisions (for reviews see Piguet 
et al. 2011; Moriniere 2009). Piguet et al. (2011) attribute the lack of environmental 
drivers in human migration research to a Western European/North American bias towards 
the belief that “technological progress would decrease the influence of nature on human 
life” (Piguet et al. 2011:3), a trend that persisted until well into the latter half of the 20th 
century. Within this rubric, migration was an economically decision, not an
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environmentally driven one. Poor economies pushed migrants, better economies pulled 
migrants -  the environment was distal as a relevant mechanism for migration. It was 
under these intellectual circumstances that a surprising essay by Essam El-Hinnawi, 
published by the United Nations Environmental Programme in 1985, defined 
environmental refugees as,
those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, 
temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental 
disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their 
existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life [sic] (El- 
Hinnawi 1985:4).
In 1990, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) made the claim that 
one of the most significant outcomes of anthropogenic climate change on human 
populations may be forced migration (IPCC 1990). In the report, the IPCC stated that the 
gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration as millions are 
uprooted by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruption (1990). In 
1993, Norman Myers further linked climate change and migration when he estimated that 
up to 150 million people could be forced to migrate due primarily to sea level rise and 
desertification by the year 2050 (Myers 1993). By 2008 and 2011 the International 
Organization on Migration (IOM) released estimates that projected between 200 million 
to 1 billion potential environmental migrants in the coming century (IOM 2008; 2011). 
Thus, in just over a quarter of a century, analysis of human migration scenarios changed 
from failing to recognize the environment as a significant push factor in migration, to
3
estimating that as many as one out o f every nine people on the planet (one billion 
environmental migrants / 8.9 billion, estimated population in 2050 (UN 2005:4)) could be 
an environmental migrant.1
These large estimates appeared in peer reviewed theoretical papers (Myers 1993), 
policy reports (Myers and Kent 1995), and governmental and non-governmental 
organization reports (IOM 2008), which identified areas of the world that were 
vulnerable to small or large changes in climate or environmental conditions that could 
trigger mass migrations. The next step was mapping these areas. Maps of hot spots of 
‘environmental migrations’ quickly came into being and gave a visual representation of 
evolving reports. In particular, Emmanuelle Boumay created a map (Figure 1.1) for the 
newspaper, Le Monde Diplomatique, that was based on Norman Meyers 2005 report on 
environmental migrants and the areas so significantly affected by ecological shift that 
migration would ensue. Boumay’s map was featured on UNEP’s website (though later 
removed) and circulated widely among scholars and policy makers. It is still featured on 
the Wikipedia site that explains environmental migration 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_migrant).
4
1 These numbers remain hotly contested.
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Figure 1.1: Map by Emmanuelle Boumay
It is extraordinary that Shishmaref is labeled on this map. The only other city to 
be named explicitly is New Orleans -  and more commonly labels are only given to entire 
regions or countries: the Caribbean, Bangladesh, India, the Mekong River delta, Mexico, 
Haiti, the Yangtze River (the third largest river in the world) and Central Asia, as 
examples. One label, the Sahel Belt, for example, has a population of 58 million people, 
is one of the poorest areas of Africa, and cyclically experiences extensive famine linked 
to desertification, land degradation and socio-economic structures (Batterbury and 
Warren 2001). The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
as recently as June 12, 2012 put out a special call for funding to alleviate up to 5 million 
children in the Sahel suffering from acute malnutrition (Niles 2012). Excepting 
Shishmaref, the labels on this map refer to large populations, in many cases under 
extreme duress -  and large, migrating populations under duress are exactly what policy 
reports on environmental migration highlight (IOM 2008, 2011) and what drives concern
about environmental migration from the IPCC and other policy makers. So, again, why 
care about Shishmaref?
1.3 Climate Change, Environmental Migration and Shishmaref
There are a few facts that remain relatively uncontested for Shishmaref as a case 
study of environmental migration linked to climate change. First, there is an extremely 
high probability that the village of Shishmaref will have to be relocated in the foreseeable 
future because of continued erosion and an increased chance of flooding (multiple 
interviews with local residents, USGAO 2003, 2009; USACE 2006). A 2003 and 2009 
government report identified Shishmaref as one of four villages in Alaska (Shishmaref, 
Kivalina, Koyukuk and Newtok) that face immanent threat of disaster related to erosion 
and flooding, and one of three villages (Shishamref, Kivalina, and Newtok) that would 
likely need to relocate in the next 10-15 years before the village sites were ‘lost to 
erosion’ (USGAO 2009:10).
Second, climate change has affected Alaska and the Arctic in serious and 
dramatic ways. From 1954 to 2003, the mean annual atmospheric surface temperature in 
Alaska and Siberia has risen between 2 and 3 degrees Celsius. This warming has been 
particularly salient in the winter and spring (ACIA 2005:992). Along with warming, 
snow and ice features have diminished, there has been an increase in windiness 
(Huntington 2000) and storminess (Hinzman et al. 2005) along the coast, and permafrost 
boundaries have moved north, meaning that previously stable permafrost areas have
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thawed, causing foundation problems for structures in Alaska and problems with erosion 
(ACIA 2005:997).
Third, increased erosion (Hufford and Partain 2005) has led to increased 
vulnerability to flooding (USGOA 2003, 2009; USACE 2006, Smith and Levasseur 
2002) for multiple villages in Alaska. Erosion along coastal areas in the North is 
increasing at greater rates today than in the past due in part to links with increasing 
temperatures (Solomon et al. 1994; Syvitski 2010).
Whether and how these three uncontested facts are connected in Shishmaref is 
less clear. However, the combined effect of these three indisputable circumstances -  (1) 
that Shishmaref will have to relocate because of erosion and flooding; (2) that Alaska and 
the Arctic have had, more than any place on earth (Perovich and Richter-Menge 2009: 
418) demonstrable effects of anthropogenic global warming, including increased erosion 
and increased severity of storms (Hinzman et al. 2005); and (3) that increased erosion and 
flooding events during storms that threaten rural villages are occurring at greater rates 
today than in previous years -  has helped to make Shishmaref a quintessential example of 
environmental migration linked to climate change, and caused researchers and media 
outlets to focus on this small village as an epicenter of the issue -  as a meaningful label 
on the environmental migration map.
In contrast, drought and possible migration linked to drought has been reoccurring 
and linked to environmental conditions not directly attributable to anthropogenic climate 
warming. During the great famine from 1983-1985, millions of people in the Sahel belt 
experienced malnutrition — causing significant, avoidable death (Ibrahim 1988). If there
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have already been environmentally tenuous conditions in the Sahel Belt, what can we 
really attribute to climate change? On the other hand, Shishmaref -  like the concept of 
environmental migration itself -  burst onto the scene, providing what seemed like an 
unmistakable example of climate change (the ice is melting!) paired with outcome (the 
people are fleeing!). Shishmaref became an example of what anthropogenic climate 
change meant in real terms, for real people, on the ground. Media representations and 
critical consequences of media exposure are explored in chapter six. What is important to 
understand for now is the backdrop under which this research has unfolded. Shishmaref 
had been a familiar place to myself and other Bering Strait researchers and then, quite 
suddenly, became a place that had been exported to the world’s imagination. This ever 
growing spotlight spurred my own interests (and suspicions) about the narrative being 
created about Shishmaref and its link to climate change.
1.4 Climate Change as Discourse
The public, media, and academic surge in interest about environmental migration 
and about Shishmaref co-exists with growing public awareness and public debates about 
climate change. This dissertation engages the complexities of multiple climate change 
discourses: the bio-physical realities of warming, what we collectively attribute to the 
bio-physical realities of warming, policy frameworks and attention, government funded 
research agendas, and academic program directives that contextualize and define ‘climate 
change. ’ In Shishmaref, flooding, erosion, vulnerability and relocation are all aspects of 
the climate change debate, and therefore this research must acknowledge and engage the
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climate change literature, even if, as Owen Mason suggests, a changing climate may not 
be the primary driver of erosion, flooding, and migration in Shishmaref (Mason et al. in 
press).
Climate change is a large and unwieldy pair of words that incorporate an 
inexhaustible set of bio-physical and ecological phenomena, as well as an equally 
inexhaustible set of values, ethics, policy recommendations and agendas -  all set in 
motion for the purposes of solving a dire humanitarian crisis and/or to promote agendas 
completely wwrelated to the dire humanitarian crisis. As with any disaster, there are 
people poised to leverage crises to promote personal agendas and influence policy 
(Scanlon 1988). The remainder of this section provides a brief introduction to how 
climate change interacts with environmental migration, and how Shishmaref fits into this 
ever-evolving history. Climate change is specifically highlighted as a discourse. This 
framing is not meant to suggest that anthropogenic climate change is only a socially 
constructed phenomenon -  merely that climate change enters into social life through 
engagement with small- and large-scale discourses.
As information and data on climate change entered the public sphere, climate 
change discourses likewise came into being (Hulme 2008; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006). 
By discourse we mean the identification of subject, agents of knowledge, norms of 
speech and acceptable concepts and theories that constitute any topic (Foucault 1972, 
1977; Woolgar 1986; Marino and Schweitzer 2009); in other words, the rules and rules of 
authority over what we call ‘climate change. ’ The academic, political and public
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discourses that have emerged following these growing knowledge sets, experiences, and 
ecological threats have been stunning in their scope, difference, and contentiousness.
Climate change discourses are divisive. In 1997, the United States Senate passed a 
resolution to veto any bill that put caps on green-house gas emissions, and following, the 
US and Australia refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol. These decisions set the stage for a 
political imbroglio that dichotomized climate change camps into ‘believers vs. deniers’ 
and ‘intervention vs. inaction.’ Incidents such as ‘climategate’ (Nerlich 2010), growing 
accusations of American and Canadian politicians as anti-science (Krugman 2011;
Stewart 2011), and the Danish text leak during the United Nations Framing Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, which called for increased power to 
economically powerful countries (Vidal 2009), have all exhibited the emergence of 
distinct discourses with different vernaculars, different ethical guidelines, and different 
agendas. These competing discourses each sought and continue to seek validation -  
through both scientific evidence and public consensus.
Candis Callison has designated the dominant domain among climate change 
discourses as the science-policy-media discourse, reflecting the powerful consortium of 
actors under whose direction the overriding discourses of climate change unfold (Callison 
2010:11) and under whose direction the rules and norms for the ‘climate change 
discourse’ are devised. There are, of course, other climate change narratives, including 
the narratives about climate change that unfold in Shishmaref itself. But in national and 
international arenas backed by the legitimacy of formalized institutions (the United 
Nations (UN), nation-states, universities, widely distributed newspapers and media
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programs), the science-policy-media discourse is unfolding and solidifying (while not 
singular), and creating information and knowledge for an engaged public.
Important in the science-policy-media climate change discourse is the ‘call to 
action’ (Gills 2008). This call for action includes two types of intervention policies. The 
first type of policy, and the one that has garnered the most attention through the Kyoto 
Protocol, is climate change mitigation. Climate change mitigation policies are directed 
towards stopping climate change from occurring and temperatures from (further) 
increasing -  by capping green house gas emissions at the level of the nation-state, 
creating carbon markets, promoting green energy, and protecting carbon sinks through 
healthy forests, among other strategies (Rogner et al. 2007). The second type of climate 
change intervention policy promotes intervention aimed at giving aid to those already 
experiencing the consequences of climate change and those who would experience 
climate change in the future (Caney and Bell 2011; Adger 2003a; Adger et al. 2006; 
Meams and Norton 2010; Baer 2006; Bronen 2009; Humphreys 2010; Posner and 
Sunstein 2008). Climate change adaptation policies aim at equitably distributing burdens 
of climate change by offering aid for adaptation planning, outcome prevention, and 
outcome relief in the event that environmental conditions linked to climate change cause 
significant damage to communities.
In order to provide aid to people who needed to adapt, the outcomes of climate 
change were important to identify and map. This research agenda became particularly 
impassioned as research began to demonstrate that the most dramatic climate change 
disasters would likely occur to already vulnerable and impoverished populations in the
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developing world. As scholars looked for test case studies to examine how climate 
change will affect communities, the Arctic appeared to be a particularly well suited 
geographic region for testing outcomes, given the early warming happening in the North. 
As environmental migration received increased attention as a critical outcome of climate 
change, an environmental migration case study linked explicitly to anthropogenic 
warming was important to research. Within these scientific circumstances, Shishmaref 
became particularly suited as a case study for the science-policy-media climate change 
narrative.
Anthropogenic climate change is occurring and the effects of warming across 
short, medium, and distant time-scales warrant political, personal, and collective concern 
and intervention. The Arctic as a land of ice, and the Inupiat as a people that rely on that 
ice, are legitimately threatened by the warming projected in recent models (Dow and 
Downing 2007:37). This is one clear reason why Inupiaq leaders have been at the 
forefront of the climate change debate (Callison 2010:11). An editorial by Neil Adger 
entitled: The Right to Be Cold (2003b), is a commentary that specifically points to high 
latitude cultures as particularly threatened by wide-scale warming.
For the purposes of this dissertation, however, we return to Shishmaref. Is 
Shishmaref really the ‘canary in the coal mine’ for climate change disaster? Is the 
environment changing so quickly that it is overwhelming local adaptation strategies? Is 
Shishmaref vulnerable because of green house gas emissions into the atmosphere by 
industrialization? What makes Shishmaref, in particular, vulnerable to these climatic 
changes?
12
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1.5 Shishmaref, Alaska: The Familiar
Shishmaref, Alaska is a small Inupiaq community in western, coastal Alaska that 
sits on Sarichef Island just off the coast of the Seward Peninsula between the Shishmaref 
Inlet and the Chukchi Sea (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2 Map, photograph, Shishmaref and Sarichef Island 
The village has a population of between 563 residents (US census) and 609 residents 
(Tony Weyiouanna, ex-transportation coordinator and relocation activist). Acutely rural, 
Shishmaref is located in the very center of Inuit subsistence hunting practices and animal 
migration routes, but is spatially isolated from the rest of the world. Small planes and 
infrequent barges are the only way to transport both goods and people in or out of the
(
village. Travel through traditional hunting and picking territories, over tundra, ice, rivers 
and the ocean, are done using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), snow machines, and small 
motorboats. Increased windiness (Huntington 2000) and storminess (Hinzman et al.
2005), increased erosion (USGOA 2003, 2009) and diminished sea ice threaten the low- 
lying island with habitual flooding. As significant, ocean side bluffs continue to erode, 
the possibility of a life-threatening disaster that renders the island uninhabitable 
increases.
As flooding events increase, Shishmaref residents face two distinct possibilities. 
They must either successfully petition government agencies and/or private donors to fund 
the rebuilding of essential infrastructure including an airstrip, a barge landing, and a 
school on nearby, tribally-owned land on the mainland, or they will eventually be forced 
into diaspora, away from traditional homelands before, during, or after a major disaster.
A third option of relocating to nearby, tribally-owned land without government 
aid and/or intervention is unlikely for two reasons. First, the cost of building 
infrastructure in the US Arctic is prohibitively expensive for the small population of 
residents to fund themselves. Second, migration to an area without basic infrastructure is 
unlikely because of dependence on electricity, gas, motorized vehicles, and other non­
local products that mark contemporary life and have since the colonization of western 
Alaska (Berardi 1999).
Shishmaref people, the Kigiqtaamiut, have inhabited the coastal and river 
drainage areas around the island for thousands of years, developing a rich tradition and a 
particular expertise for living in this location. Historically the Kigiqtaamiut food
14
harvesting techniques and adaptation strategies for climate variability and extreme 
weather events have been highly successful in this Arctic landscape (Burch 1998, 2006; 
Koutsky 1981). Beginning in the early 1900s the coastal communities that make up 
today’s Kigiqtaamiut people began to settle more permanently on Sarichef Island with the 
creation of a school, church and post office.
Kigiqtaamiut translates to people of the island, from the stem noun Kigiqtaq 
meaning island, and the suffix miut, meaning ‘the people of.’ Kikiqtaq was also the 
proper name of the island that the village now sits on according to the Kawerak summary 
home page (http://www.kawerak.org/tribalHomePages/shishmaref/index.html). and 
according to friends in Shishmaref. The ‘island-ness’ of Shishmaref dominates daily life 
even as technology and wage labor jobs make their way into the village. Passage on and 
off the island via ATV, boat, or snow machine is possible only when the ice is gone or 
when the ice is firm, creating distinct fall and spring shoulder seasons during which 
people stay primarily on the island and seasons when people are active throughout the 
area, engaged in subsistence activities.
Today, Kigiqtaamiut residents harvest and consume an extensive variety of local 
subsistence foods including bearded seal, spotted seal, caribou, walrus, musk ox, fish (of 
all sorts), berries, and greens (Sobelman 1985; Wisniewski 2011). The location of the 
village is uniquely positioned to take advantage of both land and sea mammals, and as 
Fred Eningowuk said in an interview, “It’s like Shishmaref is in the middle of a circle of 
subsistence” (September 2009).
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The circle metaphor has two uses for Shishmaref residents. First, food is available 
throughout the year -as one resource migrates out of traditional hunting and fishing 
territory, another becomes available. The cyclical turn of the year is full of a variety of 
subsistence foods, meaning literally that before the 1900s (and also, in slightly different 
ways today) hunger was preventable because of the natural patterns of animals, plants, 
and landscapes. The second metaphorical use of the circle of subsistence metaphor is that 
the people of Shishmaref themselves exist within the natural cycle of the area. I was told 
more than once that if the people of Shishmaref abandoned the area, the animals would 
also ‘go away,’ that the landscape would become fallow. In this way too, Shishmaref 
people are in the ‘circle of subsistence’ -  existing inextricably with the plant and animal 
life and the landscapes that they inhabit.
The economy in Shishmaref is a mixture of cash and subsistence economy. 
Employment on the island is limited. Nearly forty-six percent of adults are not in the 
labor force. Most jobs on the island are in government service provision, with the tribe, 
with the school, or with the local medical clinic. The economy is considered heavily 
subsistence based, subsidized by part time employment or transfer payments. Per capita, 
the average income in 2010 was $10,203 and almost twenty-seven percent of all residents 
live below the poverty line. Ninety-five percent of residents are Alaska Native (DCRA 
n.d.).
The other important economic sector in Shishmaref is the creation and exportation 
of Inupiaq art work. Shishmaref is the carving and artistic center of the Bering Strait. 
Small-scale sculptures, jewelry, masks, and carvings of all kinds are produced in
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Shishmaref by older, experienced carvers and by young, informally apprenticed (mostly) 
men. These sculptures and jewelry are made of bone, antler, or ivory and are widely 
distributed throughout the state of Alaska and the world.
Women in Shishmaref are sewing entrepreneurs, known particularly for their use 
of spotted sealskin for mittens, hats, slippers, and gloves, and increasingly hard bottom 
mukluks, though these are mostly kept within the community. Women also make smaller 
textiles, which are sold and/or used as gifts when traveling or when welcoming guests. 
These include sealskin Christmas tree ornaments and small beaded items. Sewn crafts, 
such as slippers and gloves, often incorporate beaded patterns as decoration. Most 
common is the Shishmaref star, an intricately beaded star pattern that is, to the best of my 
knowledge, unique to Shishmaref.
Shishmaref is also the only village in the Bering Strait region to rely heavily on 
the bearded seal or ugruk. This strong tasting seal meat is ubiquitous in the village and 
can be identified by the white 5 gallon buckets located in many people’s kunituk, or arctic 
entryway. The white bucket contains panaaluk -  dried ugruk meat (black meat) that is 
thin with a texture something like beef jerky -  along with other cuts (e.g. stomach, 
intestines) of the ugruk, and is filled with seal oil -  rendered seal blubber that is clear to 
opaque (depending on the quality of blubber and conditions under which it was 
produced) and full of fat and Omega 3 fatty acids that are important for a human diet.
Research suggests that daily intake of seal oil significantly lowers glucose 
intolerance and the pre-conditions for diabetes (Adler et al. 1994:1498). Aside from 
health benefits, locally consuming traditional food, particularly seal oil, is a necessary
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part of expressing local culinary expertise and is cultural performance. The best seal oil is 
kept in the freezer and when spooned on a plate dissolves into a nearly perfectly clear 
pool when it is the highest quality. Seal oil is to Shishmaref what the truffle is to northern 
Italy: delicious, expensive, painstakingly produced, and dependent on a multitude of 
factors to develop the richest flavors and most subtle complexities. Seal oil is a delicacy 
and Shishmaref is both the pinnacle of the art and the place of connoisseurs.
Through carvings, the Shishmaref star, the subsistence harvests and traditional 
foods, and through small idiosyncrasies that are difficult to name, Shishmaref is unique 
on the Seward -  a village sometimes called the black meat capital of the world. The 
endurance of this way of life shared by the Kigiqtaamiut is being threatened by the urgent 
need to relocate because of erosion and the risk of intense flooding that is increasingly 
making the island uninhabitable. The village has been in talks with the state of Alaska for 
at least 34 years about relocation. These discussions have yet to result in a comprehensive 
plan for relocation and a 2009 report declared that little progress has been made on 
comprehensive planning and/or implementation for the relocation of most villages, 
including Shishmaref (USGAO 2009). The following chapters will explore what is 
happening in Shishmaref today regarding vulnerability, experience and relocation.
1.5 An Ethnography of Vulnerability
Ultimately, the goals of this dissertation are: (1) to identify the key variables that 
contribute to Shishmaref residents’ vulnerability to flooding and erosion; and (2) to 
consider what this vulnerability may mean for the future of the Kigiqtaamiut. In pursuit
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of these objectives, this research emphasizes local experiences of vulnerability to climate 
change. Local experiences refer to the differentiated perceptions and engagements that 
local residents and other stakeholders have with risks, with adaptation strategies, with 
individual and communal resiliency and responsibility, with the media attention, and with 
American Indian/ Alaska Native politics -  historically and contemporarily which 
constitute the experience of vulnerability.
The Shishmaref case study is presented in seven chapters, including this 
introduction. These chapters are meant to offer a holistic analysis of vulnerability through 
theoretical frameworks, ethnographic data, historical information, archeological and 
engineering reports, the mounds of gray literature that relocation planning has created, 
and personal reactions and observations. The following is a summary of what to expect.
In chapter two I discuss the methods used to address the research objectives 
outlined above. This chapter explains the time I spent in Shishmaref, spanning a three- 
part personal history of engagement, from local newspaper reporter, to contracted Army 
Corps of Engineer researcher, to PhD student. Chapter two will also include a section on 
multi-sited ethnographies and a section examining the reflexivity of knowledge creation -  
particularly relevant for a location such as Shishmaref, where extensive media coverage 
and research attention has carved a network o f ‘expert’ interviewers for outsiders. I 
briefly describe the methodological toolkit employed, including interviews, ethnography 
and survey -  and some challenges that arose out of these methods.
Chapter three addresses the question, ‘to what is Shishmaref vulnerable?’ This 
chapter begins by delineating core conceptual frameworks of vulnerability from the
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existing literature. Here we also offer definitions of disaster and hazard. Chapter three 
examines how the literature informs the Shishmaref case study by positioning disasters 
within a theoretical framework that understands vulnerability as existent within a 
complex web of social and ecological conditions. Positioning the Shishmaref case study 
within the anthropology of disaster and vulnerability literature makes climate change 
induced migration legible as an ethnographic study in anthropology, and, most 
importantly, gives meaning to the grounded experiences of vulnerability.
In the end, chapter three outlines what residents in Shishmaref are vulnerable to -  
this develops the concept of vulnerability from being specifically linked to flooding (a 
hazard) to being linked to the outcomes of flooding, including physical consequences 
(drowning, exposure, death) and social consequences (diaspora, increased poverty and 
landlessness, social disarticulation, and cultural and linguistic hegemony). These 
outcomes will finally be linked to immobility -  and the ‘infrastructure trap’.
Chapter four looks at the nexus of climate and history -  which combine to create 
the infrastructure trap. This chapter begins by comparing and examining local 
perspectives of climate change data with climate change outcome data in the literature. 
Following this chapter engages Owen Mason’s claims that climate change is not a 
significant factor for erosion in Shishmaref.
Chapter four goes on to examine how and why the built, mostly immobile, 
physical infrastructure of Shishmaref came to exist in this particular location that, 
subsequently, is exposed to flooding and creates hazard and risk. This chapter describes 
immobility as it comes to exist through time within an historical context that includes
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colonial projects and ideologies of the state and examines how development and 
vulnerability are intertwined -  both theoretically and through archeological work on 
mobility, labor, and skill.
Chapter five outlines the responses to vulnerability in Shishmaref, and Shishmaref 
residents’ experiences of governance and intervention. Following chapter four’s 
investigation of the history of development, this chapter looks at the processes of 
adapting to risks now present in and around that development. This chapter presents data 
on local perceptions of risk and perceptions of governance through a mixture of survey, 
interview, and ethnographic data. This chapter also examines the relationships 
Shishmaref residents have had with the media and the press. Ethnographic data presented 
in this chapter suggests that engaging the media is a local adaptation strategy -  one that 
exists to offset vulnerabilities particular to very small, extremely rural populations, such 
as those rural Inupiaq communities in Alaska. Engaging the ‘media circus’ has its own 
critical consequences.
Chapter six uses ethnographic and interview data to explain what local residents 
consider important factors in the relocation process -  focusing primarily on the local 
value put on subsistence practices as a method of reducing vulnerability. Using the 
concept of tenacity, we explore how and why subsistence and subsistence traditions play 
such an important role in the relocation discussion -  and how local residents make a case 
for remaining on traditional land instead of relocating to a more urban environment or 
merging with another village.
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In conclusion, this dissertation will argue that Shishmaref is vulnerable to a 
complex mix of social and ecological shifts occurring simultaneously, and that a 
grounded understanding of vulnerability to climate change is complex, multi-faceted, and 
exists as an ethical problematic in multiple ways. This dissertation will describe how 
vulnerability is intertwined with colonial histories, is exacerbated and abated in 
representations with government power brokers, is incorporated into daily decision­
making, is reified in narratives for outsiders, and finally how vulnerability is mitigated 
with great tenacity and local resiliency exercised through extraordinary flexibility in 
response to change.
Shishmaref, it turns out, is an epicenter of climate change research for social 
scientists because it has become an epicenter of climate change attention. The social life 
of climate change plays out in Shishmaref. The discourses created at multiple scales of 
governance, in the media, among researchers, and among residents is a study in how we 
deal with disasters and disasters that have the cache of climate change about them. 
Shishmaref and the changes in Shishmaref are extraordinary to residents, observers, and 
outsiders alike. These changes are also familiar to an indigenous culture that is and has 
been in constant negotiations for the right to exist.
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Chapter Two: Methods and Knowledge Making
2.1 Methods
This project was sponsored by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 
0713896 in conjunction with the larger projected Moved by the State: Perspectives on 
Relocation and Resettlement in the Circumpolar North (MOVE). MOVE is an 
international effort to understand relocation issues over time throughout the Arctic. My 
research allowed MOVE participants to examine a relocation effort oriented towards the 
future -  an unusual glimpse into relocation planning in process.
The data for this project was accumulated through a series of visits to Shishmaref 
that span a personal history of ten years, including 3 (4 to 6 week) field work sessions in 
the village that occurred between 2008 and 2010. During the time that this research took 
place I also engaged in person or via phone with state and bureaucratic agency workers 
during meetings of the Immediate Action Working Group (IAWG), a joint working group 
of state and federal agencies including the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of 
Commerce, Community and Economic Development, the Department of Natural 
Resources, the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, the Denali 
Commission, and the Department of Homeland Security, among others . These 
interactions involved discussion of Shishmaref risk reduction and/or relocation, 
examination of gray literature and media representations of Shishmaref, and participation 
in expert dialogue relevant to Shishmaref at national and international climate change 
meetings.
The research methods I employed ranged from conducting surveys and formal 
interviews to orchestrating informal discussions, recording life histories, making 
ethnographic observations in bureaucratic meetings and science/policy expert meetings, 
and analyzing accumulated gray literature, online news stories, and film documentaries.
In total I collected over 40 formal interviews, 30 surveys, 2 multi-day interview life 
histories (UAF Institutional Review Board protocol #07-10), and numerous pages of 
ethnographic field notes taken in a variety of settings, including IAWG meetings, United 
Nations University symposia on global environmental migration (these were some of the 
earliest meetings focused on environmental migration linked to climate change) with 
environmental migration scholars and politicians, and the Indigenous Peoples Summit on 
Climate Change. Research for this dissertation officially commenced in the fall of 2007 
and concluded with my final fieldwork session in Shishmaref during the summer of 2010.
This research is firmly situated in the tradition of ethnography, but with an 
understanding that today, ethnography “plays a complex and shifting role in the dynamic 
tapestry that is 21st century social science” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983:2). This is 
ethnography as a process of determined and focused observation of a subject and the way 
that subject is engaged in formal and informal settings. This research is not an 
ethnography of the Inupiat in Shishmaref. Rather, it is an ethnography of risk and 
vulnerability that occurs in a specific geographic location (Sarichef Island) to mostly 
Kigitaamiut people -  whose Inupiaq-ness is inseparable from, but not the primary subject 
of, this research.
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Today relocation is the focus of most adaptation efforts in Shishmaref. Relocation 
in and of itself does not create vulnerability -  and relocation has been a successful 
adaptation strategy for humans encountering ecological shift for millennia. Forced 
migration in the 20th century, however, has led to a multitude of social, cultural and 
economic hardships of migrating populations, particularly indigenous populations 
(Cemea 1996, 2000, 2002). With these complexities of relocation in mind, it became 
apparent early on in this project that a methodology had to accommodate describing the 
processes and experiences of localized vulnerability and risk among the Kigiqtaamiut — 
without assuming relocation was necessarily a ‘bad’ thing (a maladaptive strategy) or a 
‘good’ thing (an adaptive one).
This strategy is particularly important when working with indigenous populations. 
Appadurai warns that anthropologists have a tendency to ecologically conjoin indigenous 
people to the landscape through either a “language of incarceration” (Appadurai 1988:37) 
or through implicit assumptions about the ‘naturalness’ of indigenous people’s tie to 
place (Appadurai 1988; Gupta and Ferguson 1992). Thus, the methodological approach 
sought to take into consideration the experience of Kigiqtaamiut desire, in some cases, to 
remain on the island, and to mourn the loss of home, without conflating ‘nativeness’ with 
‘rootedness,’ or the Kigiqtaamiut with Sarichef Island.
The methodology also had to investigate and describe the importance of place 
among Kigiqtaamiut people, examine relationships with landscapes that may be 
fundamentally different than Western conceptions of place and place-making (Kingston 
and Marino 2009), and understand how these relationships determine culturally
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appropriate adaptation possibilities in response to flooding and erosion. Unlike the 
interdeisciplinary literature on climate change, migration, and disaster -  which marked 
the bulk of theoretical framing for this research - I  looked to important Northern 
anthropologists such as Paul Nadasdy and Tim Ingold to frame complex, culturally- 
specific worldviews on the sociality between animals, landscape, and humans. 
Understanding place and engagement with place was a fundamental aspect of this work -  
and many interview questions and ethnographic moments attended to the way people 
discussed the landscape in and around Shishmaref. These discussions framed social- 
ecological engagement in a much different way from the disaster and climate change 
literature -  though these discussions were very consistent with the way Northern 
anthropologists discuss human engagement with the environment.
To understand the experiences of place and of traditional territory without 
assuming the conflation of the Kigiqtaamiut with Sarichef Island, it was important to 
investigate the past, the present and the future, both through current interviews as well as 
past research literature. By positioning this relocation in a longer history -  and into the 
future of the Kigiqtaamiut -  it was possible to understand place-making and connection 
to place over time without assuming a naturalness between the Inupiat in Shishmaref and 
the land on which they currently stand.
The research methodology also needed to frame and describe national and 
international discussions on environmental migration and climate change -  which in 
many cases were very different than local discussions. In national and international 
conversations about environmental migration and climate change, Shishmaref residents
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were active participants, not only as members of a local population at risk, but also as 
global citizens (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012), carbon emitters, and indigenous activists. In 
these conversations, climate change and environmental migration are understood as 
products of global systems that are highly abstract, yet Shishmaref residents embody and 
bear witness to outcomes of these systems that are highly concrete (e.g. intensive erosion 
and flooding). In other words, the methodology had to frame vulnerability as a dilemma 
caused by anthropogenic climate change, which itself is a product of industrialization, 
constituted historically from industrialized Europe and North America, that increasingly 
causes a rise in global temperatures (Dow and Downing 2007:39) and is a precipitating 
factor in increasing rates of Arctic ‘erosion’ (Hinzman et al. 2005:264). Simultaneously, 
vulnerability had to be framed in terms of the erosion that occurs when the bluff in Figure 
2.1, meets the storm in Figure 2.2 and threatens the house in Figure 2.3 with flooding.
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Figure 2.1: Bluff erosion in Shishmaref (Photo courtesy o f Tony Weyiouanna)
Figure 2.2: Weather map 2011 “super storm” (Photo National Weather Service “Bering 
Strait Superstorm” 11/09/2011)2
2 In the fall of 2011 the Seward Peninsula braced for a large storm that threatened most 
villages on the Peninsula with flooding. The storm did cause damage to fishing racks and 
other infrastructure in Shishmaref, but the prevailing winds were not from the southeast, 
making the storm surge much less impactful than it may have been if the winds had 
shifted.
Figure 2.3: The end of the sea wall / a house in Shishmaref (Photo by Elizabeth Marino) 
The conflation of the local and the global, the abstract and the concrete, is a tension 
present throughout this dissertation, beginning in the current methods section.
A mixed-methods platform was clearly the most effective manner of 
apprehending these distinct discourses and the points at which these discourses co-exist 
within one person, event, or experience. By listening to Tony Weyiouanna speak at the 
Indigenous Peoples Summit on Climate Change, in an IAWG meeting with Alaskan 
residents, to his peers and family at a local Shishmaref Relocation Coalition meeting, and 
at home with his wife Fanny about his life story, much deeper insights were obtained into 
what the experiences of vulnerability are and how they accumulate. This process of data 
collection impressed upon me the extent to which the dialog between locally specific 
vernaculars and meanings and the meanings that arise out of global discourses are in
constant negotiation (internally and externally) and can often require a complicated 
process of translation (Callison 2010).
The following discussion on methodologies lays out a personal history of 
engagement with Shishmaref, and then provides a more theoretical discussion of multi­
cited methods. I move on to discuss the challenges of conducting an ethnography of 
vulnerability in Shishmaref- while still engaging actors and discourses that affect risk, 
but are far removed from the location of risk. Finally, I consider some of the 
methodological consequences of Shishmaref s engagement with the media, and conclude 
by discussing this work in the context of the larger research project in which it was 
conceived.
2.2 A Personal History of Engagement
It has been 10 years since I first visited Shishmaref -  first as a newspaper reporter 
and Seward Peninsula resident, later as a hired researcher, and finally as a PhD student. If 
part of an anthropologist’s authority rests on familiarity, then this extended history is 
particularly suited for an anthropological study, though I do not claim full cultural 
competency in Shishmaref -  in local vernacular or social experience. Instead, what is 
most helpful about having an extended history of engagement with the Seward Peninsula 
and Shishmaref as I conducted interviews, surveys, and ethnography was circumstantially 
shared values, social networks, and experiences.
I, too, played basketball in the Iditarod tournament in 2002, when the Shishmaref 
women’s team won the tournament. “I remember you -  you played for Bering Air” - 1
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was told early on in this research project. I, too, knew Rita Buck from White Mountain, a 
traveling mid-level medical clinician on the Seward Peninsula. I already knew that 
women had to go to Nome a month before they had a baby and that elders got free lunch 
at the XYZ center. I already knew what to do with (and already enjoyed) seal oil, and 
understood that it’s good to bring baked goods when you visit someone. I had been to 
Pilgrim Hot Springs, if not Serpentine, and ate blueberries with sugar and sometimes 
milk -  if caribou fat mixed with white fish (agutuk) weren’t available. I knew (and 
appreciated) the good spots for salmon berries outside of Teller. I knew, not just 
idiomatically, but also experientially, what people were talking about when they said, 
‘good water’, ‘clean air’, and ‘dry fish’. I already felt at home in the tundra, without trees, 
on snow machines, in houses with no running water. I could do a sink of dishes using as 
little water as possible, sing at least one Inupiaq church song, and sew felt onto fabric for 
banners at church service.
Before this research project formally began, I had a family -  whose matriarch my 
daughter calls grandma -  to stay with, key interviews I knew I was going to conduct, a 
place to work in the church basement, and an understanding of who, regardless of job 
title, was actually active on relocation issues. I knew the possibly complicated dynamics 
between regional nonprofits and local tribal councils and I knew that to avoid conflict 
some of my questions about these dynamics could not be answered. In other words, my 
cultural learning curve for studying vulnerability in Shishmaref -  while surprising, 
informative, and meaningful -  was less steep because of my prior cultural experience.
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2.2.1 2001-2002
From fall 2001 through December 2002,1 worked as a newspaper reporter in 
Nome, Alaska, the service hub for the Seward Peninsula, and traveled to Shishmaref 
three times to report on newsworthy stories. The most important trip was to cover a vote 
Shishmaref residents held to gauge consensus on relocating to the mainland (an 
overwhelming majority voted in favor of relocation). This was my first exposure to the 
people, advocates, and challenges to relocating. Having this historical depth to my 
experience of the Shishmaref relocation was crucial to this research. Not only did it foster 
deeper and more personal relationships with individuals in the community, it also 
allowed me to experience how relocation discourses change over time, and how authority 
shifts among actors, while leaving an imprint of that engagement.
In 2002, one of the most outspoken relocation advocates was a Kawerak 
employee named Julie Baltar. By 2012 no one outside of Shishmaref and Kawerak 
remembers Baltar as being a critical actor in the Shishmaref relocation, and yet she is 
ultimately the reason the Kawerak transportation coordinator is the point person for state 
and federal agency workers concerning Shishmaref relocation. Baltar herself and her role 
in relocation is not as important to understand as is this process of different actors 
expressing opinions, maneuvering funding, strategizing about relocation and risk 
reduction, and then moving on -  while leaving an imprint of their actions on future 
actions that reduces and/or exacerbates vulnerability and/or progress. For researchers or 
agency workers who interact with Kigiqtaamiut people for one year or one season, this 
shifting formulation and definition of problems and solutions are invisible -  instead the
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problem and solutions seem overwhelmingly static. The time-depth I had of engagement 
with the issue of relocation in Shishmaref revealed the dynamism of defining and 
redefining problems and solutions.
2.2.2 2004-2006
From 2004-2006,1 participated in two different research projects in which 
Shishmaref was a field site and during which I spent time and effort conducting 
interviews and ethnographic observation. The first research project was a multi­
disciplinary project that investigated the intersection of water, climate, and humans in the 
Arctic. The goals of this project were to record traditional use of fresh water and fresh 
water use changes over time through ethnographic fieldwork and interviews. I visited 
Shishmaref twice for this project and began to establish more robust friendships during 
this time.
From 2004-2006,1 also participated in a research project sponsored by the Army 
Corps of Engineers. This project explicitly dealt with the relocation of Shishmaref and 
produced a final report entitled: The Collocation Cultural Impact Assessment (Schweitzer 
and Marino 2006). The purpose of this research and report was to gauge the cultural 
implications of relocating the entire population of Shishmaref into the larger hub 
communities of Nome or Kotzebue. I was second author on the final report for the US 
Army Corps of Engineers and conducted and analyzed most of the interviews in 
Shishmaref for the report. In total I conducted or helped to conduct 48 interviews with 54 
people in Shishmaref. I took multiple trips to Shishmaref during this period for up to 3
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weeks at a time. It was during this research project that I met and made friends with the 
Stasenko family. Richard Stasenko is a Native Ohioan, who moved to Shishmaref to 
teach in the 80s. Rachel Stasenko is Inupiaq, from Shishmaref, with a relatively large 
family. They have three daughters and two sons. One son is Rachel’s biological son and 
Rich’s stepson. The three daughters, Mary Huntington, Stacey Paniptchuk, and Kate 
Kokeok are more or less my age, and Stacey and Kate have become very close friends. 
Kate married John Kokeok from Shishmaref and I hung out at their house with some 
frequency while I was in the village when in need of an age-cohort of social life. At 
Rachel and Rich’s house, I felt like a daughter. Ultimately, the Stasenkos were my home 
base for continued research in Shishmaref. These were the people whom I lived with, 
with whom I vetted interview and survey questions, and who brought me into familial 
social networks. My relationship with the family remains strong -  and I’ve sent them 
ethnographic accounts to read through and ensure accuracy.
Our research for the US Army Corps found that there would be significant 
negative cultural and social consequences from relocating Shishmaref residents into 
Nome or Kotzebue. This became important to at least one of my close contacts in 
Shishmaref. This contact’s continued help throughout this project and his friendship were 
a product of his belief that Dr. Schweitzer and I had “helped save Shishmaref from 
Nome.”
The Collocation Cultural Impact Assessment contributed to the formation of my 
initial ideas about a dissertation project on vulnerability and risk. It became clear to me
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throughout my early field experiences that vulnerability, risk, and response in Shishmaref 
were extraordinarily complicated and multi-faceted.
2.3 Personal Experience as Authority
Personal experience as the granting principle of authority for anthropologists and 
ethnographers can be as problematic as it is historical (Clifford 1983). Experience does 
not ensure an accurate, emic interpretation of social events. Interpretation of ethnographic 
field notes is also problematic, as Clifford points out, because interpretation flattens 
dialectic events that happen in real time into remembered texts -  that weeks, months or 
years later are then reinterpreted into research statements of fact, erasing the dialectic 
creation of information (Clifford 1983:133). What the previous account of personal 
experience granted me in relation to this research project was: a) exposure to cultural 
vernaculars, which allowed me to create meaningful questions for interviews and 
surveys; b) exposure to and the building of social networks, allowing me to begin data 
collection immediately; and c) an authentic personal connection to a discrete set of items, 
people, and experiences rooted in the Seward Peninsula, to which many Shishmaref 
residents also had a personal connection.
This personal background provided support for developing my research questions 
and interviewing style, and maintaining social connections in the village. To keep the 
dialectic -  the intersubjectivity of knowledge creation -  integral to my research, I focused 
a great deal of my time around recorded interviews -  not just ethnographic field notes, 
though I did use both methodologies. This personal history was very helpful in
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conducting research in Shishmaref -  but this research project was not located only in 
Shishmaref, as the next section highlights.
2.4 Multi-Sited Ethnography
This research was multi-sited. Outside of a lab, anthropology projects are always, 
in some sense, multi-sited -  observations are carried out in a friend’s kitchen, another 
friend’s boat, at fish camp, in the country. When these sites fail to fall within one village, 
one city, or one city block, then they are more particularly identified as ‘multi-sited.’ This 
research is multi-sited because key ethnographic observations came from outside of the 
village of Shishmaref (Anchorage, Oxford, UK, Hohenkammer, Germany), in larger 
social-networks where key research participants or myself traveled -  and in places where 
vulnerability to flooding and erosion, environmental migration, and climate change 
discourses were being formed.
Conducting multi-sited ethnography is consistent with a trend in anthropology to 
decouple particular cultural groups from traditional homelands or places where the group 
has resided (Gupta and Ferguson 1992); and to explore social phenomena as a product of 
global systems of power, distribution, and cultural production (Marcus 1995). Gupta and 
Ferguson describe the process of coupling people with place as a bias in anthropology to 
bounded, geographically determined, spaces and cultures. The product of this spatial 
assumption, they argue, has been the practice of rooting people, and producing -  
particularly among indigenous populations -  a naturalized notion of a people and a 
homeland (Gupta and Ferguson 1992:11), as mentioned earlier. It was particularly
important to employ multi-sited research for this ethnography of vulnerability in order to 
avoid describing a ‘naturalized’ rootedness among Kigiqtaamiut people. Multi-sited 
research in this case, allowed me to see Shishmaref residents present their own 
impressions of relocation and vulnerability to outsiders (an important tool for 
understanding vulnerability experiences) and allowed me to witness local advocates 
engaging and speaking with non-Shishmaref audiences -  demonstrating bicultural 
fluency of residents outside of the village and decoupling in my own experiences and 
imagination of my Shishmaref friends as rooted to place.
Methods and theory became rapidly intertwined in this project as I set out to 
investigate Shishmaref as a homeland that community members both resist and advocate 
leaving. The romanticization of a homeland as a land left, is common. Gupta and 
Ferguson state, “remembered places have often served as symbolic anchors of 
community for dispersed people” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992:11). As a research project 
conducted before dispersal, but with the threat of dispersal immanent, there were 
uncommon ethnographic moments in which to critique and explore the notion of place as 
being, essentially land-based (rooted), practice-based (habit), or imaginative and 
symbolic (nostalgic) -  and in Shishmaref, all of these constructions of place circumscribe 
vulnerability and adaptation.
The landscape itself, the bluffs, the water line, the physicality of earth and 
permafrost, all take on preeminent importance in Shishmaref because these physical 
geographies create risk and vulnerability for Shishmaref residents. At the same time the 
symbolic interpretations of Shishmaref people and landscape will also affect experiences
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for residents. Most stakeholders -  both inside and outside the village -  agree that 
solutions to rising water, erosion of earth, and rising temperatures, depend in part on 
large-scale discussions made at multiple bureaucratic scales. These conversations happen 
among people, the majority of whom will never see the bluffs, the water line, the 
physicality of earth and permafrost on Sarichef Island. Vulnerability for these decision­
makers and power brokers is particularly dependent on the exported, symbolic creation of 
the island and its inhabitants. It was therefore important for me to follow some of these 
conversations and the symbolic interpretations of the lands, bluffs, and permafrost.
Using a methodology designed to understand how systems of power affect a 
particular location is not new in anthropology. Multi-sited ethnography is a trend 
described best by George Marcus (1995), and earlier with co-author Michael Fisher 
(Marcus & Fischer 1986). Multi-sited ethnography assumes that the delineation of any 
field of inquiry by geographical space is more or less arbitrary. Marcus’s argument for 
multi-sited ethnography is systems driven. He was interested in capitalist political 
economy and its influence over small societies. His important 1995 analysis of the 
methodology comes out of research conducted in the 1980s (1995:95), as anthropologists 
became increasingly interested in the effects of powerful, global, economic, cultural, and 
political systems’ influence in and over diverse groups of people around the world -  
including those that were previously considered ‘isolated.’ As the world became smaller, 
the interconnectedness between disparate groups and ideas, and the power disparities 
among these groups and ideas, gave rise to the need to explore multiple social spaces in 
order to understand consequences on the ground.
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Marcus’s observations about removed seats of power having an effect on local 
communities mimicked contemporary decision-making about vulnerability and risk in 
Shishmaref. It was clear early on that decisions were made in multiple locations and it 
was sometimes unclear which actors were having an influence on government response to 
erosion and flooding. The following is an example of a comment I heard in Shishmaref-  
and the methodological outcome of trailing that comment.
2.4.1 The multi-sited ethnography, an example
July 2008, in Shishmamref
Daniel Iyatunguk, co-chair of the Shishmaref elders council brings up and 
comments about a man named John Woodward -  and a new plan for relocation that 
Daniel had heard of, but doesn’t like. “I read it and it makes it where it’s only their 
decision and I don’t think that’s right.” Iyatunguk went on to insist that keeping decision­
making within the Shishmaref community was essential and that he felt outsiders 
(regional and at the level of the state) should not have more control than local residents. 
This was something repeated frequently in interviews in Shishmaref. I never saw 
Woodward in Shishmaref -  but I know he was accepted and well liked among some 
residents and considered controversial for others. I’m uncertain of his actual influence on 
government agency workers.
October 28, 2008 in Anchorage
In one of the first meetings of the IAWG a working group developed under 
Governor Palin’s Subcommittee on Climate Change, representatives from the Army
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Corps of Engineers, the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA, were all in 
attendance, as were a handful of casual observers. John Woodward is also in attendance 
and listed (as am I) in the meeting minutes as an ‘interested member of the public.’ In 
general, most government officials had not visited the villages and were unfamiliar with 
past relocation planning. During the meeting there was significant speculation about what 
would work and what wouldn’t work -  and collective congratulations that the state and 
the feds had, unusually, come together to solve a complex problem. There were at least 
two village residents present -  but no one was there from Shishmaref.
Steve Ivanoff, a Kawerak representative from Unalakleet talked about the 
flooding that happened in his village that year. How members of his community had to 
look up how to declare a disaster -  how they Googled ‘declaring disaster’ as the water 
was coming up and into town. Ivanoff had a slide show of his community, of what the 
landscape looked like, of how it would be possible in Unalakleet to move slowly, 
building one house at a time as they were needed, up to the bluffs where a majority of the 
community was located. Ivanoffs idea of a slow migration was a solution he said would 
work in Unalakleet, even if it wouldn’t work in other communities.
The meeting consisted of formal discussions and brain storming sessions; and 
participants in Anchorage moved through various scenarios: relocating people to hub 
cities, merging a village at risk with another village close by.
John Woodward was a builder who had helped to put triadedic foundations on 
seven houses in Shishmaref, houses that needed to be moved away from the bluffs on the 
ocean side in order to protect them from actually falling off of the cliffs and into the
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water as erosion progressed. Based on his comments in the meeting and on comments 
from Shishmaref residents, Woodward seemed to believe that if he had coordinating 
power to make decisions for Shishmaref and negotiate with the state and the feds on 
behalf of the village, that he could have the village relocated in a couple of years due in 
part to triadetic foundations.
Woodward’s experience and input channeled the conversation among agency 
workers to how to relocate ‘at risk’ communities quickly. For a Ml fifteen minutes the 
idea was thrown around by someone, “why don’t we just move the school? That will get 
people moving their own houses in a hurry.” Woodward agreed that moving critical 
infrastructure could be a catalyst for moving residents.
Seeing Woodward participate in the IAWG meeting gave me insight into how the 
processes of influencing decision-makers can occur. These meetings also made concrete 
the process power brokers go through to create discourses and discussions about 
vulnerability, risk, and risk reduction in Shishmaref. An ethnography of vulnerability in 
Shishmaref would not be complete without a perspective on these off-island meetings 
where Shishmaref and solutions to vulnerability in Shishmaref are discussed and 
imagined -  and where unlikely ‘experts’ such as John Woodward and their solutions are 
considered alongside local Seward Peninsula residents, such as Steve Ivanoff.
2.4.2 Bringing a ‘site’ back into the research
Marcus’s main detractor in the literature is Matei Candea. In the 2007 article, 
“Arbitrary locations: in defense of a bounded field-site,” Candea argues that all research
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projects are arbitrarily ‘bound’ and that location provides a consistent, manageable, and 
clearly communicated boundary from which to explore the goings on within as a coherent 
whole. This provocative article argues that the strength of ethnography is in the rich, 
contextualized detail it offers and which is only available if one limits the field of study. 
Limiting a field of study by location itself is ‘arbitrary,’ but the practice of limiting 
research to a bounded location enables the ethnographer to understand complexity 
inherent in social processes. By pursuing global phenomena around the globe itself, 
Candea argues, the complexity of social phenomena will necessarily be diluted. Location 
coherently binds a research subject, and provides researchers the opportunity to say 
something meaningful about how social processes actually play out on the ground 
(Candea 2007).
As this research project progressed, my desire to explore, interview, survey and 
conduct ethnography in multiple locations waned for the same simple reasons outlined by 
Candea. First, time and subject constraints for any research project must be imposed in 
any case; and second, location is a useful and intemally-coherent method of limiting a 
research subject.
Additionally, the notion of place -  as socially constructed and as a land-base -  
reemerged in the research process as an important aspect o f this project. People and the 
practices that they employ and inscribe in particular landscapes are physically and 
symbolically dependent on place and place making (Basso 1996:7; Amit 2002:7-8) and 
actively resist decoupling (Kingston and Marino 2009) -  in the absolute way suggested 
by Gupta and Ferguson (1992). Kigiqtaamiut people conduct meetings, grant interviews,
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and engage government agencies often in Shishmaref and on Sarichef Island -  with the 
emergent, dynamic relationships between Kigiqtaamiut and the landscape exerting 
particular pressures and social obligations (see chapter six). Particularities of discourse 
and social engagement at all levels of relocation planning became interesting in part 
because they were tied to place.
In order to address the following two facts: 1) that place is a grounding and 
motivating force in determining how people in Shishmaref respond to vulnerability and 
risk; and 2) that decisions are made in multiple locations; I employed multi-sited 
ethnography loosely and in a limited way. I traveled to government and non-profit 
meetings, but did not interview or survey government representatives. I spent time in 
Anchorage, Alaska, at meetings with the IAWG. I also spent a week at the Indigenous 
People’s Summit on Climate Change with Shishmaref relocation activist, Tony 
Weyiouanna. When I was in national and international climate change meetings I would 
take notes on how and when Shishmaref was used, particularly by people who had never 
traveled to Shishmaref, Alaska, or the Arctic, as a case study. Still, and happily, the great 
bulk of this research was conducted in Shishmaref.
2.4.3 Island bound
For the majority of field research I was located in Shishmaref- and I was 
explicitly located in the village, on the island, not traveling significantly to traditional 
subsistence territories either on land, on the sea, or on the river systems. Traditional 
subsistence territory is significantly larger than the island itself.
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My immobility -  the lack of travel throughout traditional subsistence territory is 
particular to this project and is not representative of a great number of Shishmaref 
residents. In fact, one irony in the Shishmaref relocation project is that many residents are 
‘stuck’ on a sinking island, and at the same time residents prize high mobility and 
pragmatically practice high mobility throughout the year. Movement off of the island is a 
constant and ubiquitous part of life in Shishmaref. Travel by snow machine, boat, and 4­
wheeler are constant and, so long as the lagoon is free of ice, or the pack ice is stable 
enough to ride on -  people are on the move.
Because many residents practice high mobility, anthropological work in 
Shishmaref almost always incorporates mainland environments and sea ice environments 
in the field of study, and topics of research are often framed around Ifiupiaq engagement 
with landscape in some way, either through place naming (Fair 1997), hunting practices 
(Wisniewski 2011), ethnobotony (McIntosh 1999), or archeological studies (Mason and 
Gerlach 1995, as an example).
These research projects, which often put high value on traditional ecological 
knowledge (TEK) (though there are problems with the label TEK, see Wisniewski 2011) 
and lifestyles of the past, have a methodological necessity of traveling through the 
landscape. My project and therefore what fit within the scope of ‘field’ was notably more 
limiting.
Stories about traveling through the landscape in Shishmaref are important to local 
residents. In 2004 I traveled to the Serpentine River with the Stasenkos and this is the 
single most referred to event from my time in Shishmaref when I speak with
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Kigiqtaamiut friends. I have spent many, many weeks and months in Shishmaref since 
2004, including Easter, through the birth of a close friend’s daughter, through illnesses, 
death, and church services; yet these 48 hours in the country are the times that my friends 
always refer to. Traveling through the landscape and coming to know the practices that 
people engage in throughout Kigiqtaamiut territory are rites of passage and a 
demonstration of belonging.
My research in Shishmaref became fundamentally island bound for a number of 
reasons. First, I was identified locally as someone interested in flooding and relocation 
and, following, I was funneled into knowledge networks and sites where ‘paper’ work 
and government work was being conducted, or into elders homes who knew about the 
past. My ‘field’ -  dictated as much by local perception as by a research plan -  was in the 
living rooms of local elected leaders, in the homes of elders who knew about change, in 
the church basement where city offices are housed, and other locales where bureaucratic 
work and organization occurs, or among traditional decision-makers. This identification 
of spaces where relocation planning occurs demonstrates local perceptions of relocation 
and adaptation planning and its position within the formal and informal political structure 
of the village. This was very important. In Shishmaref, relocation discourses are highly 
formalized. In casual conversation, I found, relocation planning is divorced in some ways 
from daily activities, including subsistence practices. When I was a person in Shishmaref 
‘doing research on relocation’ it made sense locally for me to be among decision-makers.
One other factor that affected my island-boundedness was that, during my last 
field season in Shishmaref, I was 5-to-7 months pregnant. This was a great pleasure. As a
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researcher traveling to Shishmaref as a childless, 30-something year old woman I was an 
anomaly. Family-less, childless, taking notes, attending meetings, I had made a handful 
of female friends though basketball games and through the Stasenko family; but I 
definitely met, interviewed, and engaged more men than women in Shishmaref -  this is 
associated with the observation above that I was often directed towards elected officials 
or other decision-makers, which, in Shishmaref, tended to be men.
These engagements were relatively formal. When I arrived, pregnant, in my last 
field season there was a stark change in the way I engaged with both men and women. 
This is no doubt the result of both my own changing perceptions and others’ changing 
perceptions of me. I became much more ‘off limits’ to single men -  the people who 
would have typically given me snow machine rides from one end of town to the other and 
who were most likely to be traveling into the country.
Conversely, I was much more interesting to women, particularly women who 
were not actively in the work force, whom I had not had much contact with previously. 
This demographic -  single mothers and married mothers who are not community leaders 
-  are almost invisible in the anthropological literature of the indigenous Arctic 
(exceptions are Lee 2002, and among Yupik women, Morrow 2002, Jolles 1997). 
Standing in line for cake after high school graduation, women would come and talk to me 
about the baby, about how to behave, about how to think, about keeping my mind right 
and not raising my arms above my head, about eating right and eating plenty, about 
whether or not I still drank coffee. These are people who definitely travel into the
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country, but who travel much less than their male counterparts and, during pregnancy, I 
was rooted firmly within this female demographic.
2.5 Ethnography as Humility
Being island-bound and becoming identified as a ‘mother’ created its own 
practices and ethnographic moments. During my last six-week field trip I spent a lot of 
time in kitchens, when I was not conducting formal interviews, baking bread and cooking 
my own traditional foods (Louisiana shrimp, gumbo, etouffee) for others. When I brought 
homemade cinnamon rolls to one local businessman during an interview he said, “Ah, 
you ask questions like an Eskimo.” I overheard another local entrepreneur tell a client, “I 
have this girl who cooks Cajun food for me.”
Considering these dynamics now, I appreciate that one challenge to this project 
was not representing myself as someone who was either pitying residents or someone 
who had all the answers. As the ethnographic example above mentioned, keeping 
decision-making power about relocation in the hands of local authorities was a sensitive 
topic and a very important challenge. All of the journalists and researchers that I met in 
Shishmaref were there for less than a week -  but many of them (certainly not all) had 
very strong opinions about what should be done in Shishmaref.
By becoming “the girl who cooks Cajun food for me,” or “who makes good 
cinnamon rolls,” or bad salmonberry bread, who is becoming a mother, put me into a 
more diminutive position in the community -  and was helpful in avoiding the impression 
that I knew what Shishmaref ought to do. In the highly politicized, public, and vulnerable
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conditions present in Shishmaref, it was important to actively cultivate and demonstrate 
humility. This humility was appropriate for my position. Waiting, cooking, asking 
questions, walking, spending time in kitchens with women who were not wage earners, 
all demonstrated humility. Within these more traditionally female oriented roles there 
existed the possibility of demonstrating patience; of not aggressively testing, questioning, 
or doubting the expertise, knowledge, and authority of relocation experts on the island. 
This position worked well for the research project, but was also an appropriate position 
for someone who does not know the ways and decisions of the community.
Outside of ethnography and participant observation, I also relied heavily on more 
formal modes of research. These more formal interviews and surveys also felt directed in 
part by local expectations. Because this research was about a highly formalized topic, I 
felt local leaders were very comfortable responding to questions in a more formal setting. 
So I chose a suite of research methods which included semi-directed interviews and 
surveys.
2.6 Semi-Directed Interviews
The largest body of research for this project was collected using semi-directed 
interviews. These interviews asked a series of questions about people’s experience of 
place and family history, about past flooding experiences, and visions of the future. 
Research questions were vetted with local participants to assure cross-cultural and 
linguistic accuracy. All interviews were conducted in English, and dialect differences 
were taken into account through the vetting process.
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Research questions ranged from asking participants about the aftermath of past 
flooding events (e.g. Can you describe to me what happened during the flood of 1997?) 
to asking about experiences in government planning meetings (e.g. Is Shishmaref being 
adequately represented to state and federal agencies?). Interview data was transcribed and 
analyzed to identify recurrent themes of experience.
Disasters are emotional topics that are therefore highly sensitive. “It is frequently 
in extreme conditions, particularly those characterized by loss and change, that human 
beings find themselves confronted with difficult existential questions” (Oliver-Smith 
1996:308). Discussing vulnerability and future relocation as response to flooding is 
therefore particularly challenging. These already delicate discussions are even more 
complicated in a cultural context where speaking of the future is linked to hubris (Marino 
et al. 2006) and where most respondents’ cultural scaffolding for addressing the future 
differed from my own. In the end, I asked questions about the future, but did not push for 
answers when an interviewee hesitated to answer explicitly. I accepted the linguistic 
structure with which future-oriented questions were answered or remained unanswered 
by interviewees and friends.
Because people in Shishmaref are often cross-culturally competent many people 
responded to the questions similarly to what I expected when constructing interview 
questions. For example, when I asked about what the future looked like for Shishmaref 
residents, many people, particularly people under the age of 45, responded with 
descriptions of a new village. In other cases, respondents did not respond in ways the
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author expected or respondents avoided questions about the future completely (see 
chapter seven for a discussion).
In one case, a respondent told me that I needed to learn how to talk about the 
future in Shishmaref. While I don’t believe I picked up all the cultural nuances that frame 
discussions about the future in Shishmaref, I felt that asking about the future -  using a 
method of scenario building -  worked well and that I became increasingly comfortable 
and competent at interpreting answers, whether those answers were delivered in the 
discursive forms to which I was accustomed or not.
2.7 Survey
In total I conducted 30 surveys. Five of these I did not analyze because of clear 
miscommunication concerning the numbering system and other difficulties having to do 
with a lack of clarity at the beginning of my survey distribution. In this survey 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a set of attitude 
statements on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Survey 
questions were vetted with local Shishmaref residents to assure cross-cultural clarity. 
Surveys were analyzed with Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).
Surveys are not as common a methodological tool in anthropology as they are in other 
social science fields such as psychology and sociology. Rightly, anthropologists tend to 
be critical of surveys for being overly simplistic, for including measurements of those 
people who feel uninformed, and for constructing situations in which people try to give 
the ‘right’ answer (Launiala 2009; Cleland 1973; Pelto and Pelto 1997). I recognize the
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limitations of conducting surveys. This survey gave a snap shot of correlations that would 
have been meaningless without interviews and ethnographic data. With the interviews 
and ethnographic data, however, I found some survey responses surprising and insightful. 
Anthropologists are uniquely poised to write and interpret meaningful surveys, given 
their often long-term relationships with those being surveyed. These circumstances make 
surveys a profound and useful tool for an anthropologist when selectively employed.
2.8 Sampling
Sampling has been literally overlooked, qualifying as the least ‘sexy’ facet 
of qualitative research. Yet sampling procedures are unique facets within 
any paradigm within which empirical research is pursued. Both inevitable 
and invaluable, these procedures amount to crucial moments within the 
overall research design; moments where the type of contact between 
researcher(s) and information is conceptualized -  to be later embodied 
(Noy 2008:328).
Sampling methods in anthropology are frequently invisible. For this research 
project interview sampling was conducted through what is commonly known as snowball 
sampling, the use of preexisting social networks through which a researcher comes to 
know research participants. Noy argues that this method of sampling incorporates a 
feminist approach to knowledge construction by decoupling knowledge from hegemonic 
stasis -  the false assumptions that knowledge ‘exists’ and the researcher’s job is to
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‘collect’ it. Instead, “snowball sampling relies on and partakes in the dynamics of natural 
and organic social networks” (Noy 2008:329).
Knowledge, under these circumstances, is not a pre-existing ‘item’ for the 
researcher to uncover; but a flexible, changing river of meaning that exists in the dynamic 
between people, as much or more than it resides in a single person. Snowball sampling 
locates the researcher squarely within those social circumstances. She brings with her the 
social capital derived from having spoken with someone located within a particular social 
network and releases power over ‘identifying authority’ to interviewees. Noy asserts, 
“unlike the bulk of sampling procedures and designs, in snowball sampling the researcher 
relinquishes a considerable amount of control over the sampling phase to the informants” 
(2008:332).
In Shishmaref, I recruited interview participants through two social networks. 
First, I interviewed official, mostly elected, political figures. This included members of 
the city government, the tribal government, the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition, and 
people who worked as agency workers within tribal or regional corporations or the city. 
Second, my contacts in Shishmaref referred me to people in town they considered 
knowledgeable about flooding, etc. This often included elders and skilled hunters within 
their families. Third, I interviewed people who were present within my fairly extensive 
social networks. After several trips to the island, cousins and aunts of the family I stayed 
with were curious about my project, and after spending time with them I was curious 
about what they would say. Subsequently, interviews naturally sprung up.
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2.9 The Reification of Expert
As an anthropologist interested in the local, it was important to interview and 
engage local experts. As I asked about who was considered an ‘expert’ in relocation 
issues, flooding, or traditional land use issues, I frequently was routed to people who 
often also showed up in newspaper and magazine stories. This was true when Peter 
Schweitzer and I were interviewing in 2004 and 2005 and true as I continued this 
research. As I observed these ‘experts’ over the years, I began to understand how 
complicated it was to be the locus of information for so many journalists and researchers 
-  and how the ‘expert’ becomes reified in situations where knowledge and narrative are 
being produced in large part for outsiders. The following section explains how this expert 
social-network came to be -  and how I came to walk through it and view it as I was 
conducting this research.
I ‘went to work’ most days in the Lutheran Church basement -  where there was 
internet, a public computer, and always someone sitting around drinking coffee. The 
church basement acts as an office for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staff 
member, Kawerak’s transportation coordinator, and the city grant writer, among others. 
These ‘official’ leaders of the community allowed me to conduct interviews with them 
and directed me to other people in the community with whom to conduct interviews.
As Shishmaref has increasingly hosted journalists, researchers, and filmmakers 
interested in climate change and environmental migration, Shishmaref leaders actively 
guard against the production of incorrect or misreported information. A friend who 
conducted an interview with a journalist who inaccurately identified a flooding event as
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coming from the ocean side of the island instead of the lagoon side was held in-part 
responsible for the misinformation. I witnessed myself and other researchers being 
pointed to specific experts over and over again. This repetition of experts who present 
information about the relocation has informally developed a network of individuals who 
have become adept at discussing Shishmaref relocation with outsiders. By this I mean 
that through habit, experience, and insight, leaders seem to lead outsiders to specific 
individuals in the community who are skilled at telling the story of Shishmaref and 
Shishmaref s likely relocation to the outside world. In this way, leaders exert some 
(subtle) authority over how the Shishmaref narrative is constructed for the media. They 
do this by directing journalists and researchers through a well-worn path of interviewees 
that, in turn, produces a specific, coherent, consistent narrative.
Other researchers have noted that in northern communities there is a high priority 
on the accuracy of specific events and information (Briggs 1991; Morrow 1990). Perhaps 
the development of this reified social-network of experts is an effort to maintain this 
accuracy. The network I am describing is not rigid -  there is significant flexibility -  and, 
throughout my research, autonomy for both the local agents of knowledge and for myself 
as a researcher was respected, so that knowledge production is specific to every 
interaction and can evolve as relationships evolve. However, this semi-formal inscription 
of authority, under the highly unusual conditions of such a small community being thrust 
into an international spotlight, has reified the ‘narrative’ of Shishmaref for outsiders in 
ways that are at least semi-intentional.
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This narrative is important. There is no ‘real’ truth to uncover beyond this 
narrative. As Noy explains, it is in relinquishing power over the next interview to the 
previous interviewee that social scientists are able, in practice, to recognize the social 
embededness and social construction of knowledge in all cases.
However, in Shishmaref there may be alternative truths; or co-existing, socially 
mitigated knowledge that is not situated among this network of experts constructed for 
outsiders. It was important for me to be aware of the various social networks within 
which different types of knowledge and information are embedded. Time in place and 
long-standing friendships in Shishmaref allowed me to experience this reified narrative of 
Shishmaref and experience other co-existing narratives. By heuristically investigating 
sampling methodologies, I became aware of the reflexivity of knowledge creation and 
this opened up new areas of inquiry. Understanding knowledge streams as a function of 
publicity became crucial outcomes of this research and began with interrogating my own 
sampling methodologies.
2.10 Paying Interviewees
For this research I compensated interviewees for their time by giving them a 
monetary gift of $20/hour. In almost all cases interviews lasted between 20 minutes and 
one hour. Survey participants were given $25 for taking a written survey (an oral survey 
option was also offered), and answering a handful of short questions following the 
survey. Some interviewees declined payment.
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While paying participants of research studies has been commonplace in 
psychological and medical research, it is becoming clear that compensation for research 
participants has recently become more common in other social science research (Head 
2009:335). Of paying social science participants, Head writes,
One point is clear -  the use of payments in qualitative research projects 
should be reflexively considered by the social research community, and 
the use of payments in research projects should be moved out of the 
margins and be more hilly discussed in research publications and in the 
ethical guidelines produced by social research associations (2009:336).
As Head suggests, the decision to pay participants creates its own critical 
outcomes, including but not limited to: selecting for people who would benefit most from 
a cash incentive; making the possible power disparity between interviewer and 
interviewee explicit and possibly public; creating the implication that interviewees owe 
something to the interviewer which could lead to the interviewer feeling coerced and 
cause harm (Head 2009:337).
These three possibly negative attributes of paying participants, however, are 
present in non-compensated research interviews as well and researchers can address the 
possibly negative scenarios created by compensation. The researcher can avoid sampling 
issues by being aware of the sampling techniques being used and reflexively identifying 
the outcomes of those techniques. Power disparities between interviewer and 
interviewees are problematic in anthropology regardless of money exchanges. In this 
case, compensation was a relatively small sum. Power, like knowledge, is fluid and
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embedded in social context. This means that often, in Shishmaref, I was powerless in 
some situations and recognized my relative position of power as an outsider, a funded 
researcher, and a scientist in others. To avoid or mitigate the possibility that interviewees 
would feel coerced by compensation, and would therefore admit to or reveal something 
they otherwise would not have, I was explicit in every interview that the interviewee 
could stop the research at any time, without explanation. I allowed people to remain 
anonymous if they so desired; and, as I mentioned above, I never asked a question twice 
or pressed for an answer from interviewees.
There are benefits to compensating participants for their time. First, in many cases 
interviewees were local experts and experts are typically compensated for interviews. 
Second, people’s time and knowledge is valuable and compensation is an outward 
acknowledgement of that inherent value. Third, funded research projects offer 
compensation to the researcher for his/her time and efforts. It is reasonable to redistribute 
part of these funds to interviewees and local experts in any research project that uses 
interviews to collect information, as the research in these cases becomes a joint project. 
Fourth, people in Shishmaref are often relatively poor. Because of this it seems 
reasonable to offer monetary compensation roughly equivalent to the cost of dinner from 
the local store as a meager contribution in exchange for time. Lastly, a stream of 
journalists, government officials, and other researchers have funneled through 
Shishmaref and expect residents of the village to donate their knowledge ad nauseam; 
and residents often do so out of a sincere desire to aid Shishmaref in the relocation 
process and also as a demonstration of politeness to strangers. One simple finding from
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this research was that this constant retelling is difficult work, which becomes highly 
tedious and frustrating to residents. Interviewees’ ability to reap some benefit from giving 
yet another interview was important.
Many interviewees declined compensation; and many others seemed surprised 
and thankful for it. As a general rule of thumb, an individual’s decision to accept or 
decline compensation was correlated with two factors. First, how close a personal 
relationship the interviewer and I had prior to the interview (the closer, the more likely to 
decline) and second, whether or not the interviewer would benefit from compensation 
(the more relative value $20-$25 had, the more likely to accept).
In retrospect, I would not change compensating interviewees for their time. I 
continue to feel that in research projects which do not offer extremely concrete 
deliverables to researched communities, compensation for residents’ time and knowledge 
along with clear and open communication about likely research outcomes is one method 
by which honesty and integrity between researchers and the communities in which they 
work is maintained. This exchange in no way lessens the researcher’s ethical obligation 
to report findings back to communities, protect human subjects from harm, or produce 
final research products that contribute to the overall well-being of communities.
As a final point, I feel compensation did not -  in almost every case -  change the 
overall tenor of the interviews or the data that came out of interviews. In prior research in 
Shishmaref I conducted unpaid interviews and, comparatively, these interviews felt 
similar. In some cases paying interviewees and survey participants did formalize the
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relationship between myself and the research participant. This may have created some 
distance between myself as an anthropologist and some members of the community.
In many cases I established very real and intimate relationships with people in 
Shishmaref -  but I was not a fully participating community member, and was rather a 
researcher, ‘collecting’ information, who made a handful of very dear friends. Paying 
interviewees helped to establish this role. Because of the nature of this research, I was 
comfortable with this role and felt it was an adequate and accurate collective 
identification of my role within the village.
2.11 A Concluding Discussion
All the information collected through this research project (survey, ethnography, 
semi-structured interviews) was compared and analyzed. The multitude of 
methodological tools used in this research project mimics the multitude of stories, pieces 
of knowledge, ideological positions of actors, historical circumstances, and subjectivities 
which construct the current moment in time where Shishmaraf residents are a) an 
internationally recognized symbol of climate change and b) poised to move from an 
island that has been an integral staging ground for sea mammal hunts for a small group of 
Inupiaq people for thousands of years, and c) hoping to do so before a major disaster.
This is a case study of vulnerability -  in all its complexity and grace. These are the 
glimpses of lives that are considered to be in a condition of vulnerability. The question 
the next chapter will answer is, vulnerability to what?
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Chapter Three: Vulnerability, Prelude to Disaster
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I  must say, this storm is much bigger than anyone expected.
— FEMA Director Michael Brown, Aug. 31, 2005
Act o f God is the legal term used to denote events occurring outside o f human control. 
These include sudden floods or other natural disasters, fo r  which no one can be held 
responsible.
-Wikipedia (Act of God)
3.1 Vulnerability to Flooding
The village of Shishmaref sits on a barrier sand island. The island itself is one half 
mile wide and is sandwiched between the Chuckchi Sea and Shishmaref Inlet. In the past 
three decades, the village has experienced increasing erosion and flooding. Erosion and 
flooding in Alaska has been linked to linked to anthropogenic warming (Hinzman et al. 
2005; ACIA 2005:997; USGAO 2003, 2009) and infrastructure changes (Mason et al. 
1997). The island is prone to flooding following fall storms that come off of the Chukchi 
Sea. These storms and the erosion that follows are making the island uninhabitable and 
causing an imminent threat to lives and homes.
According to residents, the island loses approximately 10 feet (approximately 3 
meters) of land to storms and erosion every year. In 1997 a large storm took 30 feet 
(approximately 9 meters) of shoreline in a single night (Tony Weyiouanna, interviewed 
by Elizabeth Marino, July 2008). This is significant to an island that has only 2.48 square 
miles (4 square km) of land. Government agencies, non-governmental agencies, and the 
local population all acknowledge that permanent, year-round habitation of the island will
be impossible in the near future, and the migration and/or relocation of people living on 
the island is imperative.
Sea walls and revetment projects have been and are currently in construction, but 
this expensive technology is reliable only for 15 years before major reconstruction will 
likely be necessary to maintain structural integrity. Both elders and younger generations 
repeat the local wisdom that acknowledges, “our elders say that these islands were made 
just from beach, and they were built up over the years, and the ocean is going to take 
back, take back what it created” (Fred Eningowuk, interviewed by Elizabeth Marino, 
September 2009). Scientists and community members both agree that increased flooding 
and erosion will cause Shishmaref residents to experience negative consequences.
To better understand the nature of vulnerability for this community, it is first 
helpful to consider the diverse relationships that exist between humans and the ecologies 
they inhabit. Flooding itself is simply a condition of high water, and conditions of high 
water alone do not necessarily produce negative consequences to humans. Indeed, 
livelihoods can be predicated on flooding in some circumstances:
In Africa one of the most significant downstream riparian ecosystems in 
river basins are the seasonally inundated savanna or forested floodplains.
These “wetland” ecosystems are relatively flat areas adjacent to rivers 
created by sedimentary deposits of meandering channels as well as 
periodic flooding. During seasonal flood events, water often leaves the 
main river channel and inundates a floodplane. ... As this occurs, 
sediment rapidly falls out of the floodwater and is deposited. These
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alluvial deposits make for extremely fertile soils, which have been 
exploited for centuries in many regions of Africa by traditional “flood 
recession” agriculture. That is, as floods abate and recede, crops are 
planted in the naturally irrigated soils (Barbier 2002:3).
In the Hadejia’Jama’ floodplain in Northern Nigeria, flooding is an essential part of 
agriculture, both small and large scale. Today, water diversion upstream increasingly 
prevents significant seasonal flooding downstream, making communities that are 
dependent on agriculture for subsistence or for small-scale market production vulnerable 
to the lack of flooding. Thus, flooding and lack of flooding can both be disastrous -  
which raises questions about what exactly constitutes a disaster. If conditions of high 
water do not necessarily cause disaster, then to what are Shishmaref residents vulnerable?
Shishmaref and Northern Nigeria are vastly distinct ecosystems, but the 
ecological conditions of high water in Shishmaref produce state and federally declared 
disasters, and in Northern Nigeria produce the necessary conditions for subsistence 
farming. The differences between these two situations rest in the social and economic 
relationships between people and ecosystems -  not in the ecological conditions 
themselves. In Nigeria, the floodplain is farmland. In Shishmaref, current flood-prone 
areas are residential. Conducting informed research in Shishmaref, and making valid 
comparisons with other flood-prone areas of the world requires an intellectual unbinding 
of the idea of disaster from the ecological condition of flooding.
This unbinding, in actuality, is very difficult. During interviews, I asked 
Kigiqtaamiut people to discuss the flooding events in Shishmaref. Transcripts indicate
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that residents responded emotionally and physically to rising water and falling shoreline -  
to ecological conditions. Experiences of these flooding events are experiences of the 
physicality of landscape. In the interview excerpts below, interviewees give descriptions 
of how the land behaves and how people respond to the land as it changes during a 
flooding event.
Interview with Anonymous l.a., September 23,2009 
Anonymous: It was just flooding, I mean, the water was just breaking off 
the high beach, I mean over the cliffs. And then like, it was going on for a 
while. Because within a week or something, I don’t know maybe a month, 
that’s when they moved those 7 houses. That was pretty weird though.
EM: Were you here during the flood of 2004?
A: That one was not as bad as ‘97, but it was coming from both, the ocean 
and the lagoon.
EM: So you had high water both directions?
A: (Indicates yes by raising eyebrows) In 2004 I think the water was going 
over the sea wall and making a little river.
Interview with Jennifer Demur, September 23, 2009 
EM: Were you here during the flood of 1997?
JD: Yeah
EM: Can you tell me what happened then?
JD: That was pretty scary. Thinking how we’re going to get out of here.
You know, and is it really going to flood all the way over. But there was a
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lot of really excited people and we were on the edge of the beach watching 
the waves and making sure nothing was going in. And I think that’s when 
those houses were falling in. And I remember we were out there watching.
EM: What were those people who owned those houses doing?
JD: Rushing, emptying the house. There was lots of people helping.
EM: Did you think those houses were in danger before the flood or was it 
a surprise?
JD: Well, we didn’t think it would go that quick.
These prototypical comments demonstrate that in real time, disasters appear to be 
completely contained by the ecological conditions in the present. “The water was just 
breaking off the high cliffs.” “The water was going over the sea wall and making a little 
river.” “There was a lot of really excited people and we were on the edge of the beach 
watching waves ... we were out there watching.” It is the experiences of water, waves, 
and the breaking of high cliffs in these excerpts that are the catalysts for danger. In a 
disaster situation, human beings are intimately connected with changing landscapes -  and 
are imminently threatened by those changing landscapes. The earth moves in a quake, the 
waters rise in a flood, the wind blows in a hurricane, and in Shishmaref the water breaks 
off the high cliffs -  the experiences of disaster are inextricable from feeling abnormal, 
dangerous ecological conditions.
The following excerpt from an interview is a conclusion that stems from these 
experiences, where the onus of needing to relocate is put on ‘mother nature’ -  the 
ecological conditions themselves.
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Interview with Anonymous 3.b, conducted by myself and Stacey 
Stasenko, former Shishmaref resident, September 2005 
A: I sure don’t want to move.
Stasenko: No one wants to, but Mother Nature seems like she’s moving 
us.
3.1.1 Hazard-centric disaster research
The ecological conditions that cause disasters (e.g. floods, hurricanes, 
earthquakes) have been the subjects of disaster research for most of the 20th century. In 
1976, a book entitled Natural Disasters, by John Butler, a researcher who comes from a 
‘mainstream natural hazards tradition’ (Adger 2006:271), was arranged into the following 
chapters: 1. Earthquakes; 2. Volcanoes; 3. Tsunamis and Storm Surges; 4. Tropical 
Cyclones and Tornadoes; 5. Flood; 6. Drought; 7. Fire; 8. Landslides; 9. Freezes and 
Avalanches; 10. Disease; and 11. Disasters in General (Butler 1976). These types of 
studies are recognized as hazard-centric approaches to disaster research and are 
characterized by a focus on the natural hazard itself (e.g. the tornado, the hurricane, the 
flood) as the mechanism for disaster and an understanding of these natural hazards as 
rare, aberrations from normal conditions. Within this framework, people (and cultures) 
can only respond to their environments during times of disaster (White 1945; Wallace 
1957), and the better the emergency-preparedness is for the episodic event, the less the 
damage we can expect to human society. The hazard-centric disaster perspective is 
characterized as a behavioral response approach, according to Anthony Oliver-Smith
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(1996:305-306), which concentrates on individual and institutional reactions to disaster 
conditions. The environment acts, and people respond to those actions.
Disaster prevention within a hazard-centric ideology almost always focuses on 
warning systems, forecasting and prediction, and protecting populations from the 
hazardous ecological conditions themselves through the manipulation of ecological 
features. For example, Butler (1976:69-70) recommends the following 10 strategies as 
essential flood prevention and risk mitigation techniques: forecasting, levee systems, 
large dams on rivers, small dams on urban creeks, river channel improvement and 
straightening, drainage works, floodways, soil conservation and small dams on upper 
catchments, flood-proofing buildings, and zoning of flood plains. All but two of these 
suggestions (flood-proofing and zoning -  mentioned last) focus on containing and 
manipulating rivers and shorelines, and do not consider changing human behavior or 
human social conditions.
Hazard-centric ideologies retain their currency in some disaster prevention circles. 
Technologically-driven, hazard-focused disaster prevention strategies are popular, 
particularly in response to deteriorating conditions along Alaska’s coast. A first response 
to erosion in and around villages in Alaska is sea wall protection. Ten million US dollars 
have been spent on sea wall construction in Shishmaref since 1981 -  a technological 
response that focuses on protecting existing infrastructure, something endorsed by the 
community. Sea walls are expensive and short-lived. The Shishmaref sea wall is 
projected to have a 15-year lifespan if not maintained and a 25-year lifespan if properly
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maintained (Gray et al. 2011). Maintenance funding was not earmarked in the original 
construction phases of the sea wall.
Hazard-centric research also aligns with how many people commonly explain 
disaster experiences -  as rare, aberrations from normal ecological conditions, as floods 
and hurricanes, with words we only use in extreme, dangerous situations. The narrative of 
‘ We survived a flood, ’ has cultural value to explain an extreme event.
Despite their intuitive appeal, hazard-centric research efforts and techno­
engineered solutions to disaster began to fall out of favor among social scientists by the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, as new research demonstrated that disasters were also highly 
dependent on social systems and social-ecological interactions (Hewitt 1983; Oliver- 
Smith 1996 for reviews). High water did not always produce a disaster. A high poverty 
rate or inappropriate development (Oliver-smith 1996:315), in association with high 
water, was likely to produce a disaster. So to say that Shishmaref residents are vulnerable 
to flooding is somewhat accurate -  vulnerability is certainly associated with flooding -  
but it is also an incomplete characterization.
Humans are not vulnerable to flooding per say; they are vulnerable to the 
outcomes of flooding, which can be dramatically different given different social, 
ecological, and cultural conditions. In Alaska, even low level flooding can lead to 
hypothermia. In Haiti, flooding accompanies water-bome diseases. In Louisiana, there is 
widespread fear of snakes. In Shishmaref, residents are vulnerable to a suite of 
consequences under conditions of flooding.
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To refine our understanding of vulnerability in the case of Shishmaref, we will 
subsequently refer to flooding and erosion as hazards, and the negative consequences of 
those hazards as conditions of disaster. Following the work of Susana Hoffman and 
Anthony Oliver-Smith’s, we define hazards as,
the forces, conditions, or technologies that carry a potential for social, 
infrastructural, or environmental damage. A hazard can be a hurricane, 
earthquake, or avalanche; it can also be a nuclear facility or a 
socioeconomic practice, such as using pesticides. The issue of hazard 
further incorporates the way a society perceives the danger or dangers, 
either environmental and/or technological, that it faces and the ways it 
allows the danger to enter its calculation of risk (Hoffman and Oliver- 
Smith 2002:4).
While disaster is defined as,
A process/event combining a potentially destructive agent/force from the 
natural, modified, or built environment and a population in a socially and 
economically produced condition of vulnerability, resulting in a perceived 
disruption of the customary relative satisfactions of individual and social 
needs for physical survival, social order, and meaning (Hoffman and 
Oliver-Smith 2002:4).
The next section of this chapter shifts from hazard-centric to political, economic, 
and social-environmental systems approaches to disaster. Importantly, we tackle the 
complex notion of vulnerability. Who is vulnerable to a disaster? How is vulnerability
constructed, and how does this apply in Shishmaref? Following this, we examine in detail 
the numerous consequences to which Shishmaref residents are vulnerable -  death, loss of 
land, infrastructure and property, and social and cultural disarticulation.
3.2 What is Vulnerability?
The term vulnerability is used in many academic fields, as well as in common 
speech. Its ubiquity makes it a difficult term -  so much so that Hans-Martin Fussel 
quotes Tinnerman as saying “vulnerability is a term of such broad use as to be almost 
useless for careful description at the present, except as a rhetorical indicator of areas of 
greatest concern” (Fussel 2007:155). The Merriam-Webster definition of vulnerable is: 
“capable of being physically or emotionally wounded” and “open to attack or damage,” 
which could certainly be applied in Shishmaref under flooding conditions, but could also 
be applied almost anywhere.
The term vulnerability was linked to disaster theory first in the field of geography, 
and quickly migrated to the interdisciplinary disaster literature.
“The term ‘vulnerability’ was introduced as a response to the hazard- 
centric perception of disasters in the 1970s (...). With its growing 
recognition at the beginning of the 1980s, ‘vulnerability’ was used to 
express the understanding that the extent to which people suffer from 
calamities depends on (a) ‘the likelihood of being exposed to hazards’ and 
(b) ‘their capacity to withstand them, which relates to their socio­
economic circumstances” (Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2004:13).
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The concept of vulnerability has also been used in the fields of ecology, anthropology, 
engineering, and economics. It is used in policy and governance forums and has become 
a central issue in the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The term 
vulnerability (and, following, the framing of analysis) is increasingly common in any 
field dealing with socio-ecological systems in general, and anthropogenic climate change 
in particular. There are multiple review articles about the myriad ways vulnerability is 
defined, and its perceived usefulness (Fussel 2007; Adger 2006; O’brien et al. 2007; 
Downing et al. 2001). The following discussion applies Neil Adger’s (2006) assessment 
of the four leading areas of vulnerability research to the Shishmaref case study, and then 
offers a critique of the concept of vulnerability.
3.2.1 Vulnerability in four parts
In Figure 3.1, below, four conceptualizations of vulnerability are represented: as a 
lack of entitlements, as a product of political ecology, as a function of pressure and 
release, and as an outcome of exposure. Derived from Adger’s (2006) assessment of the 
existing literature, these four manners of interpreting vulnerability all consider disasters 
to be the product of both the environment (X axis) and social relationships (Y axis), but 
differ in the degree to which either is considered primary.
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Social 
relations 
as
driver
Environment as driver
Figure 3.1: Conceptual diagram of vulnerability (based on Adger 2006)
When the concept of vulnerability is utilized in the hazard-centric literature, it is 
still equated with exposure (natural hazards in Figure 3.1). If you live where it is likely 
to flood, you are vulnerable to flooding. Flooding, in this case, is the center of research, 
as we discussed earlier; human interactions with the environment are secondary. Human- 
to-human interactions are rarely considered as a mechanism for disaster. This is described 
in detail in section 3.1.1, above.
At the other end of the spectrum, vulnerability is associated with impoverishment, 
a lack of social capital, and the inequitable distribution of resources (entitlements in 
Figure 3.1). Adger calls this the ‘entitlements’ approach to vulnerability (based on Sen
1984:497) -  where an individual’s or community’s resources and assets (social and 
economic) are inadequate to respond to changes or stress. Vulnerability as a lack of 
entitlements can occur in the context of a natural hazard or not -  such as is the case with 
death and malnutrition linked to famine and food insecurity. A drought may occur, and 
food insecurity linked to lean agricultural production follows; but this can happen in the 
absence of actual food shortages. As Adger states, “the advantage of the entitlements 
approach to famine is that it can be used to explain situations where populations have 
been vulnerable to famine even when there are no absolute shortages of food”
(2006:271). In a case where poor subsistence farmers cannot afford to buy food that is 
available, or cannot depend on social networks or formal institutions to provide food, 
disaster is a product of the lack of entitlements -  famine can indeed occur in the absence 
of a drought all together.
In the Shishmaref case, under the hazard-centric framework, one could say that 
residents are vulnerable to death and hardship because they live on an island that is 
experiencing rapid erosion and is prone to flooding without adequate technological 
protection from that flooding. Under the entitlements framework, one might consider 
whether or not the Shishmaref community has adequate resources (social and economic) 
to function in a way that allows for safety and growth. Vulnerability in Shishmaref under 
the entitlements approach, then, is tied to resource distribution -  other communities may 
be able to buy, build, and foster safety and growth, while the Shishmaref community 
cannot.
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In the hazards approach, all of the emphasis is on the flood. In the entitlement 
approach, ecological conditions are merely backdrop for social relationships and the 
distribution of resources. The entitlements approach is interesting in Shishmaref because 
in absence of flooding and erosion, there is still a question about whether the island is big 
enough to continue to house Shishmaref s growing population. This could easily lead to a 
‘disaster.’ For example, a lack of space for houses in areas that do not flood puts pressure 
on residents to build houses where it is certain to flood. This could potentially create 
disaster in the absence of abnormal or changing ecological conditions.
Most prevalent in the anthropological literature on disaster is the political 
ecological model of disaster (Hewit 1983; Dilley and Boudreau 2001; Cutter 1996, 2003, 
2006; Cutter et al. 2008) {political ecology in Figure 3.1). This model incorporates 
exposure to risk -  but understands exposure as a function of political ecological 
conditions. In this model, marginalized and impoverished communities tend to live in 
riskier areas and have lower adaptive capacity -  through: (1) marginalization from 
political protection and decision-making; (2) inadequate infrastructure to cope with 
hazardous conditions; and (3) inadequate resources to cope with disasters before, during, 
and after the episodic hazard event occurs.
Susan Cutter describes her political ecological model of vulnerability as a 
geography of social vulnerability (Cutter 2006). This model is useful in explaining, for 
example, Hurricane Katrina -  the hurricane that caused significant loss of life, property, 
and social and cultural disarticulation in and around New Orleans, Louisiana after 
making landfall on August 29, 2005. Cutter explains the outcomes of Hurricane Katrina -
73
which caused death to primarily poor African Americans living in the city of New 
Orleans — as a result of development that ignored ecological conditions (i.e. the city 
elevation is below sea level), followed by white flight which lowered the tax base, 
followed by levee corrosion and disrepair, followed by levee failure, which coincided 
with inadequate city planning for evacuation and the lack of personal and community 
resources to facilitate evacuation (Cutter 2006). In this analysis, the most vulnerable 
communities experienced marginalization and impoverishment in multiple ways, across 
extended time scales, which culminated in severe negative outcomes (a disaster) when 
these communities were exposed to hazardous conditions. This analysis explains why 
certain people are vulnerable to flooding because of an inability to cope with hazardous 
conditions in the present (e.g. lack of resources to evacuate), and why certain populations 
live in risky areas (e.g. history of political neglect, white flight, and infrastructure 
neglect). Cutter’s 2006 essay on Katrina begins with the statement that, “It was bound to 
happen” (Cutter 2006:1), implying that the accuracy of climatological predictions about 
whether or not this flood would happen was not the problem -  more systemic social, 
political, and economic factors were.
This political ecological model of disasters -  by which a vulnerable community is 
recognized through a conglomeration of variables that make them vulnerable and is 
located in areas of greater exposure -  is instructive in the Shishmaref case study. Under 
this framework, we are encouraged to ask two important questions. The first is similar to 
the entitlements framework of disaster -  namely, why does Shishmaref lack adaptive 
capacity or the resources (entitlements) necessary to cope with flooding and erosion in
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the present? The second question is, why do Shishmaref residents live in a risky location, 
which is repetitively exposed to hazards, in the first place?
The last model of vulnerability (pressure and release model in Figure 3.1) is 
closely tied to the climate change literature and the adaptation and resilience literature 
(Turner et al. 2003), and is adopted from the field of ecology -  most successfully through 
Wisnier, Blaklie and colleagues’ assessment of hazards and disaster (2004). This model 
seeks to bring the environment-as-driver back into the analysis more directly -  to balance 
the natural hazards model of disaster with the political ecological model. The pressure 
and release model of vulnerability understands any stress as a pressure to the system: the 
more pressure put on the system, the more likely the system will collapse or be forced to 
change into something new. Risk (of disaster) in this model is an expression of 
vulnerability and hazard -  expressed conceptually as R = V x H.
Expressed schematically, our view is that the risk faced by people must be 
seen as a cross-cutting combination of vulnerability and hazard. Disasters 
are a result of the interaction of both; there cannot be a disaster if there are 
hazards but vulnerability is (theoretically) nil, or if  there is a vulnerable 
population but no hazard event (Wisner et al. 2003:49).
The pressure and release model is increasingly popular, particularly in climate 
change research and among planners. Ideally, the benefit of this model is that it 
incorporates root causes of vulnerability that are internal to a community and then 
understands hazardous conditions as an additional pressure on that community -  while 
neither underscoring nor dismissing the physical reality and importance of the hazard
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itself. In Shishmaref, we could say that this model would incorporate internal conditions 
of vulnerability (e.g. lack of entitlements, lack of political will to demand government 
intervention) and the physical outcomes of flooding (e.g. breaches of sea walls, changing 
atmospheric conditions that lead to larger storms) as a combined explanation for negative 
consequences in Shishmaref when storms hit the island today, which both must be 
systematically explored in order to understand why a disaster is imminent.
There are some important critiques of the pressure and release model. First, while 
the pressure and release model is successful in synthesizing social and physical 
vulnerability, it fails to provide a systematic explanation of the mechanisms and 
processes of vulnerability (Adger 2006). As Cutter et al. (2008) writes,
The pressure and release model tracks the progression of vulnerability 
from root causes to dynamic pressures to unsafe conditions, yet it fails to 
adequately address the coupled human-environment system associated 
with the proximity to a hazard, confounding issues within the broader 
context of sustainability (Cutter et al. 2008:601).
What is similar in both Adger’s and Cutter’s critiques, and is as of yet under-explored in 
the literature, is the failure of the pressure and release model to adequately take into 
account how vulnerability and risk exposure develop over time. Adger argues that the 
model is unable to explain the “processes and mechanisms of vulnerability,” or, the daily 
exercises and assumptions that, over time, create vulnerable communities. Cutter argues 
that failing to understand ‘proximity to hazard’ confounds ‘issues within the broader 
context of sustainability.’ In other words, an understanding of sustainability is predicated
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on understanding the processes and events that put people in harm’s way. Both of these 
critiques imply an inability of the pressure and release model to describe the mechanisms 
for creating vulnerability over time -  even if they accurately describe vulnerabilities in 
the present.
Whether or not vulnerability and risk exposure are a function of history in 
Shishmaref is an empirical question. It is a particularly interesting question because 
disaster in Shishmaref is linked to climate change. The pressure and release model of 
disasters has become an important analytic tool for climate change researchers because 
hazards themselves are changing as a result of anthropogenic warming (O’Brien et al. 
2007:65; IPCC 2011 :section 2.8). Following, climate change researchers ask what 
happens when the environment changes so rapidly as to overwhelm social mechanisms of 
adaptation.
We know beyond any doubt that disasters disproportionately affect the 
impoverished and marginalized (Watts and Bohle 1993; Oliver-Smith 1996; Thomas and 
Twyman 2005; Cutter and Emrich 2006). However, as hazards linked to climate change 
become increasingly unpredictable, does this overwhelm social systems? In other words, 
are there situations in which the hazard itself does exert similar outcomes on people 
regardless of their entitlements or political and economic positions within society? Are 
there situations in which new exposure to risk is so overwhelming that community 
vulnerability and political economy does not predict who lives in ‘risky’ areas, and even 
the wealthy and well-connected are unprepared? Is vulnerability in Shishmaref a product 
of history, social relationships, and colonialism, or is vulnerability a product of
77
overwhelming ecological shift for which the socio-economic, political economic, cultural 
and racial demographics of the community are circumstantial, not central?
All four models described above understand that the physical environment and 
social systems act in tandem as mechanisms for disaster. Disaster is produced when a 
hazard meets with a vulnerable population and produces negative outcomes and creates 
challenges to social functioning. Determining the extent to which vulnerability is best 
described in Shishmaref as a product of history, of political economy, or of climate 
change and increased exposure to hazards is a goal of this research. From here on, we 
employ insights from these four models to examine the case of Shishmaref, and we 
define vulnerability as the cumulative social and ecological conditions that put a 
population at risk of disaster.
3.3 Critique of Vulnerability
This research project explores the cumulative effects that create and intensify 
vulnerability in Shishmaref to flooding events, and that lead to negative consequences 
during and following flooding events. Because social circumstances predict vulnerability 
to disaster, communities that are vulnerable to one hazard (e.g. flooding) are often 
vulnerable to multiple hazards (e.g. flooding, erosion, high winds, hurricanes). 
Additionally, vulnerable communities also tend to experience any additional pressure 
(e.g. rise in gas prices, lean subsistence year, job losses) more profoundly than non- 
vulnerable communities (Ribot 2010; Marino 2012; Marino and Ribot 2012).
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Vulnerability is often presented as a characteristic of a community -  of a 
community up to its neck in water. For policy workers, this image is important. Response 
to hazards should not be unidimensional (e.g. preventing erosion) because these hazard- 
centric, unidimensional responses often fail to address root causes, as Cutter explains in 
her analysis of Hurricane Katrina discussed above. Addressing root causes of 
vulnerability is the most successful way to mitigate risk in the present and the future.
However, describing vulnerability as an inherent characteristic of a community is 
also dangerous. Describing habitual community vulnerability can incorrectly confuse 
complex social relationships and environmental factors that result in conditions of 
vulnerability with a trait-like characteristic, ‘vulnerable,’ inherent to a group of people 
themselves. As Dubois highlights, “Labeling groups as vulnerable can be stigmatizing or 
contribute to harmful stereotypes” (Dubois 2005:338). The label vulnerability can imply 
a lack of agency and competence. My experience in Shishmaref has been 
overwhelmingly one of witnessing competent, flexible, and resourceful individuals. The 
community of Shishmaref may be ‘standing permanently up to its neck in water,’ but the 
skills for survival under those circumstances are truly remarkable.
The vulnerability literature, outlined above, is the best model for explaining this 
case study of Shishmaref. Vulnerability scholars have, in the last 30 years, successfully 
shifted disaster conversations to root causes and, in the context of climate change, have 
been vocal about the inequitable distribution of burdens associated with climate change 
outcomes and issues of social justice. As will be described later, the results of the current 
study fall directly into this research tradition. However, the label ‘vulnerability’ does not
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describe Shishmaref residents. It describes the weaker points of national and international 
flows of power, money, and resources, upon which the Shishmaref community falls, and 
which we will describe in detail in later chapters. If the vulnerability literatures were not 
fundamentally applicable to this research, or as robust as they are, I would use a different 
analytic term in order to avoid confusion that may result in misunderstanding Shishmaref 
residents in any way as incompetent or lacking agency.
For now, let us accept that the Kigiqtaamiut are not inherently vulnerable. They 
are vulnerable to a limited set of negative circumstances and events associated with 
flooding that are the result of complex social and ecological circumstances.
Understanding why this vulnerability exists is the higher function of this research. What 
the limited set of negative circumstances is (or, what Shishmaref residents are vulnerable 
to) follows in the next sections.
3.4 Vulnerable to Fatalities
During winter in Shishmaref, when the ocean and the lagoon have frozen over and 
the land and sea are covered in snow -  it is impossible from an airplane to discern where 
Sarichef Island begins and the ocean ends. The indistinctiveness of the island from the 
ocean is due in part to its height. Sarichef Island is, at its height, 20 feet (6 meters) above 
sea level. Much of the island sits at a lower elevation. An extensive sea wall and high 
bluffs on the ocean side of the island protect homes and land from being inundated when 
a storm hits. A storm can cause flooding from either side of the island, from the lagoon or
80
ocean, depending on high water, tide, and wind direction, but the most threatening storms 
are exacerbated by storm surges and wave action that comes from the ocean.
If both the bluffs or the sea walls were compromised during a major storm, then it 
is possible for the island to be inundated with water. How possible and what exact 
conditions are necessary to create this situation is unknown. What is known is that this 
scenario is most likely in the fall, when the largest storms come into the Chukchi Sea and 
when weather conditions make high water and wind more likely to cause damage to 
Shishmaref.
The Shishmaref Emergency Evacuation plan cached with the Shishmaref Erosion 
and Relocation Coalition documents state:
Sea wave conditions may develop which threaten the island, or actually 
cover up, a part or all of the island. ... Such a situation poses a grave 
threat to life and property; therefore, it is essential that provisions be made 
to evacuate the population to nearby safe areas on the mainland or to 
established evacuation centers in Nome or Kotzebue (Shishmaref local 
evacuation plan n.d.:10).
Temperatures in Shishmaref range from an average in summer of 47 to 52 degrees 
Fahrenheit and in winter from -12 to 2 (Department of community and regional affairs). 
In the fall, inundation of the island with nearly freezing water during a flooding event 
could be exceptionally dangerous. The emergency evacuation plan also states:
Evacuation of all individuals off the island is not feasible during a storm 
event. Sufficient aircraft and boat resources may not be available to move
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all residents with very short notice and severe weather conditions would 
not allow aircraft or boat operations during the storm. Residents with life 
safety issues need to leave prior to the storm’s arrival. All other affected 
residents should shelter themselves in a safer location at Shishmaref, such 
as the school or church, as designated by Shishmaref Emergency Services 
(n.d.:10).
In Shishmaref, evacuation off of the island is necessary in a major storm to prevent loss 
of life -  but evacuation of all community members is also not feasible. These factors co­
exist with a relatively high likelihood of a major storm. These three circumstances put 
Shishmaref residents at high risk of fatalities during a major flooding event. Evacuation 
by boat or aircraft are the only realistic ways off of the island. Both modes of transport 
are highly compromised during storms by high seas, high winds, and inclement weather. 
“During a storm, evacuation by boat may not be possible because of turbulent waters in 
the lagoon, and the inability to forecast how severe a storm may become” (Shishmaref 
emergency Evacuation Plan: 10). Yet evacuation by boat is the first off-island evacuation 
option should the island be inundated and the population need to leave.
Landing by plane in Shishmaref can be difficult under many conditions. During 
my last fieldwork trip, I was held up in Nome for two days because inclement weather 
prohibited landing in Shishmaref, and on one trip was turned around after circling the 
island because clouds were low and making safe landing impossible. This is a common 
experience. People in the village are always aware of whether the planes are coming or 
have successfully landed on any given day -  of whether or not it’s possible to get out. It
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becomes second nature in Shishmaref to listen for the hum of the plane engine -  a 
barometer for whether planes can land or whether they’ve been held because the clouds 
are too low or the wind too gusty. Helicopter pilots can fly in under severe weather 
conditions, and do, to lift critical medical patients out of Shishmaref -  but otherwise, air 
travel is not completely reliable, and patience for the weather is a required personal 
characteristic for anyone coming in and out of Shishmaref by plane.
This is important background information because large-scale air evacuation in 
the event of a storm just seems unfeasible given local experience with air travel -  even 
though it is the only way off of the island during a storm if the lagoon is beginning to 
freeze or wave action is too high. The Shishmaref Emergency Evacuation Plan reads, 
“evacuation by air will be a last resort. Normally aircraft operations will be hampered or 
be impossible during the height of a storm. This condition will not, however, preclude the 
Mayor from requesting evacuation, if in his opinion, he believes it is necessary to save a 
life” (n.d.: 10). Air evacuation out of Shishmaref is planned to come from helicopters, 
grounded at Anchorage Elmendorf Airforce Base, and the Evacuation Plan states 
explicitly that there would likely be a lapse of several hours between the mayor’s request 
and the arrival of the first evacuation aircraft. Community members would be evacuated 
25 people at a time, commensurate with how many passengers could fit into the 
emergency aircraft.
Any individuals who cannot evacuate off of the island -  or if  conditions during a 
storm deteriorate so that air and boat travel become unfeasible -  are to evacuate to 
emergency shelters at the church and the school. Both of these buildings sit on relatively
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high ground, but could also become inundated with water if the island is completely 
submerged. The principal and the Lutheran minister become the emergency shelter 
coordinators under these conditions.
All the planning and research that happens at the community, state, and federal 
level is predicated, in part, on this basic threat -  that a large storm could create conditions 
that cause fatalities by drowning, hypothermia, and exposure along with lack of resources 
as conditions deteriorate. In sum, while large storms could cause fatalities anywhere, 
Shishmaref is an isolated island that is extremely difficult to evacuate. Shishmaref is a 
village with only the most basic medical response options available to sick or injured 
community members. Shishmaref is two and one half miles wide and could be inundated 
with near freezing ocean water in the event of a flood. Thus, it is very possible that a 
large storm would cause fatalities in Shishmaref.
3.4.1 The elephant in the room
Yet, in all the interviews I have ever conducted in Shishmaref, we never talked 
about death. The interview script I have used includes the questions: “Do you get 
nervous/worried during fall storms?” “Does your family get nervous?” “Do family 
members who live outside of Shishmaref worry about you?” Most interviewees discuss 
feeling worried, and discuss family worry and phone calls or emails exchanged before 
and during bad weather. This is expressed in what I’ve come to think of as a uniquely 
Inupiaq way of understatement and precision.
Interview with Richard Kuzuguk May 12, 2010
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EM: Do they [your family who live in Kotzebue and Nome] ever worry or 
stress [about the storms]?
RK: They do, but they don’t express it often. They just make comments 
like, it would be a good idea to think about relocating. But they do, in 
essence, pray for our community.
I never ask: “what do you worry about?” It seems inappropriate to force people to 
contemplate their own mortality. I made the statement earlier that disasters were sensitive 
issues, and this is the crux of that comment -  that the problem with disasters and potential 
disasters is that they almost always imply the risk of death. The Bradford Disaster Scale, 
a scale used to quantify and compare disasters across hazard types, geographical space, 
and time, is fatality-based: 32 deaths, 1.5 magnitude disaster -  25,000 deaths, 4.3 
magnitude disaster, with an upper limit of 10 -  indicating annihilation of the planet 
(Keller 1990). The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR) officially defines a disaster not as fatality-based, but as the point at which 
normal social functioning ceases and community resources are insufficient to cope. 
Disaster is: A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a 
society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental 
losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or 
society to cope using its own resources (United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (Guzman 2002:2).
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But in practice, for the UNISDR to register an event in their database, more quantitative 
measures are used.
For a disaster to be entered into the database of the UN’s International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), at least one of the following 
criteria must be met:
A report of 10 or more people killed 
A report of 100 people affected
A declaration of a state of emergency by the relevant government 
A request by the national government for international assistance 
(Guzman 2002:23).
The first of these disaster qualifications is 10 or more fatalities. Disaster is nearly always 
predicated on the risk of fatalities -  and this is true in Shishmaref as well, though it is 
almost never made explicit in meetings or in conversation. The quantification of deaths in 
hard numbers and not population percentages is also a disadvantage for rural 
communities.
Even though I use the word disaster in every talk I give and paper I write about 
Shishmaref, I failed to recognize my own latent fear that a major storm could cause 
fatalities in Shishmaref until a large storm in 2011 was heading towards the Bering Strait. 
That night I was logged onto Facebook all night checking my friends’ pages for updates. 
Because the electricity never went out, I read updates in real time throughout the flooding 
event. The storm caused relatively minor damage in Shishmaref because of favorable 
wind direction. Northeast winds cause the most damage during a large storm, pushing
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storm surges into the island most directly. During the 2011 Bering Strait “super storm,” 
the winds came in from the south, which dramatically reduced risk to the village. I 
remember clearly the moment I heard about the “super storm” heading towards the 
Seward Peninsula -  my breath caught in my throat and I started to make plans to fly into 
Anchorage, Nome, or Fairbanks in case there was an evacuation. During this storm I 
realized two things: (1) that I had become the friend I had interviewed about, calling to 
make sure everyone was okay, and (2) that I was nervous because I feared that people 
would die.
3.5 Vulnerable to Evacuation, Relocation and Diaspora — Why Researchers Fear 
Environmental Migration
In 2004, a USGAO report presented information by the Army Corps of Engineers 
stating that Shishmaref had 10 to 15 years before permanent habitation of the island 
would be impossible because of severe erosion and flooding. In the interim, there has 
been sea wall construction, but as stated earlier the sea wall has a lifespan of between 15 
and 25 years. Predicting “how long communities have” is difficult, but in Shishmaref, 
relocation will likely occur sometime in the relatively near future. If planned relocation 
does not occur before a major disaster makes the island uninhabitable and forces 
relocation, then Shishmaref residents will -  at least temporarily, and perhaps permanently 
-  be relocated outside of land owned by the tribe following the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA), and off of land and territory that has been inhabited by 
ancestors of the Kigiqtaamiut for millennia.
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Resident Richard Kuzuguk fears that, under these circumstances, Shishmaref 
residents will lose their individuality: “My biggest fear is that we’re going to end up in 
Fairbanks or Anchorage. My best bet would probably be at the army base within those 
areas that could hold part of the community depending on the season and it would be 
more like refugees” (Richard Kuzuguk interviewed by Elizabeth Marino May 12, 2010). 
Many other people, when asked about what they feared or what made them feel scared 
referenced moving or being evacuated from the island. “We feel kind of scared (in the 
fall) -  especially scared for our elders if they evacuate us to a different town”
(anonymous 2.c interviewed by Elizabeth Marino September 25,2009). Many people 
consider diaspora a “worst case scenario.” “Worst case is if we have to choose our own 
spots to live where the people in the village would move to different cities” (John Sinnok 
interviewed by Elizabeth Marino July 18, 2008). Other interviewees, when I asked about 
whether or not they get nervous or feel worried during the fall storms, responded 
immediately that they did not want to move to Nome or Kotzebue. “We don’t want to 
move to Nome or Kotzebue” was a first response to questions of worry and fear.
Forced displacement out of traditional homelands is of paramount concern for 
residents. However, if the island is inundated with water and residents must be evacuated 
during a storm, what happens next is a mystery. It is an even bigger mystery what will 
happen if the island becomes permanently uninhabitable following a storm. There is no 
local, state, or federal plan in place should this occur. The likelihood of Sarichef Island 
becoming uninhabitable is high, according to local stakeholders and agency reports. 
Planning an organized relocation is slow and there has not been significant progress on
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building a new village, in spite of continued local, state, and federal efforts. There is no 
ground broken for construction of any kind on the mainland for a new village. At present, 
the most likely long-term ecological scenario (island inundation) has no corresponding 
long-term social or governmental plan in place. Where will people go?
Residents are very explicit that they do not want to merge with another village or 
move to Nome or Kotzebue, the closest, larger, hub and service towns in the region. 
Kigiqtaamiut people overwhelmingly feel that to do so would compromise the health, 
wellbeing, and cultural integrity of community members (Schweitzer and Marino 2006). 
My colleagues and friends in Shishmaref predict a number o f negative consequences 
linked to moving into Nome or any larger city, including lack of subsistence 
opportunities, loss of cultural traditions and language, and exposure to drugs and alcohol.
There is also a sense that the landscape itself in and around Shishmaref is “safer.” 
In the following excerpt, two interviewees discuss keeping their grandkids in the village, 
where it is “safe.”
Interview with Kim and Stella Ningealook May 13, 2010 
EM: Do you get worried during fall time?
KN: Every year. Yep. That’s why I get gray hairs.
S: And I think about our grandchildren, because they’re all growing real 
quick and we want them in a safer land and a safer environment.
EM: It’s important to you to keep them in this area?
S: Yes, at the same time.
EM: Can you talk about why?
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S: Because in urban lifestyle, like in Nome and bigger cities, some of our 
grandchildren we don’t want them to grow up with all these bars and all 
these drugs happening. And here in the village, we’re banned from 
bringing in alcohol in our village and now we feel safe and everyone is 
doing real good.
This excerpt is, I think, complicated. When I asked “It’s important to you to keep them in 
this area?’ S responds: ‘Yes, at the same time.’ She is parsing out for me, two different 
conversations. The first is a conversation about what is dangerous in relocating to Nome 
or a larger urban area. The second is a conversation about why it is dangerous to be 
exposed to flooding, but still important to stay in and around traditional territory. These 
are distinct. We deal with the first conversation in this section. It is important to note that 
the interviewees clearly state their fears of Nome as a place where their grandchildren 
wouldn’t be “safe” or “good.” In Shishmaref, her grandkids are not safe because of the 
risk of flooding -  but S. indicates relocating outside of the Shishmaref area is also unsafe.
Relocation has not happened yet. Shishmaref residents have not been forced to 
migrate due to a large storm. Because it has not happened yet, the question remains, 
would migration off of the island cause the negative consequences Shishmaref residents 
predict? These kinds of disaster analyses are complicated in cross-cultural situations. If 
subjective well-being and happiness is a culturally constructed experience (Lu and 
Gilmour 2006:36), then people must be taken seriously when they tell you what makes 
them unhappy or what will compromise well-being. Post-traumatic stress disorder related 
to disasters have been shown to be highly variable in cross-cultural circumstances (Norris
90
et al. 2001). I am sensitive to the fact that if Shishmaref residents report that relocating to 
Nome or another urban area would be detrimental to their well-being, then I assume this 
to be the truth. However, it is still helpful to compare the Shishmaref case study with 
other cases of forced migration to establish some analytic predictive power surrounding 
outcomes of migration in the event of a storm, and the likely outcomes of forced 
environmental migration linked to climate change.
3.5.1 Environmental and forced migration outcomes
The climate change literature demonstrates that migration, particularly temporary 
migration, as a response to economic or environmental stress is not uncommon today 
among vulnerable populations (Raleigh and Jordan 2010:112). It is conceivable that 
environmental migration, therefore, may be a strategic adaptation option for vulnerable 
populations, including Shishmaref residents (Mayer 2011), which would not necessarily 
produce negative outcomes. Labor migration, for example, can make life sustainable in 
drought-prone areas both for the labor migrant and for families and social networks left at 
home (Raleigh and Jordan 2010:113; Henry et al. 2004). The Army Corps of Engineers’ 
initial investigation into three possible scenarios to deal with flooding and erosion in 
Shishmaref included (1) doing nothing, (2) relocation to a site chosen by the community, 
or (3) co-location, involving permanent habitation in Nome or Kotzebue with seasonal 
trips back to traditional Kigiqtaamiut subsistence territory (though the mechanisms for 
this travel, who would pay for travel, how it could occur in the absence of village 
infrastructure, are all undefined). Co-location would best mimic temporary migration
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(though loosely), which is considered by the scholars listed above as being a successful 
adaptation strategy to environmental change.
These scholars rightly critique the incorrect assumption that migration is always 
maladaptive, as early climate change literature suggested (Myers 1993). Raleigh and 
Jordan’s (2010) analysis of the intersections between climate change and migration found 
that researchers needed to be cautious when identifying migration as a negative and 
catastrophic adaptation decision. They also note, however, that the literature has not 
adequately dealt with circumstances under which cumulative disaster becomes so 
frequent and pervasive that landscapes become uninhabitable. “By extending the time 
frame into future generations, issues surrounding climatic thresholds, coping strategies, 
and cumulative disasters become critical factors not yet fully considered in migration 
literature” (2010:105).
In Shishmaref, relocation of the entire community is an outcome of cumulative 
disasters leading to breached climatic thresholds -  not a response to progressive 
ecosystem shifts that demand adaptation in place (e.g. planting different crops), but of a 
habitable area becoming uninhabitable for humans. Climate change specialists who study 
migration, as Raleigh and Jordan note, know less about conditions under which migration 
is an immediate and forced coping mechanism, not one strategy among a suite of 
adaptation strategies.
If forced migration, linked to climate change, mimics development-induced 
resettlement that is also often involuntary and swift, then there is a vast literature that 
predicts negative consequences for migrants. Michael Cemea and others have
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demonstrated that forced migration and resettlement which occurs in the wake of 
infrastructure development, land conservation, energy development, and for other 
political, social, and economic reasons, increases landlessness, homelessness, poverty, 
and social disarticulation among migrating populations (Cemea 2000; De Wet 2006; 
Oliver-Smith 2006a; for additional examples of development-induced displacement see 
McCutcheon 1991; Shami and McCann 1993; Appa and Patel 1996; Lassailly-Jacob 
1996; McCully 1996; Tamondong-Helin 1996).
This literature overwhelmingly identifies enormous social costs associated with 
forced displacement and resettlement. Research indicates that resettled populations fail to 
own land in resettled areas and frequently remain homeless. Poverty is also exacerbated 
after relocation and social structures and social networks break down. These negative 
consequences are exacerbated among the most poor and vulnerable populations as a 
whole, and within social subgroups (the elderly, the young). Hugo argues that as 
researchers study environmental migration, “it is especially important that the lessons 
drawn from this experience [development-induced displacement] are heeded because so 
few resettlement schemes in the past have been successful” (Hugo 2011:284).
Hugo’s analysis is sobering for stakeholders who live in and work on relocation in 
Alaska Native villages. While 20th and 21st century environmental migration, and 
environmental migration linked to climate change lack detailed case study analyses, there 
is a robust research literature on forced migration linked to development. This literature 
predicts overwhelmingly that populations forced into migration experience negative 
outcomes.
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In Shishmaref, residents are vulnerable to flooding and erosion because flooding 
and erosion may force relocation. Researchers can tentatively predict that forced 
relocation of Shishmaref residents in the absence of a well-funded, well organized 
relocation plan may mimic development-induced forced migration and could lead to 
increased poverty, increased homelessness and landlessness, and social disarticulation. 
Residents continually reiterate that catastrophe will occur if residents are relocated off of 
traditional territory and are unable to maintain a discrete village -  including decreased 
well-being, increased substance abuse, language and cultural loss, and loss of subsistence 
traditions. When we talk about vulnerability to flooding in Shishmaref, this is more 
precisely what vulnerability to flooding may entail for residents.
3.5.2 Contingency planning
In the absence of a clear plan following an evacuation, or in the event that 
permanent migration becomes necessary because the island is uninhabitable, I found 
there is widespread speculation among residents about what authorities would do, and 
about what local responses to evacuation and inundation would be. These observations 
were often in casual conversation, but also occurred in some more formal interviews.
Two trends emerged out of a group of comments about what individuals or families 
would do if they were forced off of the island before a new village was constructed. The 
first is that people would move their houses to the mainland before, during, or following 
a flood, and start a new village themselves, without help from the state or the federal 
government.
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Interview with anonymous, May 12, 2010
I feel that I would be willing to do this, with one of my friends, is to 
actually move our physical house and actually move it off the island onto 
the mainland. I know [we] would be willing to do that, get it started. If we 
do get evacuated off the island ... at least we would have one village intact 
with our environment.
This is an extreme statement because living on the mainland would more or less mean an 
abandonment of modem conveniences. There is no public infrastructure on the 
Kigiqtaamiut-owned mainland. There would be no way to fly or barge in food or building 
supplies. There is no school, church, post office, medical clinic, road, electric service, 
trash service or any other civil infrastructure. It would be very difficult for this to be a 
sustainable solution in the long term, but the willingness of residents to move themselves 
is indicative of the tenacity people have to stay on their land.
Another option that some discuss is “moving back to the island anyway.” In one 
discussion, a resident commented that he would go to “Nome or wherever,” get a house, 
and then come back to the island. When pressed about what he meant he said he assumed 
the government would build houses for Shishmaref residents in Nome in the event of a 
major storm and then close down the village of Shishmaref. This man said he would stay 
in Nome just long enough to receive the government benefits and then go back and live 
however he was able again on the island. Again, this lifestyle would be very difficult with 
no transportation, no store, no gas -  no access to the conveniences that have become 
commonplace in Shishmaref.
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These options of moving to the mainland or remaining on the island are 
impossible for any elderly person and would be very difficult for young children who are 
required to go to school. These contingency plans imply community fracture and hint at 
what would, in practice, be a form of social disarticulation.
Vulnerability to evacuation, relocation, and diaspora incorporate many different 
outcomes. Both literature reviews and local perception is that relocation off of traditional 
territory would create negative outcomes. Lacking a clear plan for what would happen to 
community members in the event of a flood (a flood with a very high likelihood of 
occurring), leads to an assortment of assumptions and contingency planning among 
individuals. Shishmaref residents are highly organized in response to state and federal 
plans to relocate the village in traditional subsistence territory, but contingency plans 
made about what to do if an organized relocation does not occur before are more 
individualized and haphazard.
3.6 Vulnerable to Loss of Property
In the event of a flood, Shishmaref residents are also vulnerable to loss of 
property. Particularly, Shishmaref residents lose traditional subsistence hunting and 
fishing equipment every year to storms. The sea wall on the island acts as shoreline 
protection from flooding for buildings and other infrastructure projects, but does not 
extend to areas on the southwest side of the island where people have racks for drying 
black meat and fish, and where ugruk preparation occurs.
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For people with large investments in residential houses and businesses, relocation 
and flooding present the problem of eliminating their livelihoods or the investment 
they’ve made in housing. Loss of houses that are paid for is particularly problematic for 
the elderly and retired. Business owners and entrepreneurs in Shishmaref are key citizens 
in small communities and redistribute funds. Rachel Stasenko’s son Dennis is a restaurant 
owner in Shishmaref. Investing in better equipment and building materials is a risk in 
Shishmaref because infrastructure and property are vulnerable to flooding. At present 
there is no housing compensation plan in the event of relocation.
3.7 Vulnerability to Flooding
We end this chapter where we began. What does vulnerability to flooding mean in 
Shishmaref? Shishmaref residents are not vulnerable to high water itself. They are 
vulnerable to fatalities, evacuation, relocation, and diaspora, increased landlessness and 
homelessness, increased poverty and social disarticulation (Cemea 2002), loss of cultural 
integrity and language, increased alcoholism and decreased well-being associated with 
cultural loss (Schweitzer and Marino 2006), and loss of property and livelihood -  
scenarios that are likely to follow significant flooding in Shishmaref. This shift in 
terminology is important. If we ask: “How can we prevent flooding?” then the 
technocratic answer of sea walls, seems reasonable. If we ask: “How do we prevent 
death, loss o f land, infrastructure and property, and social and cultural disarticulation?” 
-  then the answers are broader and more complex.
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This is not to say that Shishmaref is perfect as it stands, or that poverty, cultural 
disarticulation and language loss are not happening in the village. In Shishmaref, modem 
life, educational and work opportunities, and continued marginalization, continue to 
fracture the village. Old social networks dissolve and new ones are created. It is fair to 
say, however, that Shishmaref residents overwhelmingly insist on remaining in their 
territory -  maintaining a discrete village in order to protect themselves from “unsafe” 
outcomes of relocation. From the perspective of the development-induced displacement 
literature, residents are right to worry. Yet, regardless of whether planning and organizing 
the creation of a discrete village for relocation is possible or not, any state and federal 
organization and planning effort should focus on preventing the negative outcomes 
commonly experienced by forced migrants, and should aim to alleviate negative 
outcomes that residents and researchers alike predict will happen. Shishmaref residents 
are not vulnerable to water. They are vulnerable to the loss o f life and well-being. In the 
following chapters we examine the causes of this vulnerability.
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Chapter Four: Social-Ecological Systems, the Nexus of Climate and History
People aren ’t talking about the past, about why villages were here in the first place. And 
they ’re not talking about the future -  what i t ’s going to be like for our kids.
Tony Weyiouanna, interview July 2008
4.1 Social-Ecological Systems
In all theoretical models of vulnerability, vulnerable communities are a product of 
social circumstances and ecological features in the landscape, as well as the interactions 
between those systems. In the case of Shishmaref, Alaska, the village has been identified 
as a case of environmental migration linked to climate change. If ecological features and 
social circumstances are interlinked in disaster scenarios, then in order to understand die 
construction of vulnerability in Shishmaref, it is imperative to investigate the linkages 
between cultural, social and ecological systems -  particularly those systems that are in 
flux.
This chapter investigates exposure to risk as a function of social and ecological 
change -  asking what is changing and how are those changes through time linked to 
contemporary vulnerability? First, I draw upon the pressure and release model of 
vulnerability, asking what climatic changes are occurring in Shishmaref and how they 
add additional pressures to the community. Following, I draw upon Cutter’s political 
ecological model of vulnerability and ask: why are Shishmaref residents living in an area 
of high risk in the first place? Finally, I use historical information collected through the 
literature and through interviews to understand processes of development in the area. In
summary, the chapter discusses patterns of development and infrastructure and how these 
interact with environmental features and climatic change.
4.2 Climate Change in Shishmaref, Alaska
Climate change scientists have been particularly interested in the Arctic, leading to 
a robust literature on how atmospheric, terrestrial, and hydrological systems have 
changed over time, linked to both greenhouse gas emissions and natural processes 
(Moritz et al. 2002; Hinzman et al. 2005; ACIA 2005). Indeed, “Alaska has been called a 
“ climate canary” because it is already seeing the early effects of global climate change” 
(Larsen et al. in press). In spite of this robust literature, climate change modeling and 
research remains difficult to downscale to any specific locale because of modeling 
limitations and because research projects are typically fanned out over the Arctic, not 
focused on one location.
General circulation models (GCMs) are an important tool in the 
assessment of climate change. These numerical coupled models represent various 
earth systems including the atmosphere, oceans, land surface and sea-ice and offer 
considerable potential for the study of climate change and variability. However, 
they remain relatively coarse in resolution and are unable to resolve significant 
subgrid scale features (Fowler et al. 2007:1547). While there have been advances 
in climate model downscaling (Fowler et al. 2007), it remains difficult to predict 
and link large-scale environmental change and climate change research across the 
Arctic to a particular coast, lagoon, river bank, or community due in part to
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resolution issues. In this case, understanding how Arctic climate change trends 
affect Sarichef Island is not straightforward.
Linking climate changes themselves to disaster and migration is also difficult 
because, as the social science literature demonstrates, changes in the environment itself 
are never the only causes of a disaster. In Shishmaref, for example, erosion on the island 
has been linked to development, which insulates and warms the ground under structures 
(Mason et al. 1997), increasing temperatures, which move the permafrost boundary north 
(Yoshikawa and Hinzman 2003; Chambers et al. 2007:2), and inadequate and ineffective 
sea walls (Mason et al. 1997:106-110; Mason et al. in press). It is difficult to determine 
where the outcomes of atmospheric temperature increases end and where the effects of 
development begin.
What is certain is that climate scientists have documented substantial changes in 
the Arctic climate regime over the last 100 years, with increasing changes recorded since 
the 1970s. My research demonstrates that Shishmaref residents have also observed and 
documented in the oral record significant ecological changes over time, and particularly 
within the last 30 to 40 years. Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 present ecological changes 
observed by Shishmaref residents at a local scale and contrast/compare these 
observations to scientific findings on climatic changes in the Arctic.
The observations made by Shishmaref residents are not necessarily of a 
comprehensive set of changes observed on the landscape, but are those changes that were 
discussed through the interviewing process. The following Figures catalog changes in the 
climate (e.g. stronger currents on the ocean side of the island) that were identified by two
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or more individuals during interviews. In cases where an observation of change was 
mentioned by only one interviewee, I have given the individual’s name and the date of 
the interview. To compare Shishmaref residents’ observations with scientific data on 
climate change in the Arctic, I use the framework adopted by Hinzman et al.’s (2005) 
article, which summarizes Arctic climate change research with a particular focus on 
Alaska, and is meant as a literature survey, which incorporates research from a variety of 
disciplines.
Overlaps between Shishmaref observations of climate change and scientific data 
on Arctic climate change fit into five broad categories of change: weather, permafrost 
thaw, thermokarst ponds, freeze-up, and coastal erosion. These categories are 
interrelated, particularly in interview data from Shishmaref, so that permafrost thaw and 
erosion, for example, are co-occurring, mutually constituting phenomena. They are 
separated out here for comparative purposes.
4.2.1 Weather
Weather throughout the Arctic has been observed to be increasingly 
unpredictable. In my interview data, unpredictability was tied specifically to ice and wind 
conditions. Ice unpredictability and a decrease in ice thickness in the Shishmaref data, 
like weather unpredictability in the Arctic climate change literature, are recognized as 
creating hazardous travel conditions. Shishmaref residents particularly identified 
increased windiness, warmer winter temperatures, longer fall seasons, and fluctuations in
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winter wind direction as changes that have occurred within one lifetime. Figure 4.1 
summarizes overall weather changes observed in Shishmaref and in the Arctic.
Climate change 
observation comparison
Time Frame
Shishmaref interviews
Changes in weather and ice
Stronger winds, changes in 
winter wind direction 
(consistently north winds in 
winter now -  used to be more 
variable); spring and fall 
longer, winter shorter 
Erosion along the island, sea 
ice changes
Wind and temperature were 
specifically referenced in my 
interviews -  weather 
variability may be implied, but 
I did not specifically ask about 
variability and interviewees 
did not specifically identify 
increased variability
Recent decades -  within one 
lifetime
Hinzman et al. 2005
Weather changes
Greater variability, less 
predictable weather
Increased mortality to plants 
and animals; greater hazards 
in traveling; Krupnik and Jolly 
2002; Simpson et al., 2002; 
L’Heureaux et al., 2004
North America 
Changed synoptic patterns
Stronger winds and changes in 
wind direction were not 
mentioned in Hinzman et al. 
2005
Recent decades
Figure 4.1: Changes in weather patterns
4.2.2 Permafrost thaw
Thawing permafrost has been consistently observed by Shishmaref residents and 
in research on climate changes in the Arctic. In Shishmaref and throughout Kigiqtaamiut 
and Tapqagmiut territory, residents constantly engage and observe the landscape. 
Permafrost thawing is experienced, not just observed, and changes in time are marked by 
personal histories. For example, Clifford Weyiouanna remembers building his reindeer 
corral 30 years ago, hitting ice at one foot below ground level. Today he can dig much 
further without hitting ice. Fred Eningowuk had to move a cabin on Serpentine River 
because shifting permafrost caused infrastructure damage. Changes in permafrost have 
also been swift. Residents report that when permafrost and ground ice is exposed to the 
ocean, erosion processes speed up exponentially. Permafrost thaw is also linked to 
draining tundra lakes. Figure 4.2 outlines these observations.
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Climate change
observation
comparison
Shishmaref interviews
Permafrost thawing
Easy to dig into the ground, 
which used to be frozen; 
visual changes in landscape, 
cabins sinking
Exposed permafrost “ice” at 
the coastal shoreline which, 
following exposure, rapidly 
erodes; have had to move 
cabins and camps 
Erosion noticed particularly 
at Cape Espenberg hills, at 
Serpentine, and on the ocean 
side of the island -  but many 
people point out erosion 
happens on both sides of the 
island -  linked to erosion by 
interviewees.
Snow fall has not changed 
significantly (Clifford 
Weyiouanna)
Time frame No longer than two
generations
Figure 4.2: Changes in permafrost
Hinzman et al. 2005
Permafrost thawing
2-4 degrees C warming; 
thawing; Osterkamp and 
Romanovsky, 1999; Clow and 
Urban 2002; Romanovsky et al. 
2002
Thermokarst, infrastructure 
damage
Alaska
Warmer air temperature, changes 
in snow
Since the late 1800s, especially 
last decade
4.2.3 Thermokarst ponds
Figure 4.3 identifies an effect of permafrost erosion and anthropogenic warming 
that is of particular importance to the Arctic and sub-Arctic, and may have important 
effects on hydrological regimes on the Seward Peninsula -  such as the availability of 
fresh water.
The important processes involved in thermokarst include thaw, ponding, 
surface and subsurface drainage, surface subsistence and related erosion.
These processes are capable of rapid and extensive modification of the 
landscape and predicting, preventing or controlling thermokarst in a major 
challenge for northern development (Yoshikawa and Hinzman 2003:152) 
Thermokarst is not a commonly used word in Shishmaref but residents have observed 
large ponds that have completely disappeared and new channels draining into the ocean 
where these ponds may be draining through. This kind of extreme topographical change 
that is quick enough for residents to observe in a single lifetime, or even within the span 
of a single year, corresponds with hydrological data suggesting rapid changes to the water 
regime on the Seward Peninsula.
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Climate change
observation comparison
Shishmaref interviews [ Hinzman et aL 2005
Decrease in area
Landscape and vegetation 
changes; Yoshikawa and 
Hinzman, 2003
Seward Peninsula, Alaska 
Degradation of permafrost
1951-2000 
Figure 4.3: Changes to thermokarst ponds
4.2.4 Freeze up
Shishmaref residents repeatedly indicate that the ocean and lagoon freeze later 
than they used to. Freeze up and spring break up are momentous occasions on the island, 
as the in-between states of water “trap” people on the island and prevent easy travel to 
and from the mainland or out into the ocean to look for sea mammals. This means that 
freeze up and break up dates are clearly recorded. Clifford Weyiouanna remembers his 
father consistently traveling across the lagoon with a dog team on his birthday. This sets 
the freeze up date of the lagoon to October 22nd. This date can be measured against freeze
3 big lakes that emptied out 
-  “there was a little creek 
attached to them. I think the 
permafrost melted and 
drained them out.”
New channels, landscape 
changes
Approx. 5 miles west of 
Sarichef Island
Permafrost thawing
Time Frame Last few years
up dates today. In my interview set, Shishmaref residents did not discuss the freeze up 
and break up of river systems -  though this does not suggest that the freeze up and break 
up of rivers had not changed. Hinzman et al.’s summary of the literature discusses river 
freeze up and break up exclusively -  not sea ice or lagoon ice. I have combined and 
compared these observations in Figure 4.4 because they are related to similar climate 
drivers, but they are observations of different hydrological systems.
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Climate change
observation comparison
Climate driver (i 
Shishmaref, this 
expressed as co-i 
features)
Shishmaref interviews
Later freeze up
Later freeze up of lagoon 
and ocean ice; “It freezes in 
December, when I was 
young it started to freeze in 
October.” (Clifford 
Weyiouanna).
Thinner ocean ice; thin ice 
can mean dangerous 
conditions for hunters; 
difficult to travel by snow 
machine on the ocean or 
across the lagoon 
Chuckchi Sea and 
Shishmaref Inlet
Warmer temperatures in 
winter, longer falls and 
springs
In Shishmaref my 
interviewees discussed the 
ocean and lagoon freeze up 
and break up more than the 
rivers-
Time Frame In two generations -  when
the lagoon was consistently 
frozen by the end of 
October.
Figure 4.4: Changes to freeze up and break up
4.2.5 Coastal erosion
Finally, Shishmaref residents are experiencing coastal erosion -  the rapid loss of 
land and shoreline as bluffs on the island, and hills and bluffs along the mainland coast 
disappear. Coastal erosion on Sarichef Island is linked directly to migration outcomes -
Hinzman et al. 2005
Later freeze up, earlier 
break up
Earlier breakup, delayed 
freeze-up; Magnunson et 
al., 2000; Riihland et al., 
2003
Longer open water season; 
changes in aquatic ecology; 
riverine transportation
Lake/River: northern 
hemisphere
Warmer air temperatures
The Hinzman et al. 2005 
paper does not list ocean or 
lagoon ice as having later 
freeze-up
1900s to present
as Sarichef Island diminishes, the chances of flooding increase and permanent inundation 
of the island with floodwaters becomes more likely. It is important to point out that 
coastal erosion is not confined to Sarichef Island -  though erosion on the island causes 
the greatest risk to residents. Large-scale erosion of cliffs along the mainland coast, 
especially at Cape Espenberg, is also reported. Coastal erosion in the climate change 
literature has been reported and associated with warming temperatures in the Arctic. 
Government reports also predict that anthropogenic climate change will intensify the 
need for relocation options for communities experiencing coastal erosion. “Since 2003, 
state officials have identified the growing impacts of climate change, increasing the 
urgency of federal and state efforts to identify imminently threatened villages and assess 
their relocation options” (USGAO 2009:1). Figure 4.5 compares climate change research 
with local observations.
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Climate change
observation comparison
Shishmaref interviews Hinzman et at 2005
Heavy erosion rates 
throughout the coast
Coastal Erosion
Increasing rates of erosion Increased erosion rates,
throughout Kigiqtaamiut and Osterkamp et al., 2000
Tapqagmiut territory
Sea Walls become necessary; Increased sediment and carbon
Relocation
Sarichef island, Serpentine 
River, Cape Espenberg
flux to ocean, infrastructure 
damage
Barrow Alaska
\ Stronger current, permafrost Shift of storm winds, active
| thawing, increasingly violent submarine erosion
* winds
Stronger currents were 
mentioned in multiple 
interviews -  this does not 
come up in Hinzman et al. 
2005.
Increasing since 1974 1949-2000Time Frame
Figure 4.5: Changes in coastal erosion patterns
4.2.6 Climate change in Shishmaref: A conclusion 
There is widespread ecological change occurring in the Arctic, and Arctic 
residents observe and respond to these changes. When I spoke with Shishmaref residents, 
one of the more overwhelming experiences for me was the level of detail and specificity 
with which most people spoke of the landscape and of changes in the landscape. Very 
rarely were statements generalized, cataclysmic, or propagandists. More often statements 
were qualified by personal experience, exact location, and precise detail. The situated 
nature of observation and experience in Shishmaref with ecological shift, consistent with 
that of other Inupiaq groups, compels anthropologists to take the oral record very
seriously, particularly when interpreting the “grounded truths” of scientific statements 
(Callison 2010:55). These frameworks for interpreting changes in the landscape are 
locally specific discourses that do not always conform to the “climate change” discourse 
directed by science-media-policy norms, and the label “climate change” can diminish 
complex, grounded, local knowledge (Marino and Schweitzer 2009). It is illuminating to 
consider these discourses as parallel narratives assessing the same contours of landscape, 
which identify similar but slightly divergent experiences and phenomena as appropriate 
“data” for interpretation. The similarities in these discourses are apparent in the tables 
above. When the discourses diverge -  there is tension.
The next section investigates the extent to which anthropogenic climate change 
can be directly “blamed” for coastal erosion on Sarichef Island. For the purposes of 
understanding disaster and vulnerability, this might ordinarily be considered a moot 
point. Coastal erosion and flooding (a natural hazard) meet a population in a condition of 
vulnerability (the Kigiqtaamiut) and produce a disaster -  the climate drivers for hazards 
are not part of the investigative model. However, there is increasing speculation from a 
long-time Arctic archeologist that the “narrative” of and from Shishmaref concerning 
climate change and erosion is divergent from “geological reality” (Mason et al. in press). 
This dichotomy between the Shishmaref “narrative” and “geological reality” obscures 
complicated cultural processes both among media representations and among the lives of 
the Kigiqtaamiut themselves, who observe and interpret landscape both differently from 
and similarly to scientists searching out “geological reality.”
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The previous discussion on anthropogenic climate changes in Shishmaref and in 
the Arctic is meant to present changes on the landscape, seascape, and weather in as 
accurate detail as possible -  demonstrating a changing Arctic environment that is 
observed and experienced by climate change scientists and Arctic residents alike. That 
the landscape is changing, and that this is linked in part to greenhouse gas emissions and 
anthropogenic warming, is beyond doubt or reproach.
This next section examines the extent to which anthropogenic climate change is 
creating risk through coastal erosion. Framing a conversation about erosion in terms of 
the percentage of erosion created by anthropogenic climate change (instead of 
development or natural processes) is problematic, in part because there is no research that 
separates the drivers of coastal erosion on the ground, and in part because the outcomes 
and experiences for residents are not different whether erosion is a natural process, an 
outcome of development, one linked to greenhouse gas emissions, or (as is most likely 
the case) a combination of these three factors. Nevertheless, the following section 
engages this conversation as a gateway for understanding other factors precipitating 
erosion, as well as the reasons why Shishmaref residents came to inhabit Sarichef Island 
in the first place.
4.3 What if Anthropogenic Climate Change is Not Causing Erosion in Shishmaref?
In a provocative new chapter on Shishmaref erosion, dissenting (and highly 
experienced) archeologist Owen Mason makes the following claims,
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The prevailing narrative from Shishmaref represents it as “the front line” 
of climate change. (...) Shishmaref does [original emphasis] face a duel 
threat, both from coastal erosion and from the thinning and disappearance 
of sea ice that may cripple its subsistence economy (...) Missing from the 
media and community conversation is that the 1 km-long bluff on which 
the modem village is concentrated is a developed coastal reach that has 
been subject to nearly 75 years of erosion control efforts and that its 
erosion history differs significantly from that of adjacent undeveloped 
coasts on the Seward Peninsula. In terms of historic erosion processes, 
Shishmaref more resembles some areas of the New Jersey shore and is 
better understood as a battle in the ongoing “war” between the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (ACE) and the shore (Mason et al. in press).
Understanding anthropogenic-induced climate change effects on erosion at a particular 
bluff, on an extremely small island, with little recorded (not including the oral record) 
data from the last 100 years is very difficult -  if not impossible. Add to this difficulty 
consistent development and human intervention (nearly 75 years of erosion control) and 
parsing out natural processes, anthropogenic climate change processes, and the effects of 
development on erosion rates is difficult and, if possible, has not been done. Mason’s 
article documents that even the extent of erosion itself is unknown. In Shishmaref, 
scientists are not even sure how much land exactly has eroded over the last 100 years -  
much less which isolated climate (or development) mechanisms were at play. For
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example, an Army Corps of Engineers report “produced an erosion total for the last 31 
years that is 57% higher than CU (Colorado University) rate” (Mason et al. in press).
Mason also points out that erosion rates are highly variable across decades, and 
that erosion rates prior to 1950 were higher than contemporary erosion rates (lower 
erosion rates coincide with shoreline stabilization and protection projects in Shishmaref, 
though these projects may have actually increased erosion rates compared to undeveloped 
coastline). He shows that erosion rates were highest in the 1970s (when relocation was 
first being discussed [Percy Nayokpuk]) and in the early 2000s (when interest in 
relocation began again in earnest and the community relocation vote occurred).
Mason’s assessment is that 75 years of development has increased erosion rates 
on the island compared to undeveloped coasts, particularly before 2003 when revetment 
and other sea wall projects may have increased erosion rates on unprotected parts of the 
island by intensifying and redirecting wave action and wave energy to unprotected 
coastal areas of the island. A second claim from Mason is that popularly quoted erosion 
rates, most often attributed in the media to local estimates (Mason calls them 
“anecdotes”), do not reflect actual scientific data (though scientific data is also highly 
variable).
Mason’s article arguably presents the best scientific data on erosion, storm action, 
and erosion protection for Sarichef Island and Shishmaref to date. What his article 
implies is that the automatic link between anthropogenic climate change, erosion on 
Sarichef Island, and migration linked to erosion lacks sufficient substantiation within the 
scientific literature. Mason’s review of the scientific data, including his own field notes,
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implies that climate change is not the sole driver (or even a substantial driver) of coastal 
erosion on Sarichef Island, nor has erosion on Sarichef Island substantially increased over 
the last 30 years. How much of the decrease in erosion on the island is linked to shoreline 
stabilization is unclear -  particularly since the sea wall projects beginning in 2003. The 
Army Corps of Engineers disagrees with Mason’s assessment in a government report, 
writing, “Climatic conditions have led to icepack development occurring later and later 
each year. Without the icepack in place, the island is more susceptible to fall and early 
winter storms that have increased erosion and littoral drift [my emphasis]” (USACE 
2006:32). The Corps also estimates that erosion rates in Shishmaref will increase to the 
point of island inundation and/or increasing flood -  risks that essentially destroy a large 
percentage of critical infrastructure. The following map in Figure 4.6 was developed by 
the Corps to show projected coastline erosion under current conditions. These 
discrepancies may be due to a scarcity of information, different analytic methods, and the 
inability to parse out anthropogenic climate effects from development and other effects. 
What is important in Mason’s article, however, is compelling data demonstrating that 
erosion rates have increased due to development, and the significant statement that coast 
erosion is a natural process of barrier islands. My interview data corroborates this second 
claim.
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Red line: year 2053 Purple line: year 2013
Yellow line: year 2028 Green line: year 2004
Figure 4.6: Map of predicted and historical shorelines of Shishmaref, Alaska
4.3.1 We knew the island would disappear; so why do we live here?
In multiple interviews, Shishmaref residents repeated a common local dictum that 
says the Shishmaref barrier island chain is going to disappear into the ocean, and that 
elders of the Kigiqtaamiut people always knew this would be the case. In an interview 
with one Shishmaref resident, she reported:
My grandparents used to talk about it. Even their parents used to say, 
when you guys get older you’re going to see big storms; you’re going to
see our land get smaller. And when our grandparents lived long enough to 
see that happening they say, ‘our parents told us about this.’ Some of them 
didn’t even want to be buried here even on the island. [They said] When I 
die, will you please bury me somewhere else, not here. My great uncle is 
buried in Deering because he knew Shishmaref was going to be relocated 
some day and he didn’t want to be disturbed. He died in 1998.
Fred Eningowuk told me that “the elders always knew the ocean would take back this 
island, take back what it created.” Multiple individuals made similar statements in other 
interviews. While residents observe climatic and terrestrial changes in Shishmaref, and 
while coastal erosion in generalthroughout Kigiqtaamiut territory, has been widely 
observed and reported as increasing by Shishmaref residents (likely due to permafrost 
thaw and the effects of a warming climate), they also recognize that the Chukchi Sea 
Coast and specifically the Shishmaref barrier islands are a fluctuating and impermanent 
landscape.
If the Kigiqtaamiut knew that the barrier island was impermanent, and would 
subsequently be at risk of flooding and erosion as the ocean “took back what it created,” 
then why do people live there? In July 2008, at the beginning of this dissertation research, 
Tony Weyiouanna relayed the statement with which I opened this chapter: “People aren’t 
talking about the past, about why villages were here in the first place. And they’re not 
talking about the future -  what it’s going to be like for our kids.” Trusting his expertise in 
this early interview, I added a series of questions to my subsequent interview scripts 
regarding where interviewees and their ancestors were bom and what made them relocate
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to Sarichef Island and the village of Shishmaref permanently. Tony told me this before I 
read Susan Cutter’s work on the political ecological model of vulnerability and before I 
knew that social scientists studying disasters had been increasingly investigating why 
certain, politically marginalized people, tend to live in “risky” areas. So while my 
research did not begin with this theoretical lens, deciding to ask these questions was 
consistent with the analytic approach adopted by other work on the anthropology of 
disaster.
Overwhelmingly, residents answered the question, “Why did you, your parents, or 
your grandparents move permanently to Shishmaref?” in one of three ways: (1) this is a 
good place to hunt sea mammals and have access to the mainland; (2) the BIA built a 
school here; or (3) this is a good place to hunt and the BIA built a school here. Most 
often, my interviewees answered (3). The following excerpts give examples of responses. 
Interview with John Sinnok July 18, 2008 
EM: Were you bom here?
JS: Bom and raised.
EM: Were your parents bom here?
JS: My mom was bom here, in this area. I’m not sure if it was here in this 
village -  but according to my grandparents they lived inland a lot. My 
dad’s family came from Wales. They were reindeer herders. He brought 
his family and reindeer this way. So my mom got married to William.
EM: Do you know why they moved from inland and settled in 
Shishmaref?
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JS: Well, it’s always been a traditional village (...) this has always been a 
good central place to hunt. Our community is mainly built for seal 
hunting. This has always been a very good place to access the ocean 
during the spring, during the fall. And then from here we can travel to the 
river and then up and down the coast. So, people originally moved here 
because it’s a good location. Plus, at the same time, the school was built 
here.
Interview with Fred Eningowuk September 25, 2009 
EM: Where were you bom?
FE: Shishmaref
EM: Do you know where your parents were bom?
FE: Shishmaref, I believe.
EM: Where did they grow up?
FE: Here.
EM: Do you know where your grandparents were bom?
FE: I’m not exactly sure, but my grandparents they grew up all along the 
coast, so it doesn’t mean that they were bom here, it just means this 
general area.
EM: Do you know why they moved to Shishmaref permanently?
FE: They moved here permanently because of the school, BIA school, 
required everybody to go to school and so this became a permanent 
settlement, otherwise there were other settlements up and down the coast.
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EM: Did people want to come here?
FE: (...) To my knowledge the Ikpik people were the last ones to move 
into the settlement.
EM: How was the island used before the school?
FE: Shishmaref was used as a seasonal site. Where they used to, come 
springtime, they would come camp out on the coast depending on ice 
conditions -  to put away dry meat, seal oil, and what not.
Interview with Tommy Obruk May 17, 2010 
EM: Where were your parents bom?
TO: Right here too, but Shishmaref was kind of spread out, long ago, 
before the school and the church. From Cape Espenburg to Ikpik. After the 
school and the church came they decide to have Shishmaref [in the] 
central part.
Like I said, it was the elders that decided for their families, you know, 
where it was easier for them to hunt. North sea for springtime hunt and for 
fishing a seal hunting in the lagoon, and moose and salmon berries and 
fish nets, berry picking or mostly up in Serpentine flats and I think that’s 
why they choose island of Shishmaref.
Interview with Brice Eningowuk September 24, 2009 
EM: Where were your grandparents bom?
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BE: Down the coast I think. Most of them down the coast, some of them at 
Tin Creek.
EM: Where did they grow up?
BE: Mostly in Shishmaref.
EM: What do you know about when people decided to live on the island 
fulltime?
BE: I know that when [they came] fulltime was probably when the BIA 
school and the post office were set up here, early 1900s. From there 
everything kind of coalesced around the school.
It is no surprise to anyone who has spent time in rural Alaska that school development 
was a U.S. strategy to promote the sedentarization of native peoples (Berardi 1999). 
Considering that today 200 Alaska Native villages are subject to flooding and erosion 
(USGAO 2009:1), and that the literature suggests ecologically “risky” conditions are 
social constructions of political ecology, the facts of colonial history necessitate careful 
examination. In the following section, we trace the historical use of Sarichef Island 
through the literature, through contemporary hunting practices, and through oral histories, 
examining changes in mobility patterns and laying out as specifically as possible if and 
how historical development and colonial processes have contributed to vulnerability and 
risk.
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4.4 The Island is a Center of Subsistence
Nearly everyone I have interviewed, including people who were relocation 
activists and community organizers, were saddened by the idea of leaving Sarichef Island 
and the village of Shishmaref. At some point during interview sessions, without 
prompting, many interviewees made note that Shishmaref was a perfect access point for 
sea mammals, especially seals -  the subsistence foods through which, by hunting, storing, 
and eating, Shishmaref people express their cultural vitality most publicly. During many 
interviews people claimed that even if they moved to the mainland, they would have to 
return to Shishmaref and pitch tents in the springtime to conduct the seal hunt (e.g.
Minnie Sinnok July 18, 2008). Moving further away from the sea is a tremendous 
concern to some residents who think life will be harder -  and this is true even of people 
who promote relocation.
Interview with Fred Eningowuk September 25, 2009 
If we were to move to the mainland it’s going to be a lot harder to live the 
way we are living right now because we subsist off the ocean, the land, the 
lagoon. Come the springtime if we move to the mainland we’re going to 
have a lot harder access to the ocean to do our spring hunt. Usually that 
time is when the ice is, the lagoon ice is not very safe to travel on to get to 
the ocean. (...) I think we would have a lot of accidents with these 
younger generations trying to get to the ocean.
Sarichef Island is located five miles away from a fresh water source and allows 
travel up and down the coast for seals and other sea mammals (such as walrus, though
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some people claim walrus hunting is relatively recent -  which differs from Burch 2006) 
and access to river drainages and caribou hunting locations. Traveling inland, residents 
can access land mammals, river fish, greens and berries, which are important, but there is 
no doubt that Shishmaref residents are and have been oriented towards the sea. The 
ancestors of the Kigiqtaamiut -  the greater political and geographical nation, the 
Tapqagmiut -  were coastal people and marine mammal hunters. The following 
summarizes a history of that cultural legacy.
4.4.1 A history of the island people
The Seward Peninsula coast has been inhabited by a rich, complex diversity of 
cultures, technologies, economies and ideas for thousands of years prior to the whaling 
traditions that brought Russian Cossacks and European whalers to the Northwest coast of 
Alaska. The Arctic Small Tool Tradition -  which lasted for over 3000 years 
(approximately 2900 BCE to 1000 AD) and is associated with diverse economic 
strategies and technological expertise (Lutz 1982:143, Giddings 1960:122) -  is an 
example of that rich history.
The Seward Peninsula and the Bering Strait region in general is known as being 
the most significant migratory access point into North America. Instead of viewing the 
Seward Peninsula as a permanent migratory route, Giddings stresses that “the emphasis 
can be, for a time, on the cultural stability of a Bering Strait which is a center, rather than 
a way-station, of circumpolar ideas” (Giddings 1960:121). The Bering Strait as a region 
has the character of being consistently inhabited, and archeological records demonstrate
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continuous technological advances and extensive trade routes. This allows for both 
cultural stability and dynamic change. Patterns of mobility also exhibit the characteristics 
of stability and dynamism in consort. Changes in the landscape, including unstable sea 
levels, fluid coastlines, and the destruction of village sites have been reoccurring 
conditions (Wisniewski 2011:46), and communities have adapted by making selective 
change and selective maintenance to social and cultural habits, technologies, and 
customs. Traditional mobility patterns throughout the Northwest Coastal region of Alaska 
demonstrate the fluidity of change and tradition.
By the 19th century on the Seward Peninsula, Inupiaq people along the Bering 
Strait were sedentary seasonal. Movement was governed by seasonal employment (Burch 
1975; Koutsky 1981). Seasonal rounds and human migration were determined by animal 
movements and availability (Burch 2006:31-52), by ice conditions, and by the weather. 
Shishmaref residents today are mostly descended from the Tapqagmiut. The Tapqagmiut 
people were a loosely joined “nation”3 of family groups (Burch 1998), who shared 
dialects, lands, and punctuated feasting periods and festivals throughout the year. Figure 
4.7 shows the “nations” of the Seward Peninsula in the 19th century with the island and 
Shishmaref identified in the northwest comer of the peninsula.
Nations in the Seward Peninsula stayed within their respective territories for most 
subsistence activities -and seasonal rounds differed between nations. Some Seward 
Peninsula Inupiaq nations moved inland for fall and winter. For the Tapqagmiut, fall and
3 Alternately identified as a “society” (Burch 2006: 1) or a “tribe”, the Inupiat word for 
these family groups is nunaqatigiitch “people related to each other through possession of 
the land” (Burch 1998: 14, 2006: 29).
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winter settlements were located along the coast. At freeze-up (or possibly earlier) smaller 
family groups would gather at a larger, more permanent village site, and remain there 
through break-up (Burch 2006:45). People were not immobile during the winter, and 
would travel inland for caribou hunting, but over-winter villages were more stable places 
to gather. Housing structures in these villages, which we will discuss later in this chapter, 
reflected greater permanence.
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Figure 4.7: Map by Josh Wisniewski (2011) based on work by Burch (2006).
During break-up, at the height of the ugruk hunt, Tapqagmiut would move out 
along the coast -  including moving onto the shore ice itself to hunt for seals. “So all the
camp sites that we had along the coast were based on what the ice conditions were going 
to be. But those days (...) just by looking at the ocean ice you could pretty much predict 
what the ice was going to do” (Clifford Weyiouanna July 21, 2008). During the spring 
and summer, Tapqagmiut families spread out over their land for inland hunting and 
fishing. Burch estimates that the population of the Shishmaref region in 1800 was about 
510 (Burch 2006:7).
Mobility throughout the year, while patterned, was also dynamic. As the quote 
above by Clifford Weyiouanna indicates, decisions about movements, camps, and 
mobility were made following an analysis of weather and ice conditions. The 
particularities of any given minute, day, season, or year could significantly influence 
where a small family group or larger family unit would move to and whether or not they 
would gather or disperse. High mobility therefore allowed for flexibility to weather 
conditions.
Kigitaq, or “Old Shishmaref,” was the largest winter settlement in the 
Tapqagmiut region and was located on Sarichef Island. While archeological excavation 
has not been carried out on the island itself, items found on the island by residents have 
been dated to 1400-1500 AD (Mason et al. in press). The following map in Figure 4.8 
identifies development from the 20th and 21st century and the site of “Old Shishmaref.”
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Figure 4.8: (Map of island taken from Mason et al. in press, radiocarbon dates from 
Mason 1996)
“Old Shishmaref’ sits on a low sand bluff on the east side of the island that, while at a 
low elevation and close to the water, is on an area of the island that has not experienced 
significant erosion (Mason et al. in press).
According to Susan Fair, the Inupiaq designation Kigiqtaamiut traditionally 
referred to families who were identified with this over-winter village (Fair 1997:472). 
The Kigiqtaamiut, or “people of the island,” were Tapqagmiut who used the island as a 
sea mammal staging ground. Other over-winter villages include Ikpik and areas around 
Cape Espenberg.
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Families in Shishmaref today are still associated with the traditional village sites 
most utilized by their ancestors. Localized knowledge — including knowledge of place 
names and landscape -  is linked to specific family groups and where they spent the 
winter prior to settling on the island. Today, traditional land tenure is loosely maintained 
in the village and informal rights to hunting and gathering locations are dependent on 
family histories.4 For example, families originally from the Ikpik area down the coast or 
families from up the coast at and near the Cape Espenberg area return to these places to 
hunt, fish and gather. In the following excerpt Clifford Weyiouanna identifies specific 
people and families who have locally recognized access to and knowledge of traditionally 
inhabited areas.
Interview with Clifford Weyiouanna July 21,2008 
“D- -  he knows all the names from Serpentine east, every little hill, every 
little creek. He’ll admit, he don’t know nothing on the west side, because 
that’s (east of Serpentine) where his parents did most of their subsistence 
hunting. And you take the O—  and they’re all on the west side -  Ikpik.
They know that area real well. I grew up in Arctic River -  our families had 
special areas that they went to.”
4 Maintenance of traditional subsistence land tenure makes the relocation of Shishmaref 
residents into a neighboring village problematic. A primary finding from the Army Corps 
of Engineer’s cultural impact assessment regarding relocating Shishmaref (Schweitzer 
and Marino 2006) was that relocating to a nearby village was not a tenable solution for 
permanent relocation. Shishmaref residents reported instances of historical violence 
between the Kigiqtaamiut people and some villages to the North. Residents also 
commented that they would not have access to berry patches and hunting areas, as these 
areas were delineated for people from the area.
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In spite of continuing to identify specific families with early, pre-colonial (and post­
colonial, as some Ikpik families didn’t move into the village until the 1950s) settlements, 
the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition website identifies all Shishmaref residents today as 
Kigiqtaamiut -  people of the island. This is another example of selective social 
adaptation through a combination of selective change and dynamism. While land tenure 
to some degree is maintained through continuous family use of traditional hunting and 
fishing grounds, Shishmaref people today recognize themselves under a single Inupiaq 
place-name based designation -  the Kigiqtaamiut.
This economic history of the 19th century tells us that prior to colonization and 
sedentarization, the Tapqagmiut were scattered in smaller family groups throughout the 
region and would gather in smaller villages to over-winter. High mobility was an 
economic strategy, as Tapqagmiut people followed their resource base inland during the 
summer and onto the sea during seal mammal hunts. High mobility also allowed for 
flexibility. Seasonal migration was deeply connected to reading the weather, the animals 
and the ice, and knowing where one should be in relation to environmental, terrestrial, 
and oceanic conditions. One’s family group had patterned migration practices, but at any 
moment these patterns could change because of the weather. As such, this high mobility 
would constitute an extremely successful adaptation strategy to flooding and erosion.
4.4.2 Mobility and adaptation
If Shishmaref has been inhabited for at least 500 years and if the coast has always 
been dynamic and impermanent, then why was it not a risky location in the past? There 
are two probable answers to this question that are suggested from the literature and from 
my interviews. First, that as long as the island has been in use -  approximately 500 years 
-  it has never been inundated by water. And second, that high mobility was a successful 
adaptation strategy to protect against flooding and erosion5 because movement off island 
could be quick and efficient and infrastructure losses were minimal.
In interviews and in casual conversation I routinely asked whether or not there 
were old stories of flooding -  before the school or post office was built. I did not find an 
oral history of a flooding disaster before people were permanently settled on the island. 
This suggests (but does not prove) that the island has not been inundated with water for 
the last 500 years.
This is not to say that Tapqgamiut people did not experience flooding events. 
When unusual flooding hazards or high water events occurred prior to sedentarization, it 
appears that people simply moved “to higher ground,” as demonstrated by the following 
interview with a Shishmaref elder, Tommy Obruk.
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5 Mobility into another nation’s territory was also an important social insurance during 
times of scarcity and food insecurity (Burch and Correll, 1972: 32), though one that could 
be lethal without appropriate social alliances. Schweitzer and Golovko write, “contacts 
among individuals from different communities were always potentially problematic and 
hostile, as long as no kinship or partnership relations had been established. Individuals 
who had such relationships in other communities could travel freely and thus extend their 
existing social networks” (1997: 175).
Interview with Tommy Obruk, May 17, 2010
EM: Did you ever hear of any old stories about flooding?
T: Twice, I think, I witnessed a tidal wave. One at fall time, when they 
were in skin boats and we flooded up the river. We had to move to higher 
ground, up in the hills.
Mobility and retreat to higher ground or away from the coast seems commonplace in the 
Seward Peninsula. In a letter written by Sister Anna Huseth, a missionary from 
Minnesota who was stationed in Teller from 1919-1928 she writes,
Our little village, when the spring break-up comes, is flooded so that we 
must move out. We pack provisions and tents and go inland to camp 
where we fish and hunt so as to get our winter supply of food ready 
(Huseth n.d.).
The ability to “move to higher ground” corresponds to flexibility and is adaptive in the 
sense that flooding events did not lead to flooding disasters. Sister Anna Huseth 
referenced flooding as habitual, but not problematic, linked to the sheer ability to move. 
Flexibility through mobility in this context is not only the movement of people, but also 
the mobility of equipment, housing, cultural meaning, and social practice.
High mobility is tied most explicitly in the literature to infrastructure. Binford, in 
a summaiy of hunter-gatherer housing structures introduces a meta-analysis of dwelling 
structures this way, “I think it is fair to say that all else being equal, there is a very 
general inverse relationship between mobility and investment in housing” (Binford 
1990:120).
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Housing and infrastructure in the Bering Strait region were qualitatively different 
from other indigenous regions in Northern Asia, and different from infrastructure 
throughout the southwestern region of Alaska, along the coast, and all the way into 
California. “The recent authorities on the western Eskimo report structures that refuse to 
conform to expectancy” (Waterman 1924:290). Housing structures in the Bering Strait 
region were instead comparable to those on Baffin Island and Greenland. Housing 
structures during the 19th century were mostly made of timber, buried underground, and 
covered with sod. These dwellings would have a tunnel on the side that served as an 
entrance, and a hole in the top, which served as a flue where smoke could escape 
(Waterman 1924). These more permanent structures were built in winter settlements -  
those settlements that maintained larger and more permanent populations such as in “Old 
Shishmaref’ or Kigitaq.
Ekblaw identifies three distinct types of structures for Thule Eskimo peoples, 
whose dwelling structures resemble those of the Bering Strait Inupiaq populations. These 
are: (1) the tent, made of wooden poles, seal or other skins; (2) the icehouse, constructed 
while hunting on or off sea ice; and (3) and the more permanent sod house (Ekblaw 
1927). The first was/is used during the summer when smaller family groups are highly 
mobile, following land mammals and fish and gathering plant food. The second is 
likewise used as housing when hunters are following sea mammals, and is productive 
because of the ease with which the icehouse can be constructed -  conducive again to high 
mobility and used most frequently during seal mammal hunts in springtime for 
Tapqagmiut people.
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Using, in part, Murdoch’s work on Eskimo housing, Binford summarizes that in 
the case of seminomadic peoples (Murdoch identifies Eskimo peoples as seminomadic) 
more time and effort would be invested in winter settlements than in summer and spring 
hunting settlements. Infrastructure used in the summer and spring would not require a 
significant investment of time or resources, but even winter settlements could be 
reconstructed with relative ease and using materials found in the immediate territory or 
“nation.”
We can say, then, that dwelling structures on the Bering Strait, up until the 20th 
century, were conducive to mobility. The construction materials needed to build critical 
infrastructure on the Seward Peninsula through the 19th century were largely available: 
timber, skin, and sod. The skill sets needed to construct dwellings were part of a local 
repertoire of knowledge. According to Binford, local materials and in-group knowledge 
are the “investments” in infrastructure, and this infrastructure was transferable among 
residents, to different hunting grounds, and in deference to changing weather conditions, 
social conditions, and dynamic coastal conditions. Flexible infrastructure and high 
mobility even allowed hunters to exploit changing social conditions as non-Native 
whalers came into the region. Wisniewski notes that as commercial whaling ships began 
to over-winter in the Bering Strait region towards the end of the 19th century, “it was 
common practice for hired native hunters to set up satellite hunting camps away from the 
ships and further inland for caribou hunting in order to supply whaling crews with fresh 
meat throughout the winter” (Wisniewski 2011:56). Social habits and seasonal rounds 
were thus incorporated into patterns of high mobility. Eskimo life prior to the turn of the
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20th century was on the move -  and being on the move was a cultural and social 
relationship with the immediate environment that would have significantly reduced 
vulnerability to flooding.
4.5 Schools, Houses and Sea Walls: The Critical Development of Colonialism
“The old heathen home, from its very character, was a hot-bed o f vice. ’’ (Northern 
Canadian Methodist Missionary Thomas Crosby, 1907, quoted in Perry 2003: 587).
4.5.1 Civilizing and educating
The first written account of Tapqagmiut people engaging with non-Native 
explorers was July 4th, 1816, when Otto von Kotzebue landed on Sarichef Island and 
observed semi-subterranean houses (presumably Kigitak) and named both the island and 
Shishmaref Inlet (Grauman 1977:13-14). As the sailors came ashore, the Kigiqtaamiut 
present in the village retreated, though some members of the expedition later met with 
hostile Inupiat in the same area (Ray 1975:57; Ellana and Sherrod 2004) who launched 
projectiles towards the Russian sailors (Wisniewski 2011:52).
For the next 200 years, and particularly in the last 100 years, Kigiqtaamiut and 
Tapqagmiut social life would change profoundly due to the colonization of the Seward 
Peninsula. It is important to note that the Kigiqtaamiut have never been “locked in a 
historical vacuum” (Ellena and Sherrod 2004:23). Similarly to adaptation strategies 
employed by Tapqagmiut prior to Kotzebue’s landing, Kigiqtaamiut people made and 
continue to make selective changes in cultural traditions, social habits, and technological 
use as history unfolds and new situations arise. It is also clear that for Alaska Natives, the
last 100 years have been characterized by a history of outsiders imposing belief structures 
through powerful incentive programs, forced schooling, infrastructure development, 
economic giving and taking, and other mechanisms. This is the history of ideological and 
material imposition that we have come to understand as colonialism.
Federal development began in Shishmaref with the construction of a post office in 
1901, a government school in 1906, and a Lutheran Mission in 1930 (Koutsky 1981). The 
convergence of education and missionization became an explicit goal of the U.S. 
government following the end of the Indian wars and as the reservation systems became 
the standard bearer of indigenous affairs. “The use of missionaries in dealing with 
American Indians involved the objectives of wholesale cultural change and assimilation 
into American society -  principally through formal education commencing in 1871” 
(Ellanna and Sherrod 2004: 6). Alaska became a U.S. civil and judicial district in 1884, 
making way for education policies to be carried out under the jurisdiction of the Secretary 
of the Interior (Berardi 1999:333-335) shortly after a formal push to handle the 
“American Indian problem” through policies of education and civilization instead of 
removal. This project of civilization was often carried out pragmatically with 
infrastructure development.
On the Seward Peninsula, Sheldon Jackson promoted education and 
missionization (and industrialization through reindeer herding) most fervently. Jackson 
was appointed General Agent for Education in Alaska in 1885, and in spite of having 
very little experience in rural Alaska, was fundamental in its infrastructure and colonial 
development. Federal funding at the end of the 19th century was insufficient to build and
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staff extensive school and church facilities throughout rural Alaska, and so Jackson relied 
heavily on donations from Christian women’s groups (Steward 1908:263 in Ellanna and 
Sherrod 2005:73). Whether because of the need to raise funds or due explicitly to 
character and personal conviction, Jackson was prone to exaggeration and often described 
rural Alaska in over-stated conditions of squalor, poverty, and oppression. For the 
women’s church groups, he repeatedly spread the idea that Alaska Native women were 
considered exploitable property of their husbands. Significantly, as an excuse to bring in 
domestic reindeer herds (a third wheel of civilization: industry), he declared widespread 
famine throughout the Seward Peninsula at the end of the 20th century. The extent of this 
starvation period is controversial in the literature (for support see Burch 1998:47-50; 
Wisniewski 2011:60; for detractors see Ellanna and Sherrod 2004:76). Notably, he made 
the argument that the population at Kigitak had fallen from a height of 2000 people to a 
measly 80 -  this was a misinterpretation of the explorer Beechy’s estimated population of 
the entire Seward Peninsula coast. This exaggeration by Jackson lays an interesting 
foundation of hyperbolized threat for the purposes of aid and infrastructure development 
in Shishmaref.
Infrastructure development through schools and missions, and policies that 
required children to participate in school programs, resulted in consolidation of smaller 
over-winter villages to the centralized location of Sarichef Island, and population of the 
old settlement of Kigiqtak grew steadily over the next 100 years (Ellanna and Sherrod 
2004:11). The following list shows an increase in residents who lived permanently or
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semi-permanently on the island, particularly between 1912 and 1940, which correspond 
with a decline in year round habitation of smaller villages along the coast.
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Year Population
1912 131
1920 223
1940 257
1950 194
1957 175
1960 217
1970 267
1975 306
1980 394
1990 456
In my interviews, there are a variety of reactions to the development of the school 
and the church and their influence on Shishmaref today. Some people attribute forced 
policies requiring school attendance to be the catalyst for consolidation of family groups 
into the larger village. Others say that their elders knew the school was going to be 
important and so they chose to settle on the island. Most people fault the schools for 
forbidding kids to speak Inupiaq -  resulting in the loss of the language for most people 
under the age of 40. There are similarly mixed reactions from people I spoke with 
regarding missionaries. In one of my last days on the island I was caught off guard by a
young woman who fervently believed that God had sent the missionaries to save 
Shishmaref people. She felt lucky to have the opportunity to be Christian, unlike her 
ancestors. Other conversations I had on the island were more critical of the Christian 
influence, regretting the loss of Inupiaq dancing and other traditions. Christianity in 
Alaska Native communities is a complex spiritual system that incorporates new and old 
beliefs in varying ways (for a discussion see Ellana and Sherrod 2004:153-183). One 
thing remains true in reports of the BIA school -  which is that the school came before 
sedentarization and consolidation of family groups, and that these development decisions 
were outside of local planning. Even when interviewees discuss sedentarization as a 
result of the wisdom of elders -  it is always wisdom that came after the school was built. 
The original school infrastructure has never been, in all of my interviews, seen as a 
product of internal decision-making.
4.5.2 Modem infrastructure
The church and the school are still the largest buildings in Shishmaref today, and 
are accordingly where people gather for major events, from celebration and mourning to 
Christmas and athletic events. They are also evacuation centers for a major flooding 
event. It is difficult to trace the history of infrastructure on Sarichef Island outside of 
federally and church funded institutions such as the church, the mission, and the post 
office, but the transition from sod-house to framed house seems to have been gradual. In 
1919, a schoolteacher responding to the influenza epidemic of 1918 explains that in the 
village there were daily inspections of people and “igloos” (J.P. Jones 1919 in
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Wisniewski 2011:70). Presumably, the igloos he is referring to are subterranean houses. 
He makes no mention of framed houses being checked by the nurse during the epidemic.
A 1920 transitional house made of driftwood -  something between traditional 
sod-houses in Kigiqtak and framed houses already used at the way-station in Deering -  is 
described in Ellanna and Sherrod (2004), from oral histories taken with Gideon Kahlook 
Barr Sr. in 1991. These houses were located at Ublasaun, a village used by reindeer 
herders near Shishmaref following the importation of the reindeer herds to the area by 
Jackson.
In 1920, from the exterior, the village resembled several small hills with 
prodtruding smokestacks. A small skylight made of the translucent 
stomachs of walrus or of glass was set in the apex of each of these sod- 
covered mounds -  this skylight being large enough to emit light but small 
enough, hopefully, to deter the raiding paws of a polar bear.
Gideon remembers that the family’s 10-by-18 foot house at Ublasaun was 
constructed of driftwood. The small amount of scrap lumber available at 
Cape Espenberg was used to build the single bed for Thomas and Emily.
Gideon and his siblings slept on the floor (41).
Gideon also remembers the conversion from a seal oil lamp to a cast iron stove as 
coinciding with the transition to this type of housing structure. These intermediate 
housing structures stood more upright than traditional sod houses and were more 
dependent on outside materials such as glass, stove fixtures, and eventually lumber if
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sufficient driftwood was inaccessible -  but were not framed, were rounded at the top and 
the outside construction was made with mostly locally available materials.
Today most houses in Shishmaref are framed houses. The house I lived in was a 
rambling product of Richard Stasenko’s imagination and fortuity, a big house for 
Shishmaref. As he and Rachel had more kids, he added on -  room by room. Most houses 
in Shishmaref today are not self-designed projects (though some are), but are products of 
the federal government’s housing and urban development agency (HUD). The HUD 
agency was formally authorized by the United States Housing Act of 1937. In the 1960s 
HUD prioritized American Indians as recipients of federal funds to promote home 
ownership. It was significant for rural Alaska when, in 1970, “President Nixon 
announced a new Indian housing initiative under which the federal government 
committed to the construction of 30,000 new Indian housing units over five years. Alaska 
Senator Ted Stevens was influential in having HUD assign 6,000 of the units to meet the 
housing needs of Alaska Natives” (Botelho 1996:3). This political funding for homes 
followed the American Indian occupation of Alcatraz and increasing attention to the poor 
conditions of reservations across the United States. Many older houses in Shishmaref 
date to this era and at least two of my friends in Shishmaref live in homes that were 
previously their grandparents’.
In 1996, the HUD programs that were particularly aimed at providing low income 
housing to Alaska Native and American Indian populations were consolidated and 
reorganized into the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act 
(NAHASDA). This new legislation provides community block grants that are distributed
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through 14 regional housing authorities including the Bering Strait regional housing 
authority -  which serves Shishmaref.
4.5.3 Over-crowding and deteriorating infrastructure
Housing infrastructure and other service infrastructure, including piped water and 
sewer, are contentious issues in Shishmaref and many people I interviewed consider a 
housing shortage, overcrowded housing, and the lack of piped water and sewage a health 
issue. Shishmaref, unlike an increasing number o f rural Alaska Native villages, does not 
have critical infrastructure development including a new health clinic, piped water, and 
new housing. This lack of modem infrastructure is related to the community vote to 
relocate, organized by Kawerak, the Bering Strait regional native corporation. In most 
cases, infrastructure development projects in rural villages are the result of a competitive 
grant system filed through the Denali Commission or other state and federal agencies. 
Because Shishmaref has expressed the intent (through a vote) to relocate -  it is an 
undesirable location for investment and, following, community infrastructure 
development has been minimal since 2002.
New houses are rare. Finding land on the island that is on sufficiently high ground 
for new houses is a challenge. Small lakes on the island that were used as water sources 
have been filled in to make space -  yet the population continues to grow without 
adequate housing facilities. Multi-generational families with up to 12 people living in a 
single 3-bedroom dwelling are common in Shishmaref.
Interview with Anonymous, September 25, 2009 
A: If we’re to remain here on the island, a lot of our grants that we apply 
for to expand our community public buildings like multi-purpose building 
or elders/youth facility, like a rec center, a bigger school, a bigger clinic -  
that’s not possible because our island’s too small and it’s going to get 
smaller.
EM: If you think about what you would want in a new village, what do 
you see?
A: At least some sort of road that everybody could walk on. Running 
water, and just the fact that, you know, our community would finally be 
granted new buildings that we apply for so we don’t have to live in these 
third world conditions. Be civilized like everybody else. To be provided 
services like any other community.
I believe the lack of modem conveniences and housing is leading to brain drain -  though 
admittedly this is difficult to measure. This is an issue that is likely to increase if 
educated men and women who are poised to become local leaders are forced to live in 
overcrowded conditions. This is especially true for returning students with bachelor’s 
degrees, with jobs, and with money to pay for apartments or houses -  but without the 
infrastructure available on which to spend their money. I saw two exceptional young 
leaders move out of the village while I was there and at least one expressed that this was 
directly tied to the lack of conveniences and overcrowding.
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4.5.4 Sea walls and revetment development
Shoreline stabilization was needed to protect framed infrastructure almost as soon 
as permanent settlement of the island became standard for Tapqagmiut people. Sea walls 
and other revetment projects began in Shishmaref in the late 1940s and have included 
gabions -  concrete block and rock revetments -  as well as sea walls (Mason et al. in 
press). They constitute the “battle in the ongoing “war” between the U.S. Army Coprs of 
Engineers (ACE) and the shore” (Mason et al. in press). These projects have had different 
levels of success and local residents have different opinions about the success, failure, 
and the relative safety provided by sea wall and revetment projects.
Sea walls are controversial within the environmental migration community. Twice 
after I’ve presented conference papers on Shishmaref, audience members began to argue 
amongst themselves about the relative benefits for and against sea walls in Shishmaref 
and as a general ideological position. Like almost everything connected to Shishamref, 
for outsiders sea walls become a metaphor representing a larger issue, in this case 
technocratic versus flexible lifestyle solutions to for sustainable relationships between 
humans and the environment. Sea walls and revetment projects are expensive and have a 
short life span. They also protect critical infrastructure. Multiple times while in 
Shishmaref, I’ve heard that the official community strategic plan is to “first protect what 
we have, and then plan to relocate.” Protection means island shoreline stabilization. The 
following is a history of shoreline stabilization projects in Shishmaref based on Owen 
Mason’s work and the most recent erosion report by the Army Corps of Engineers.
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Though I am not qualified to offer expert analysis on the content of these reports, the 
history of sea walls and revetments are an important piece of the Shishmaref story.
According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the cost of erosion control in 
Shishmaref to date is estimated to top $9.5 million (USACE 2006:6). The lifetime costs 
of some revetment projects are estimated by Mason to be up to $260,000,000. “By 
contrast, the ACE “preferred alternative,” a 1,000 m revetment, has an estimated cost of 
$13 million and would involve considerably less up-keep costs” (Mason et al. in press).
The first shoreline protection placed a series of 55 gallon drums at the north side 
of a landing strip. The 1973 storms eradicated this effort. During the 1973 storm more 
than 50,000 sand bags were used to stabilize the bluffs located on the northwestern side 
of the island (Mason et al. in press). These may have successfully prevented erosion 
during a following large storm of 1974 -  but were broken by ice in subsequent years. In 
1982, a cement block revetment was constructed for 100 m along the bluffs, but failed 
during the first big storm, within a year of its construction (Mason et al. in press; Mason 
et al. 1997). In order to prevent continued erosion residents also pushed trucks, other 
vehicles, and old equipment over the shoreline. The following is a summary of sea wall 
construction since 2004.
In 2004, the BIA installed 200 feet of shoreline protection along the 
shoreline near the Native store. In 2005, the Corps installed 230 feet of 
protection connecting to the BIA project, extending to the east to protect 
the Shishmaref School. Also in 2005, the community of Shishmaref
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installed about 250 feet of protection extending to the east from the Corps 
project (USACE 2006:32).
In summary of these projects, the ACE states, “All efforts to arrest the erosion 
have been unsuccessful for other than short periods of time” (USACE 2006: 32). The 
Shishmaref barrier island chain is a series of dunes built up in the sea. Today boulders 
and rocks are barged in to prevent this sand from washing away. Everyone I speak to 
understands this as a temporary solution, including residents of Shishmaref.
Interview with Jennifer Demuir, September 23, 2009
EM: Do you think the island can be protected enough that people will not
need to move?
JD: The sea wall is just buying us a few more years. It won’t last forever, 
we’ve got fine sand out there. Those rocks are going to sink eventually.
Those are pretty big boulders.
All sea wall and revetment efforts to date have been put in place to protect critical 
infrastructure. There are no efforts to protect the southwest side of the island, where most 
residents have racks and equipment that are used to butcher, dry, and put away 
subsistence harvests, especially black ugruk meat. This leads to the loss every year of 
traditional technology and equipment -  this is a fine example of what the state 
ideologically feels is necessary to protect. Below is a summary of the history of sea walls 
given by resident John Sinnok.
Interview with John Sinnok, July 18, 2008 
EM: Do you want to relocate?
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JS: Yep. I can’t see any other reason why we shouldn’t. Like I just told 
you, the way that the village has been eroding, they’ve put rocks right in 
front of the village, but on the west side, is where we have our racks to dry 
our meat and my wife and I for the last three years, our racks are about 
maybe 20 feet. Every year for three years in a row we’ve had to replace 
them all. We’ve been three years in a row. We’ve lost at least 60 feet right 
there, our racks. If they don’t save that part all of that is going to erode and 
there’s just going to be this tiny village. And how much longer will those 
rocks stay. They’ve tried. In the 70s or sometime around there, they’ve 
tried to put a whole bunch of 55 gallon drums welded together right along 
that beach, right along that land. Those stayed for a while, but they all 
sunk. Few years later they tried the sand gabions. I think those are below 
my mom’s house. Used to be right by the Native store. Right there is used 
to be a long gentle slope and long flat land right there when we were kids. 
All that eroded. Then they put those gabions. I think that lasted for 25 
years. But then they didn’t do maintenance and it started eroding behind it. 
Couldn’t keep the erosion away anymore. Gabions were bags of sand 
inside of wire. After those they tried cement blocks, going quite a ways 
under the sand. Those cement blocks -  they started to topple right away. 
People have been putting their old trucks and stuff and they sink right 
away. Anything that’s not sand sinks.
Shoreline stabilization is a hazard-centric response to increasing erosion and is common­
place (the standard US Army Corps of Engineers response to flooding). It is also 
expensive -  though it offers very good short-term protection for critical infrastructure. 
What shoreline stabilization promotes is protection, what it discourages is flexibility. The 
history of infrastructure in Shishmaref reveals an increase in inflexibility to weather and 
climate conditions, which corresponds to an increase of exposure and risk. This is 
directly tied to development decisions, often in the absence of local input or even that of 
authorities who are experienced in rural Alaska.
An illuminating passage by Owen Mason published in a 2006 conference 
proceeding states,
About ten years ago, the State of Alaska sent me to Shishmaref to examine 
various alternative relocation sites, all on the mainland. In addition to this 
task, I considered the means available to remain on the barrier island 
chain. With some flexible engineering such as moveable structures and 
dune trapping devices (plants, fences, matting, etc.), I suggested that 
Shishmaref residents could remain in sync with the barrier or groom a 
nearby island for future settlement. The approach favored in the last 10 
years has been the opposite: increasing hard stabilization, with the rocks 
larger and the lateral distance subject to seawalls longer. Further, the 
height of the wall is still far below the maximum storm surge limit, for 
reasons that I do not understand (Mason 2006: 11).
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The focus on building flexibility is striking in this passage. Moveable structures were 
essential in Binford’s analysis of hunting and gathering culture’s key infrastructure 
requirements. Flexibility was also recommended by the state’s leading archeologist in 
Shishmaref. In spite of these recommendations, the Corps’ main objective appears to 
have been to keep the shore from moving and thereby to protect framed houses purchased 
through federal grant and loan programs, as well as other critical infrastructure.
4.6 Cultural Values and Infrastructure Traps: “We live here because Shishmaref is a 
good place to hunt and because they built a BIA school.”
The last section of this chapter summarizes the risks and vulnerabilities in 
Shishmaref associated with flooding, erosion, and infrastructure. Here I attempt to sort 
out climate change from colonization, and infrastructure from ideology. Addressing the 
issue of why people live in any given location is a crux in understanding social-ecological 
relationships. When that place is exposed to risk and hazard, the question becomes 
especially critical.
Climate change is affecting the Arctic. Residents of Shishmaref recognize these 
changes and are affected by these changes in multiple, complex ways. In government 
reports, climate changes have been directly attributed to causing increased erosion in 
Shishmaref, leading to a need for shoreline stabilization and relocation. Climate change 
scholars also point out that coastal erosion, continued permafrost thaw, and increased 
storm and wind activity will be a consequence of climate change that is expected to 
increase and increase risk to Shishmaref residents. These climatic changes are not
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insignificant in the Shishmaref case study or in the need to relocate. However, the simple 
equation that anthropogenic climate change = erosion = relocation is not an accurate 
analysis of this complex social-ecological system.
As discussed above, like most hunter-gatherer societies, the Tapqagmiut were 
highly mobile before the increased presence of colonial institutions such as the mission 
and the school. This high mobility was linked to the ease with which infrastructure and 
other aspects of material life could be moved quickly. Patterns of migration were 
important for the seasonal round, and the year was constituted through location in and 
engagement with specific areas of the Tapqagmiut land base, but climate conditions and 
weather also determined movements. Before sedentarization, Tapqagmiut people were 
therefore able to make split decisions in response to changing weather conditions. High 
mobility and flexibility around weather events -  including flooding hazards -  was a 
successful adaptation strategy against flooding.
Building infrastructure was a key component to bringing education and 
Christianity into the Bering Strait region. The ideology of education and worship are fully 
embedded in and expressed by infrastructure projects. Sheldon Jackson, the General 
Agent for Education in 1885, saw infrastructure and ideology as interlinked so much so 
that he raised money from outside federal streams to build schools and churches on the 
Seward Peninsula. This infrastructure project continued and expanded to include 
installing prefabricated houses, filling in island lakes to make room for new houses, and 
building a new modem school in the late 1970s. This development is why people live on 
the island permanently, and the inflexibility of this development is also why it is so
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difficult for residents to move today. Residents are aware of this irrefutable link between 
the first school that was built, moving to the island permanently, and the subsequent loss 
of flexibility to relocate easily. This is why Tony Weyiouanna made the statement “no 
one’s talking about why we’re here in the first place” in response to a question about 
contemporary relocation. Creating fixed, sedentary indigenous residents has been a 
strategy of the United States since the American Indian reservation project began and has 
been a goal of States all over the world (Scott 1998).
When “Old Shishmaref’ or the old village at Kigitak had been seasonally 
inhabited for 500 years, high mobility and flexibility to storms provided an adaptation 
strategy for residents. Decisions regarding infrastructure development in the past remain 
somewhat cloudy -  however, it is clear that Shishmaref residents and their ancestors, 
going back at least four generations according to my interviews, and presumably further, 
knew that the island would eventually deteriorate, change, and erode. Unlike this 
localized, particular knowledge, Sheldon Jackson’s knowledge of the island was non­
existent. In fact, some scholars claim Jackson knew very little about rural Alaska at all, as 
the following passage suggests.
Dr. Jackson had been credited with a profound knowledge of Alaska. This 
is a great exaggeration, for at best his knowledge was very superficial. In 
fact, it was his ignorance of the physical conditions in the Northland and 
of its people which led him to make many egregious blunders of 
administration. Another factor coupled with this was Jackson’s fondness 
for sensational statements, no doubt in part developed as necessary to the
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propaganda to which he devoted most of his life. ([Brooks 1973: 494-495] 
in Ellana and Sherrod 2004).
There is strong indication that local knowledge was passed over in favor of outsider 
knowledge when development decisions were being made in the past. This might be a 
stale fact of colonialism if it didn’t seem to be repeating itself today.
The following chapters demonstrate how this pattern play out in multiple ways. 
Residents feel misunderstood, local knowledge is passed over in favor of outsider 
authority, and flexibility is exchanged for sedentary (short-term) stability. The historical 
depth of this type of decision-making suggests it is more than just circumstantial. I 
propose instead that these are points of ideological disagreement that are deeply rooted in 
cultural understandings of people in the environment, and are also institutional cultures 
themselves that frequently (but certainly not always) demean indigenous knowledge in 
favor of expert knowledge that is often blind to locally known hazards and risks.
Measuring risk and exposure to hazards can test the validity of this claim. If 
circumstantial, then indigenous communities should be no more exposed to hazards than 
other communities. If, on the other hand, indigenous communities are more prone to live 
in “risky” locations -  those locations that are exposed to repetitive hazards -  then an 
historical understanding of development is imperative. In Alaska, 184 out of 213 (86%) 
Alaska Native villages experience problems with erosion and flooding (USGAO 2003).
From work in Shishmaref, I suggest that colonial development can “trap” 
indigenous communities into previously ‘safe’ places because of undermining and 
negating traditional adaptation strategies without providing sufficient new adaptation
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strategies. In this case, high mobility acted as an adaptation strategy to flooding and other 
hazardous weather conditions. Development in Shishmaref, did not take into account 
local knowledge. Ancestors, parents, and grandparents of the Kigiqtaamiut today likely 
moved to the island and were happy to stay on the island because it was a “good place to 
hunt.” Early infrastructure was probably not their domain or responsibility. So, as two 
different ideologies for what constitutes a good place -  for Tapqagmiut it was a good 
hunting staging ground, for missionaries and educators there were people there to educate 
and missionize -  Shishmaref became the “village” that it is today, and the village that 
needs to relocate to avoid social and cultural disintegration.
This tension between outsider influence and local control over why people live on 
this barrier sand island in the middle of the Chukchi Sea, is present in the answers I 
received to the question: Why do people live here? The island was acknowledged by 
almost everyone I spoke with in Shishmaref, whether I interviewed them or not, as an 
excellent place from which to hunt. Old Shishmaref, or Kigiktak was the largest seal 
mammal hunting staging ground of the Tapqagmiut prior to colonization. This well-used 
site is a location of subsistence, of deep-rootedness, and of value defined entirely by 
Inuipat sense of worth -  the value of ugruk hunting and preparing. This has significant 
cultural currency for a people who are wholly oriented towards the sea. Shishmaref 
people are a people who exist on the edge of two mediums, between the landscape and 
the seascape, on a dynamic and shifting coastline.
The ubiquity with which conversations in Shishmaref include references to the 
island as a good place to hunt, makes it clear that a cultural value is present when people
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state and restate the significance of the island -  particularly now that the island is a 
“risky” place to live. To reiterate that Shishmaref people are hunting people (“our 
community was mainly built for seal hunting”) and that the Kigiqtaamiut live, therefore, 
in a good hunting location is, I believe, an assertion of local power to define “good 
location” apart from colonial definitions or outsider value systems. To say, “we live here 
because it is a good place to hunt,” is highly culturally significant, and stands in stark 
contrast to the assertion, “we live here because they built a BIA school.”
Most people, however, also give the latter response: “we live here because they 
built a BIA school.” The tension between these two explanations for why Shishmaref 
residents reside on the island, in this increasingly risky location, is a microcosm of a 
complicated history of independence and colonialism that plays out in embodied ways. 
Shishmaref people -  the people who are able to exist between the two mediums of earth 
and ocean -  are in constant negotiation with new infrastructure, bureaucratic channels of 
funding, government apathy for rural communities, and the resolution to protect the old 
ways of life.
In chapter three, we isolated the negative outcomes that Shishmaref residents are 
vulnerable to. In this chapter, we identified the clash between climate and history -  and 
between ideology, perspective, and knowledge -  that has led Shishmaref residents to live 
in this highly exposed location in the first place. With this historical background in mind, 
the next chapter engages the interactions between government agencies and residents 
today, as they seek to reduce vulnerability and pursue a viable relocation strategy.
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Chapter Five: Finding A Way Forward: Trust, Distrust and Alaska Native Relocation
Planning in the 21st Century
5.1 The Pragmatics of Planning
This chapter presents interview, survey, ethnographic, and government report data 
in order to demonstrate how relocation is being planned today as a final strategy of 
adaptation to erosion and flooding, which are causing an increasing threat of negative 
outcomes to Shishmaref residents. The millions of dollars o f infrastructure that has been 
built in Shishmaref since 1901 now requires millions of dollars to be reconstructed or 
relocated. This is essential in order to mitigate risk for Shishmaref residents and avoid the 
negative outcomes associated with a flooding event and forced relocation, such as 
fatalities, loss of property, evacuation, diaspora, social disarticulation, increased 
landlessness and increased poverty.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ map presented in Chapter Four indicates that 
increasing erosion in Shishmaref will continue to remove land on the northwest side of 
the island until houses and critical infrastructure lose the ground they stand on. At present 
there is not sufficient land on Sarichef Island to which to move these houses, or upon 
which to build new houses. Relocation is acknowledged by nearly everyone as the only 
long-term solution for Shishmaref residents who are adamant that they remain as a 
discrete village in traditional subsistence territory, the “nation” of the Tapqagmiut. The 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has estimated that relocation of the village to a site
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selected on the mainland coast will cost between 100 and 200 million dollars (USACE 
2006:2).
The previous chapter identified climate risks to Shishmaref residents and 
identified how climate and landscape changes linked to anthropogenic warming are only 
part of a complex array of factors that create risk, including interactions among 
Kigiqtaamiut ancestors with one another and with outsiders, ideologies and infrastructure 
associated with educators and missionaries, and a number of historical circumstances, 
such as President Nixon’s vow for new housing in American Indian and Alaska Native 
communities following the taking of Alcatraz, as well as HUD’s increased presence in 
rural Alaska.
This chapter examines the mechanics and experiences of relocation planning 
today. I suggested in the last chapter that indigenous communities may be more 
susceptible to risk from climate and ecological change because cultural differences and 
colonial ideologies in the early 20th century translated into development decision-making 
that ignored local knowledge of the environment. Over the last 100 years, Alaska Native 
communities have become excellent advocates for themselves in governmental and non­
governmental arenas. Local communities create and foster social networks at the 
regional, state, national and international levels in order to advance Inupiaq needs in the 
21st century. There are, however, still dramatic inequities when very small, very remote 
village and tribal governments, coalitions, and institutions engage very large state and 
federal institutions -  as we will see in this chapter.
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Other social science work on relocation in rural Alaska focuses on the political 
positioning of the villages with regards to state, national, and international funding 
streams for relocation (Shearer 2011; Bronen 2009, 2011). This is important work, and I 
dedicate a section of this chapter to government relocation planning strategies. However, 
what these studies leave out is the ethnographic, pragmatic, and personal experiences of 
ecological shift and relocation planning, and how these experiences may be tied to longer 
histories of inequity and development. In this chapter, I give primacy to ethnographic 
data, survey data of attitudes in Shishmaref, and interview data that expresses local 
concerns and fears. This is a conscious decision that aims to frame all relocation planning 
through grounded experiences.
This chapter begins with an ethnographic account of a planning meeting between 
agency workers and Shishmaref residents. Following, I discuss interview and survey data 
that suggests there are still significant sentiments of fear and concern among Shishmaref 
residents regarding agency planning and government capability of planning a successful 
relocation before a major disaster. Next, I present a history of local relocation planning, 
followed by an account of state and federal agency responses to relocation planning, and 
identify some particular points of misunderstanding between local and state approaches 
to planning. Included in this analysis are comparisons with the village of Newtok’s 
relocation effort and subsequent success. Finally, the chapter closes by examining media 
representation as a method of adaptation to government apathy in Shishmaref.
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5.1.1 The participatory structure
The following account provides an ethnographic portrayal of the pragmatics of
relocation planning. I was located in Shishmaref during the meeting described below.
Descriptions of what the participants in Anchorage looked like and of the Anchorage
meeting site itself were constructed from previous Immediate Action Working Group
meetings I had attended.
May 17th 2010 (reconstructed from field  notes, the Immediate Action 
Working Group meeting agenda, interviews, and memory)
On May 17, 2010, the Immediate Action Work Group (IAWG), a 
sub-division of the Alaska Governor’s sub-committee on climate change 
meets to further discuss progress that has been made among villages that 
need to relocate, to develop criteria for adding “at risk” communities to 
the high priority list, and to plan the next 12-18 months of work at 
previously identified “at risk” communities.
Agency members meet in Anchorage in person to exchange 
information about ongoing planning of hazard mitigation and the possible 
relocation of endangered communities.
The board members meet in a large meeting room. Men and 
women are dressed in suits and are sitting around a long table with stapled 
agendas, brief cases, and computers. Someone is taking notes. Most, if not 
all of them, are white.
The language is highly bureaucratic as soon as the meeting begins, 
but before the meeting officially starts, Anchorage participants use
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familiar language with one another. The participants in Anchorage know 
one another. At the center of the table is a conference telephone. No 
Native participants from affected rural communities are physically present 
at the meeting, but at least eight participate by phone.
Six hundred and four miles away, in Shishmaref, sit five 
community members in the basement of the local church. The IAWG has 
put up information in real time on the web concerning the agenda, but the 
internet connection in Shishmaref is too slow to pull agenda slides up as 
the Anchorage participants move through them. It is difficult to hear what 
the board members are talking about from a small speakerphone in 
Shishmaref.
Fred Eningowuk, a city council representative from the village gets 
a karaoke machine. He sets up the microphone against the phone speaker 
in order to broadcast the meeting through the karaoke speaker. This is 
marginally successful, but the sound wavers between static mumbling, and 
way too loud, depending on who is talking in Anchorage and where they 
are seated with respect to the telephone.
This meeting lasts for four hours; and is so impossible to follow 
that it is both extraordinarily disheartening and hilarious. I am pained and 
exhausted by the end -  so uncomfortable in my chair that I shift positions 
constantly and essentially unable to actually understand more than two 
words at a time. The other Shishmaref residents participating in the
meeting are much more still in their chairs than I am. There are two elders 
present for whom English is a second language.
Finally, after waiting for hours while the board discusses criteria 
for adding new communities to the “imminent risk” list, it is time for 
Shishmaref residents to give their update on local concerns and progress to 
the board in Anchorage.
Eningowuk tells the group in Anchorage that Shishmaref needs 
help getting old, abandoned bulk fuel containers from a nearby village into 
Shishmaref. The fuel containers in Shishmaref are eroding, but Shishmaref 
isn’t eligible for new fuel containers, as with any infrastructure upgrade, 
because the village has voted to relocate.
Instead residents have used social networks to locate some 
abandoned tanks from the nearby village, but they do not have the 
transportation capacity to move them from one village to another so they 
are asking for help from these people in Anchorage who are the working 
government body charged with helping villages who need to relocate.
There is silence from the board in Anchorage.
Fuel containers and fuel container transportation do not fall under 
the mandate of the working group, so the group in Anchorage moves on 
without comment. They literally ignore Eningowuk’s comment. Say 
“thank-you” and move on.
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For some reason I feel extraordinarily embarrassed at this moment.
My face turns red.
This is the participatory, bureaucratic mechanism through which a 
long-standing, indigenous community is supposed to plan their relocation.
Sitting in Shishmaref, the connection is clear between climate change, 
environmental migration, and bulk fuel containers. Also clear are the links 
between funding streams, immediate risk, long-term risk, local poverty, 
poor internet connections, and the increasing reliance on outside decision 
makers for aid and risk mitigation.
I estimate that 98% of the 4-hour meeting is government agency workers 
discussing amongst themselves disaster mitigation planning, interspersed 
with seemingly disconnected comments by Native leaders from rural 
Alaska via phone.
“Waste of time,” says someone after the phone call is finished. “Waste of 
time.”
My experiences living and working on the Seward Peninsula have allowed me to 
witness the bureaucratic capabilities of Inupiaq people today. I am not surprised by the 
highly formalized ways in which tribal council meetings or meetings with the Shishmaref 
Erosion and Relocation Coordination are held. These are highly bureaucratized events 
that are predicated on a quorum and agenda driven. Unlike the Indigenous People’s 
Summit on Climate Change -  which sought explicitly to create discourse scenarios that 
did not mimic standard government agency exchanges -  Shishmaref meetings often
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follow the same format as any city council or other agency meeting. While there may be 
slight differences in speech speed, recognition of elders, and other linguistic and 
performative differences, government and tribal government officials in Shishmaref 
understand the mechanics of agency meetings.
Considering this, I have been continuously shocked by what I perceive is lack of 
understanding and real communication between Alaska Native participants and agency 
workers in these meetings. The ethnography above serves simply as a prototypical 
example. When meetings are held on the phone, this lack of understanding is exaggerated 
because of slow technology, insufficient consideration for the difficulties of following a 
meeting via the telephone, insufficient in-person participation of Native leaders, and 
formats (especially on the phone) that do not allow for thoughtful commentary by 
Shishmaref elders and other Native leaders. Survey data corroborates that Shishmaref 
residents do not feel adequately or accurately represented.
5.1.2 Linking climate change, distrust and participation in Shishmaref
As a supplementary methodology, I conducted a survey in Shishmaref regarding 
attitudes about relocation and government planning. The most interesting results from the 
survey demonstrated clearly that Shishmaref residents were highly concerned about 
climate change and were distrustful of government relocation strategies. Being able to 
measure these concerns quells suggestions that climate change and inequity are mostly 
concerns of researchers and journalists.
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In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with the following 3 attitude statements on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree): (1) “I feel confident that Shishmaref will be relocated in a timely 
manner before a major disaster occurs”; (2) “It is clear to me which government agencies 
would fund relocation”; (3) “Global warming, or climate change, is the greatest threat to 
Shishmarefis future.”
Results: On average, survey respondents strongly agreed that “climate 
change is the greatest threat to Shishmarefis future” (M= 4.60, SD = .88).
Despite high unemployment, inadequate housing, and other economic difficulties 
(IAWG 2009), climate change was forefront in people’s minds as a pervasive and ever­
present danger that will affect the future. While climate change is not the only driver of 
vulnerability -  it is locally perceived as a major threat. This suggests that Shishmaref 
residents are witnessing coastal erosion and other climatic changes either on the island or 
on the mainland to such an extent that it is causing dramatic concern.
Results: On average, Survey respondents tended to disagree that 
“Shishmaref will be relocated in a timely manner before a major disaster 
occurs” (M= 2.05, SD = .94).
While there was variation among residents, overall, those surveyed did not 
believe that Shishmaref would be relocated in an organized way before a major disaster 
occurred. In Chapter Three I discussed how, in interviews and during conversations with 
friends, Shishmaref residents expressed fears about diaspora and discussed individual, 
seemingly haphazard, planning strategies regarding what would happen in the event of a
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storm, and how people could possibly keep themselves or their families in Tapqagmiut 
traditional territory if Kigiqtaamiut people were relocated to Anchorage or Fairbanks. 
These informal planning strategies included moving to the mainland without critical 
infrastructure, such as a barge landing, an airport, or electricity and water facilities, and 
returning to a mostly abandoned island to live in old houses following a storm. These 
discussions stem from this measurable sentiment: Shishmaref residents do not have high 
confidence in government relocation planning.
There was a substantial correlation among survey respondents regarding 
perceptions of global warming and beliefs about the likelihood that organized relocation 
would be carried out before a major storm.
Results: Survey respondents who were not confident that Shishmaref 
would be relocated in a timely manner were more likely to agree that 
global warming was the greatest threat to the village, r(28) = -.42,/? = .03.
Perhaps most interestingly, results from the survey also revealed a correlation between 
belief that an organized relocation would occur and clear knowledge about which 
government agencies would fund relocation.
Results: Survey respondents who agreed with the statement, “I am clear 
about which government agencies would hypothetically fund relocation,” 
were likely to disagree with the statement, “I believe that Shishmaref 
residents will be relocated in a timely manner before a major disaster.”
K28) = -.47,p = .02.
164
In other words, awareness of bureaucratic processes predicted low confidence in 
bureaucratic processes.
These survey results augment data collected in interviews and during the 
ethnographic project, and help to isolate and assess general feelings from the community. 
The next section examines more descriptive interview data. For now, we can proceed 
with a basic acceptance that Shishmaref residents feel a lack of confidence in relocation 
planning, are concerned about climate changes, and that when residents have experience 
and clarity about larger governing entities, these concerns increase.
5.1.3 Personal experience as a prerequisite for understanding 
During an interview with Kim Ningealook, I asked if  relocation caused him any 
stress or frustration. “It’s what’s giving me gray hairs!” he said. Stella, Kim’s wife, and I 
laughed -  but there is a tension in Shishmaref between the stress of storms and relocation 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, daily life that goes on without being predicated 
on relocation and disaster. In an interview with Steve Samuels, the principal of the 
Shishmaref school in 2010, he said, “[Relocation] doesn’t ever seem to have a positive 
spin. It’s almost always a negative thing. Not that people obsess about it or anything, but 
it does come up from time to time. (...) It seems to be a sad thing, in my experience.” 
There are full lives being led in Shishmaref that have nothing to do with 
relocation, but these persistent risks are also constantly under the surface of daily life. 
Researching disaster was a sad business and lent itself to difficult discussions -  my 
experience in Shishmaref included asking people to discuss some things that they would
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rather not. I found that as an interview went into 25 or 30 minutes, sometimes to an hour 
or more, greater fears and concerns emerged and people expressed greater emotions.
There are three most common concerns in Shishmaref regarding risk and 
relocation. The first is that the island is experiencing increases in risk -  both to flooding 
and erosion and because the ice conditions are changing so rapidly that hunting patterns 
are changing. Table 5.1 lists representative responses from interview data and 
ethnographic conversations regarding how changes on the landscape are experienced. 
There is widespread concern about climate change and changes in ice patterns 
influencing hunting practices. Residents also experience a sense of helplessness. In 
Chapter Six I discuss the resiliency and tenacity o f Shishmaref residents in the face of 
dramatic changes -  but present in interview data is also the feeling of helplessness, which 
is demonstrated in the first two of the responses in Table 5.1.
In the literature, flooding in Shishmaref is linked to coastal erosion, but sea level 
rises may also be problematic. Sea levels are predicted to rise due to two primary drivers, 
an increase in existing water volume due to ocean thermal expansion and glacial melt 
adding to ocean water levels from Greenland and Antarctica (Hemming et al., 2007). A 
conservative estimate predicts sea levels will rise 280-340  mm by the end of the century 
(Church and White 2006), while other models predict much higher estimates (Pfeffer et 
al. 2008:342). Shishmaref residents’ concern for increased risk seems realistic.
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Table 5.1: Interviews on risk
Risk is increasing in Shishmaref linked to 
climate change
“It’s [the island is] going to go away until 
there’s nothing. It is global warming and it 
is mother nature that we can’t help. 
(B.E.2009).
“It feels like we’re sitting on a big tub, like 
it’s going to fill up with water. That’s how 
it feels being on this island” (K.N.2010).
“Biggest change is that climate change is 
playing such a big effect in our community, 
not only that the ice is thinner. The water’s 
too close for hunting with snow machines” 
(R.K. 2010)__________________________
The second area of concern is the fear of diaspora following a major flooding 
event, before an organized relocation occurs (see Table 5.2). Chapter Three discussed 
negative outcomes that may occur in Shishmaref following a major disaster -  and many 
of these negative outcomes are linked to forced relocation and diaspora. On the ground, 
emergency relocation that causes the dissemination of the Shishmaref community into 
different villages, towns, and cities is a palpable fear. It is also a fear that spans 
generations. During one interview I sat down with three young men each in their late 
teens and early twenties. They spoke of the scattering of the population as their biggest 
fear -  similarly to the elders I spoke with on the island. There is not a plan in place for 
what will happen after a major storm if the island becomes uninhabitable and residents 
are evacuated -  but this scenario is most people’s biggest concern regarding storms.
I also found widespread concern that relocation planning was going to fail, that it was too 
slow, and that the result was going to lead to a diaspora. The Shishmaref Erosion and
Relocation Committee understands dissemination of the population to be an annihilation 
of the community and an annihilation of the cultural integrity of residents.
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Table 5.2: Interviews on disaster and diaspora
Disaster will occur (and lead to diaspora) 
before relocation can be organized
I don’t believe the political structure/process 
can do it (fund relocation). It is too slow. It’s 
always in the planning stages, but there’s no 
funding for it. One day we are going to be 
evacuated. (R.K. 2009).
“To not act represents the annihilation of our 
community through dissemination” 
(Shishmaref Erosion and 
Relocation Committee).
“Nothing’s being done. Look, we’re still here” 
(J.D. 2010).
“Just scared if we relocate we’re going to have 
to move to different towns” (Y.M. 2010)
“We’ll be scattered like refuges” (R.K. 2009).
“Most of the conversation that I hear around 
relocation, the people don’t have a real 
positive feeling about it, not that they don’t 
want to relocate, but that they don’t think that 
there’s a site that’s viable” (S.S 2010).
The third component of concerns in Shis imaref is that agency workers and other
decision-makers do not really understand what Shishmaref residents go through, that 
these outsiders are uneducated about the history of Shishmaref relocation planning, and 
that there is miscommunication and misunderstanding between agency workers and local
residents. There is a sense in Shishmaref that if government workers could just
experience a storm for themselves, then this experience would translate into forthcoming 
state and federal aid. Table 5.3 lists interview excerpts that describe this frustration.
Table 5.3: Interviews on communication
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Alienation and communication difficulties 
with bureaucratic agencies
“People say: we don’t need to go to those 
meetings, they just go around and around. We 
won’t move; we won’t ever move” (A.K. 
2010).
“They’ve got to see it to believe it” 
(anonnymous 2010)
“It’s been, same every time. It’s like: how 
come you guys are here again, saying the same 
stuff. We already heard this last time, you 
know?” (J.D. 2009).
“Let the federal agencies come here and 
experience a whole storm, not come for the 
day and leave. Let them be here two weeks, so 
they could see it for themselves, cause it 
always seems like they don’t believe us.” (J.S. 
2009).
These concerns also point to the redundancy of community meetings hosted by 
agency workers. I found many residents who reported that, since 2002, there have been 
multiple meetings a year to discuss an aspect of relocation with the community and with 
state and federal agencies. For residents, these meetings are redundant. High turnover 
rates among agency workers also lead to black holes of information regarding relocation, 
with each successive generation of outsiders tasked with analyzing some aspect of 
relocation. As a new agency worker or engineer or researcher comes in, residents must
tell and retell the story of relocation from the beginning. As this educating process 
became frustrating, community members participated less and less. Annie Kokeok, the 
Kawerak transportation coordinator in 2010, talked about how motivating residents to 
participate in the process again was a challenge -  that morale about the likelihood of 
moving was low.
Lack of participation by community members can be misunderstood as inherent 
apathy. Agency workers today are devoted individuals with a stake in Shishmaref 
relocation and who are dedicated to culturally appropriate solutions; but personal concern 
is obscured by short-term participation and a lack of historical awareness. In an early 
2008 meeting with the Immediate Action Work Group, someone suggested moving the 
school and thereby forcing residents to relocate. This is a strategy very similar to the 
early 20th century planning by Sheldon Jackson -  and a very sensitive issue to most 
people in rural Alaska whom I know.
Local participation is also cyclical. A new generation of leaders is taking over in 
Shishmaref -  in some cases sons are literally taking over positions held by their mothers. 
As younger members of the community enter into office there is renewed energy. 
However, any outsider working in Shishmaref (researcher, engineer, journalist, 
bureaucrat) should be vigilantly aware of the repetitiveness with which Shishmaref 
residents have told and retold, educated and reeducated outsiders about the history of 
relocation -  and how often they have heard of new strategies and surveys being done 
before construction can begin. As Jennifer Demir said on September 23, 2009, “It’s like:
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how come you guys are here again, saying the same stuff. We already heard this last 
time, you know?”
Residents are most satisfied with the attention and aid given by the late Senator 
Ted Stevens. This satisfaction is linked to Senator Stevens’ tenure as an Alaskan 
government servant and as a result of his visit to Shishmaref.
Interview with Anonymous l.a., September 23, 2009
The biggest help that ever came in and we had stuff done after the visit
was Senator Ted Stevens. He saw the erosion for himself.
In 2002,1 witnessed Senator Stevens engaging with a local community on the 
Bering Strait during a trip to Little Diomede. My overwhelming impression of this event 
was how well Senator Stevens related to and took seriously the concerns of Little 
Diomede residents. As the interview above suggests, the fact that Senator Stevens saw 
the erosion for himself, was significant to the satisfaction some Shishmaref residents 
experienced following his visit.
In the past, outside decision makers made development decisions that ignored 
local knowledge and subsequently developed the village site on an unstable sand island. 
Today, Shishmaref residents are keen to focus on local experience as a key component to 
expertise in relocation issues. When outside planners, researchers, and stakeholders lack 
local experience and long tenure in the region, this can lead to misunderstandings 
between themselves and local residents. The data presented above indicates that residents 
fear that flooding risks will increase and doubt that planning will ultimately protect the
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island from a disaster, which may lead to diaspora. This misunderstanding is a backdrop 
to the relocation planning that occurs among local, state, and federal relocation planners.
5.2 Relocation Responses: A Local/Governmental Perspective
5.2.1 A history of local relocation planning
Local efforts to relocate the village have been on-going since the 1970s. In 1974, 
the Department of Community and Regional Affairs released a report on the Shishmaref 
relocation effort after a severe fall storm led to extensive damage on the island (DCRA 
1974). At that time there was extensive planning by local residents and meetings between 
government representatives and local leaders. These plans did not come to fruition. The 
estimated cost of relocation in 1974 was placed at 1 million USD (Mason et al. 1997), 
compared to today’s 100-200 million USD.
Local residents say that the decision to relocate was voted down by a majority of 
residents in the same year. Percy Nayokpuk was in charge of these discussions in 1974 -  
he still has copies of letters exchanged between the DCRA and himself discussing 
possible relocation. Nayokpuk says that the decision to remain on the island was 
significantly influenced by the belief that shore stabilization would control erosion. Even 
more influencing to the vote was that Shishmaref had been put first in line to receive a 
new school. As community members are experiencing now: voting to relocate typically 
removes the village from competitive infrastructure investment grants from state or 
federal agencies. Local residents voted for the new development. The school remains the
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largest building in the community, a center of community events, and an emergency 
shelter in the event of a major storm or flooding event.
Today, the Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition is the locally established 
cooperative committee who meets to plan and organize Shishmaref s relocation efforts. 
The Coalition was established in April 2001 and is comprised of members from the three 
official government organizations, the Native Village of Shishmaref, the City of 
Shishmaref, and the Shishmaref Native Corporation. The Relocation Coalition has 
depended on a handful of community advocates who are or were employed in 
government positions to take the lead on developing strategic planning agendas and 
suggesting paths forward. In the last 10 years, The Kawerak Transportation Coordinator 
position, funded through the regional non-profit, has acted as a relocation coordinator and 
provided the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition with information and updates about state 
and federal agencies. Important leaders who have occupied this position are Bryce 
Eningowuk, Annie Kokeok, and Tony Weyiouanna. Weyiouanna in particular has been a 
central and influential voice in the relocation process for the last 10 years, as well as a 
significant figure in the media coverage that Shishmaref has received.
The make-up of the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition is very important. We 
discussed in the last chapter how different family groups are identified with particular 
subsistence territory. Extended participation in the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition is 
one way to incorporate as many of these different family group representatives as 
possible. There continue to be locally contentious and sensitive issues regarding 
relocation, including site selection for the new village. Including all elected positions in
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the Relocation Coalition allows many voices to be represented. Like all democracies, 
extended participation can be cumbersome, but is highly valued.
Many people I spoke with commented that it was critically important to local 
residents that any decision regarding relocation came from Shishmaref people themselves 
and not from outsiders.
Interview with Richard Kuzuguk September 24, 3009 
We wanted to make it, as much as we could, a local priority, from our 
local perspective with our cultural values -  we want our village and our 
residents to be the actual people to be in charge of the relocation.
The late Daniel Iyatunguk, former co-chair of the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition also 
expressed an imperative for local control.
Interview with Daniel Iyatunguk July 17, 2008
They come here and said pretty, nice things about what they would do to 
help our village, but I read it and it makes it where it’s only their decision 
and I don’t think that’s right.
Local strategies for relocation have varied over time, but as has been noted, 
revolve specifically around lobbying for government funding to relocate or reconstruct 
critical infrastructure in a new site on the mainland. For most of the decade between 2000 
and 2010, Tony Weyiouanna promoted relocation efforts aimed particularly at the federal 
government -  and lobbied that Shishmaref could be used as a federal case study for 
climate-induced relocation. In 2004 the Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Committee’s 
office to Senator Stevens. The letter requests “using Shishmaref as a template for
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relocation by directing one single State or federal agency to relocate to a site on the 
mainland selected by our community.” While the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition asked 
for aid from a state or federal agency, the letter is addressed to Senator Stevens.
Shishmaref s pursuit of federal money is tied to the close relationship Shishmaref 
people had with Senator Stevens and, I believe, a more general trust in the federal 
government over the state government. Subsistence rights in Alaska are highly 
controversial. The federal government has been an advocate for a Native priority for 
subsistence foods while the state does not recognize this authority. This and other moves 
by the state to limit Alaska Native rights to land and resources lead to a general feeling in 
rural Alaska that the federal government is more sympathetic to Alaska Native needs. In 
the last six years, responsibility for relocating communities that are immanently 
threatened by flooding and erosion has shifted towards state responsibility through the 
Division of Community and Regional Affairs (DCRA). The DCRA is especially active in 
planning Newtok’s relocation. Shishmaref s efforts towards relocation began earlier than 
the DCRA’s involvement and at the time Tony Weyiouanna believed the federal 
government would be more likely to provide funding for relocation. This is 
circumstantial -  but may have significant impacts on relocation. I discuss Newtok’s 
relative relocation success at the end of this chapter.
Shishmaref has hired lobbyists in Juneau and Washington D.C. to push their 
relocation agenda. Studies continue to be funded and carried out regarding relocation. 
This includes a Department of Transportation sponsored reconnaissance study for a road 
that leads from Ear Mountain to the Coast and provides an analysis of the contents of Ear
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Mountain -  which has been mined for uranium (IAWG 2009). Ear Mountain is a 
potential gravel source for reconstructing the village of Shishmaref and offers the 
possibility of an economic resource for the village. Despite these studies, actual 
relocation of residents seems further away now than it did in 2002.
Interview with Jennifer Demir September 23, 2009
We were like, cool, everybody want to go, people are going to get 
funding. We had all these high hopes, you know? We thought it was just 
going to happen, but in reality that does not happen at all. You know, 
we’re still here.”
Interview with Richard Kuzuguk September 24, 2009 
At that time [2002] we were led to believe, we had a chance at that time 
[to relocate], but not understanding what the total process was at the 
legislative end was hard to picture.
To this day the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition’s time line of important events still has 
the entry: 2009, April 30: Move to new site is complete.
Today, Shishmaref residents are waiting for new site selection studies to be 
completed. A community planning grant was obtained with the purpose of identifying 
culturally and structurally feasible sites. On October 22, 2012 I emailed the Vice Mayor 
of Shishmaref, Esther Iyatunguk, and asked about the most up-to-date state of relocation 
activity. She emailed back that the community was waiting for the URS Corporation to 
finish their site studies -  a privately contracted engineering and construction corporation. 
Continued studies are necessary for government investment in a new relocation site. Yet
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these studies feel redundant for residents who remember a 2004 Natural Resources 
Conservation Service report entitled Shishmaref Site Analysis for Potential Emergency 
Evacuation and Permanent Relocation Sites, and which analyzed six sites: East Nunatuq, 
Arctic (Arctic River), Igloot, Tin Creek, West Tin Creek Hills, and West Tin Creek Flats 
for feasibility.
If an organized relocation is not carried out prior to a major disaster -  as is 
expected by the community -  community members and local relocation activists talk 
about the relocation “card in [their] back pocket.” In 1972, Molly Hooch along with 26 
students and 126 rural villages sued the state for not providing equitable educational 
opportunities to Alaska Native schoolchildren -  by making them choose between family 
and/or a boarding school outside of rural Alaska. In 1975, an agreement was made that 
stated Alaska Native students have a constitutional right to be educated through high 
school in their home communities -  and that any rural village with 8 or more high school 
students had the right to school infrastructure (Associated Press 1980).
Tony Weyiouanna says that there are Kigiqtaamiut people, including families 
with children who make the requisite 8 high school students, ready to move to a new site 
and withstand harsh conditions until the makeshift community is recognized as a village 
and the government is forced to build a school. Building a school requires a barge landing 
or an airstrip (or both) to allow for materials and machinery needed to construct the 
building. Weyiouanna assumes a road of some sort would also have to be cleared. Thus, a 
school would literally pave the way for other infrastructure projects and the resurrection 
of a Kigiqtaamiut village. This is a particularly interesting inversion of an original
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colonial project of education -  which may ultimately protect Shishmaref residents’ ability 
to live in their ancestors’ traditional subsistence territory.
The following describes the primary relocation strategies from the perspective of 
state and federal agencies during the course of this research project.
5.2.2 Government relocation planning
Following a storm in 2001, then governor of Alaska Tony Knowles issued an 
administrative order declaring “Not doing anything [in Shishmaref] would pose an 
imminent and continuing threat that justified the State taking action to provide some kind 
of protective measure along the shoreline of Shishmaref’ (Shishmaref Erosion and 
Relocation Coalition 2002:2). In 2006, the Army Corps of Engineers published a research 
inquiry into possible solutions for Shishmaref relocation. Three possible scenarios were 
described: relocate to the mainland and reconstruct village infrastructure from scratch, 
relocate residents to the regional centers of either Nome or Kotzebue, or take no action. 
The result of this report seemed to be increased focus on relocation as the only feasible 
long-term solution for Shishmaref residents. However, a 2009 report from the Immediate 
Action Working Group (described below) includes the “do nothing” and co-location 
possibilities in their report for Shishmaref.
In 2007, a coalition of state and federal agencies were identified to address 
immediate risks to rural communities affected by climate change. The Governor’s Sub­
Cabinet on Climate Change was established in September 2007 by Governor Sarah Palin. 
The Sub-Cabinet was then sub-divided into working groups. The Immediate Action
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Working Group was charged with recommending strategies to avoid disasters in places 
and areas that were in imminent risk of disaster (http://www. climatechanee. alaska. gov A  
and was made up of high level representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
the Department of Commerce, Community and Economic Development, the Department 
of Natural Resources, the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, the Denali 
Commission, the Alaska Municipal League, the Alaska State Legislative and Budget 
Committee, the Alaska Division of Homeland Security, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, Alaska Tribal Health Consortium, Environmental 
Protection Agency, and the U.S. Economic Development Administration. The IAWG 
originally identified six communities which were the most significantly affected by 
climate change and which needed immediate attention. These were: Kivalina, Newtok, 
Shaktoolik, Shishmaref, Unalakleet, and Koyukuk.
When I first began my research in Shishmaref, a preliminary finding was that high 
turnover rates among state and federal bureaucrats, as well as short-term budgets for 
relocation and risk mitigation intervention, created a situation in which Shishmaref 
residents were constantly dealing with agency workers who had no background 
knowledge and no historical awareness of local protocol, previous relocation studies, or 
previous government efforts -  as I discussed above. Shishmaref residents and local, low- 
level bureaucrats are more stable and institutional memory is long because turnover is 
often among relatives or friends. Comparatively, state and federal agency workers who 
work on relocation are revolving. From 2007 to 2009, however, I began to reconsider the 
revolving-door theory of bureaucratic workers in Shishmaref who worked on risk and
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relocation. The IAWG seemed committed and stable. The group had significant funding 
and was actively seeking to add new villages to the list of communities they worked with 
and served. It seemed reasonable to believe that the IAWG would become a clearing­
house committee to handle relocation issues. To date, these reports are the first attempt at 
collecting information for relocating communities and developing protocol for at-risk 
communities who need to relocate.
However, 2009 was the last time the IAWG produced a report, and the committee 
has since disbanded. The disbandment of the IAWG demonstrates what Shishmaref 
residents have often pointed out, that there is no cohesive planning and that, as new 
iterations of help and strategizing committees arrive, the community and planning phases 
have to start all over again. This is often discussed in Shishmaref as “another study being 
done.” Tommy Obruk commented, “you know that kind of slows them down, the studies. 
Government always works real slow to do the studies” (May 2010).
A new organization ran through the Department of Commerce, Community, and 
Economic Affairs, and the Division of Community and Regional Affairs, called the 
Alaska Climate Change Impact Mitigation Program (ACCIMP) has followed in the 
footsteps of the Immediate Action Working Group. The ACCIMP is attempting to set 
protocol for villages and village leaders to follow. This is an important step in the 
relocation process. Without clear steps in the relocation process, local and state leaders 
are inefficient at streamlining funding. This is a new development, and I feel a surge of 
hope -  similar to when the IAWG was at their most active. The two contact personnel 
listed on the ACCIMP website, Sally Cox and Erik O’Brien are both individuals who
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have worked on relocation issues since the beginning of this research, though mostly in 
Newtok. Even so, this is a change from the IAWG who mostly had high level bureaucrats 
as board members.
The ACCIMP is a state agency. In 2009, the Alaska Federation of Natives 
suggested that the Denali Commission act as a clearing-house for erosion and flooding 
issues (AFN 2009:27). The Denali Commission is a unique government institution 
formed by a federal-state partnership that “provides cost-shared infrastructure projects 
across the state, particularly for Alaska Native communities” (denali.gov). The Kivalina 
evacuation road reconnaissance study was funded through the Denali Commission. The 
Denali Commission could possibly allow more Alaska Native Control over relocation -  
but the DCRA under the direction of Sally Cox was the most obvious reiteration of the 
IAWG from a governmental perspective.
5.2.3 Village relocation as an example of inefficient disaster governance in the
face of climate change
Relocation as a step towards mitigating risk or as an adaptation strategy is a 
particularly interesting climate change problem. Rural Alaska Native villages serve as 
case studies for environmental relocation in the United States because they demonstrate 
they ways in which disaster governance is response-oriented in the United States and is 
inflexible when ecologies and landscapes themselves are shifting. After a disaster, the 
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) acts as an umbrella organization 
and has the power to coordinate disparate agencies and infrastructure projects
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simultaneously. FEMA is governed by the Stafford Act of 1988, which, among other 
procedural amendments, outlines the goals of disaster recovery as promoting “recovery 
through rebuilding” (Sec. 504 [a] 9D). The Stafford Act sets rebuilding in place as an 
explicit goal of disaster response (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act 2000 amended 2007; Bronen 2011), which is illogical in places like 
Shishmaref that are becoming increasingly uninhabitable due to increased exposure to 
flooding.
There is no corresponding agency for preemptive disaster planning or risk 
reduction in cases where erosion increases exposure to flooding hazards. Relocation 
planners, researchers, and Kigiqtaamiut advocates all recognize the organizational 
nightmare of attempting to coordinate multiple governmental agencies and their annual 
budgets to plan an organized, timely relocation (IAWG 2008; Bronen 2009, 2011; AFN 
2009; Atkinson et al. 2009). The effect is that every step must be funded and undertaken 
individually. Whatever protocol is established and whichever institution eventually 
coordinates these relocations will set a precedent for possible larger-scale relocations 
linked to climate change, increased erosion, and preventative flooding disasters in the 
future. It already has. At the Indigenous People’s Summit on Climate Change a member 
of the United Houma Nation of Louisiana participated in the event specifically because 
he wanted to network with relocating tribes in Alaska and understand procedures to 
mitigate increasing risks of flooding through relocation -  an adaptive strategy his tribe 
increasingly embraced.
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5.2.4 The success of the Newtok Planning Group
One example of the lack of protocol in village relocation is the fact that of all the 
villages that need to relocate one village, Newtok, seems to be proceeding rapidly where 
the others are not. To date a barge landing and access road has been built and an 
evacuation shelter is being constructed at a new relocation site. This progress is often 
attributed to the coordination among the Newtok Traditional Council, led by Newtok 
resident Stanley Tom, and state and federal agencies -  together this group constitutes the 
Newtok Planning Group (Bronen 2011). The Newtok Planning Group was considered by 
the IAWG a “model for local, community, state and federal partnerships to address 
complex issues -  the community planning efforts have enabled the community to 
advance its already innovative successes” (Bronen 2009:6). In at least one phone meeting 
I was present at, an IAWG board member suggested that progress in Shishmaref was 
stalled because of the lack of local organization. In the 2009 report, the IAWG stated that 
Shishmaref had “community planning needs to coordinate with the various organizations 
to effectively plan for the needs of an entire community” (Bronen 2009:6).
The Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition was convened in 2001 (before 
the Newtok Planning Group), meets regularly, and is representative of all the local 
political affiliations. My research cannot directly account for the discrepancy in what 
appears to be the IAWG’s belief that local Shishmaref relocation planning is unorganized 
and the actual existence and functionality of this overarching body of local government 
representatives -  but I suggest that this has to do with institutional knowledge and agency 
organization.
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As stated above, the success of the Newtok Planning Group is often attributed to 
Stanley Tom (Bronen 2009, personal observations). Success is less often attributed to 
Sally Cox. Cox, an agency worker from the Division of Community and Regional Affairs 
has been working with Newtok on relocation issues for at least 7 years and has been 
instrumental in their success -  at least in part due to her long tenure working on this issue 
and her personal relationship with the Newtok community.
Certainly local organization and leadership is preeminently important in order to 
successfully plan relocation. Stanley Tom and the Newtok Traditional Council seem to 
exemplify this type of organization. I would argue that Shishmaref has a similarly stable 
organization in the Shishmaref Relocation Coalition. Earlier in this chapter I identified 
turnover within state and federal agencies as being a significant obstacle to relocation, 
and that turnover causes a lack of institutional memory and long-term organizational 
strategy. If Shishmaref leaders had personal and professional relationships with key 
agency workers, and if key agency workers were invested for extended periods o f time -  
a relationship similar to the relationship between Cox and the Newtok Planning Group -  
then perhaps relocation would be progressing more rapidly.
Because multiple villages need to be relocated and because these relocations are 
very expensive, the progress of one village over other villages could be highly sensitive 
and rendered competitive. I have witnessed and recorded Shishmaref residents defusing 
this potentially sensitive and competitive situation among “at risk” communities by 
identifying erosion and flooding as a collective struggle, and characterizing the success of 
one village as also a success for Shishmaref.
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EM: When you’ve worked with the IAWG, what do you see being
accomplished?
BE: Yeah, not necessarily for Shishmaref but for other communities.
They’re helping Shishmaref in a way too. If  they’re helping one 
community we get a little better edge on we need to ask for it.
In a different interview, Tommy Obruk said the following:
Interview with Tommy Obruk May 17, 2010
TO: On that teleconference yesterday I noticed that some lady spoke that 
they were trying to get a relocation planner for Kivalina and Shishmaref.
That was great, to help both villages, you know.
In a 2007 testimony to a Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs sub-committee on 
disaster recovery of the United States Senate, Tony Weyiouanna said,
In conclusion, we understand that other communities are faced with the 
similar problems as we are here in Shishmaref and also are working to 
relocate their communities. Shishmaref has tasked the Shishmaref Erosion 
and Relocation Coalition to advocate for funding and coordination of the 
erosion and relocation project by forming the Coalition in 2001 and to 
move forward by consensus of the community.
In this last paragraph, Weyiouanna gives three important pieces of information. First, he 
acknowledges other communities facing erosion and flooding issues. Second, he points 
out that Shishmaref has been working on erosion and relocation issues locally since 2001
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Interview with Brice Eningowuk September 24, 2009
-  as early as any village. Third, that the Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition is 
moving forward only by consensus of the community -  through the participation of many 
voices, not the voice of one person speaking for the community.
I worry that the success of Newtok and the identification of Stanley Tom as a 
good leader promotes a narrative that puts the onus of failed relocation attempts or 
inefficient relocation planning on local leadership. If Newtok is successful, a failure to 
relocate other villages before a major disaster may more easily be attributable to 
inadequacies within villages themselves and not inadequacies of state and federal 
government interventions and organization. This research suggests that the local 
Shishmaref Coalition is more highly organized and has a longer institutional memory 
than state or federal organizations.
5.2.5 Site selection
In Newtok, selecting a site has been a key decision that facilitates progress 
(Bronen 2011:382-383). Bronen identifies criteria the Newtok Traditional Council 
prioritized when choosing a relocation site: good soil, lack of erosion, subsistence 
accessibility, barge accessibility, space for an airport, and not infringing on other villages 
subsistence practices (Bronen 2011:382). These criteria would be similar for Shishmaref 
residents -  but may be problematic if one or more criteria need to be compromised.
In Shishmaref, possible relocation sites include and have included: East Nunatuq, 
Arctic (Arctic River), Igloot, Tin Creek, West Tin Creek Hills, and West Tin Creek Flats. 
During the 2002 vote, Kawerak employee Julie Baltar pushed for quick site selection
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believing it would facilitate funding. At that time the community nominated Tin Creek as 
the relocation site. Some people in the community did not feel that nomination was legal 
or binding and disagreed with the site selection (interviews, personal communication). In 
2010, Kate Kokeok reported that Tin Creek, West Tin Creek, and Nunatuq were the most 
community-supported sites. All of the sites have resurfaced as possibly implausible 
because of ice and permafrost rich soil, which challenges potential relocation and is a 
poor foundation for infrastructure.
Shishmaref residents have supported the planning of a road that would connect a 
barge landing, new village site, and a gravel source at Ear Mountain. The road footprint 
(from potential barge landing to Ear Mountain, village site has not been selected) also sits 
on permafrost rich land (AKDOT 2009:17-21). Because hydrologists predict continuous 
thawing of permafrost throughout the Seward Peninsula throughout the 21 st century 
(Busey et al. 2008), this complicates planning. Because warming is predicted to continue, 
and because buildings and other infrastructure insulate the ground and could cause 
increased thaw, choosing a site is difficult. Site selection is also sensitive because of 
allotments of land given to Native families in the traditional family camp areas 
throughout the mainland.
Residents of Shishmaref are also worried about leaving the island at all to go 
inland. First, they worry about not having access to the sea for spring seal hunting. On the 
mainland, residents would have to cross lagoon ice that could be rotten in order to get to 
the sea and the important spring seal hunt. Shishmaref residents say that they would need
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to return to the old tradition of camping during springtime -  going to the island or some 
other point along the coast or camp on the ice to wait for the seals.
The famous seal oil and dry meat from Shishmaref also requires coastal 
conditions to properly dry and render, according to sources. Preparing dry meat requires 
cooler temperatures and ocean breezes that protect the meat from insects and flies. As 
one woman told me: “even 10 miles makes a big difference.” If sites along the coast are 
considered unfeasible because of permafrost and Shishmaref residents are pushed inland, 
then this all-important cultural tradition would be much more difficult, maybe impossible 
to carry out.
As in 1901, choosing what is a viable site for an Inupiaq sea mammal hunting 
community, and what is a good site for state-sponsored infrastructure development, may 
be two different objectives. Again we see practical considerations and ideologies clashing 
and we might ask, what happens if all these criteria cannot be met? What makes a place 
“viable” for habitation depends on the value system one uses to assess a site.
5.3 Media Attention as a Counterforce to Apathy
When Tony Weyiouanna began to lobby state and federal lawmakers for erosion 
protection and relocation funding he had a difficult time. In the early 2000s, the 
relocation of rural Alaskan villages linked to climate change was an invisible issue. Early 
in his planning Weyiouanan decided to use the media to draw attention to the problems in 
Shishmaref. In 2002, a People Magazine reporter phoned Weyiouanna in his office in
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Shishmaref. The reporter had an ultimatum: convince him to come to Shishmaref or he 
was going to Tuvalu for a climate change story.
“I looked up Tuvalu on the internet,” says Weyiouanna, “and saw that he could be 
sitting in shorts drinking a margarita.” Or, he could come to Shishmaref, the relatively 
desolate island in the middle of the Chukchi Sea. Weyiouanna says, “what I knew we had 
was culture.”
Since then media interest in Shishmaref has been significant. A Shishmaref 
Relocation Coalition Newsletter from 2006 reports that 64 news organizations had visited 
the community since 2002. A partial list of news and documentary organizations that 
have visited Shishmaref for climate change pieces includes, but is not limited to: The 
New York Times, The National Film Board of Canada, The Associated Press, Reuters, 
People Magazine, Earth watch Radio, Global Create (Japan), National Geographic 
Magazine, Maison Radio (Canada), Viverra Films (Holland), The New Yorker, The 
Weather Channel, BBC, Time Magazine, TV Asahi (Japan), ABC News, French Daily 
Liberation, HBO, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, Thalassa (French television), 
HD Net TV, National Public Radio, the German TV network, ZDF, Svenska Dagbladet 
(Sweden), and CBS news.
Interest in Shishmaref spills over into the public, and as a researcher in 
Shishmaref I have witnessed the intense interest climate change researchers, journalists, 
and sympathizers have ascribed to rural Alaska villages. In February 2009, in Oxford 
England, I met a researcher with the Environmental Change Institute who was interested 
in my work. We decided to go out for coffee. Once we sat down she asked me to read a
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theatre drama she’d written that takes place in Shishmaref. She had never been to the 
Alaska or to the Arctic, but she was inspired by the tragedy unfolding there.
On Friday, November 5, 2010,1 gave a talk at Boise State University about my 
research in Shishmaref. After the talk a student approached me and asked how she could 
go to Shishmaref in the summer to help. I told her there was probably not anything that 
she could do to help. She corrected me: “I am going to Shishmaref.”
Rachel Aronson, a Masters student at the University of Washington’s School of 
Marine and Environmental Affairs raised money through a crowd funding website 
(petridish.org) to fund a research project in Shishmaref. In this case the Shishmaref 
narrative inspired donors. A documentary (Mason et al. in press call it a “docudrama”, in 
press) has been released to critical acclaim entitled “the Last Days of Shishmaref.”
Reading through Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition meeting minutes is 
to peruse through the lists of visitors interested in a climate change story. The following 
is just an example from one month o f visitors, June 2004:
June 2004 (Shishmaref Relocation Coalition Meeting Minutes)
Elizabeth Kolbert -  the New Yorker Magazine Reporter came to 
Shishmaref to interview various people for a story on Shishmarefs 
erosion problems. The news is likely to be printed sometime this summer. 
Another trip is being planned by Elizabeth to gather more information on 
Shishmaref for the article. We are expecting more television documentary 
crews to come later this spring and summer documenting our situation.
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Sidney Moore of the Weather Channel was here recently to get some 
footage of Shishmaref for a half hour story on Global Warming to be 
shown on the Weather Channel, the story is to be broadcasted on July 25,
2004, for those of you wishing to view the footage. Also, APRN will be 
here October 2004 to work on a story on Shishmaref and the effects of 
Global Warming on our community.
This constant barrage of media attention begets important questions: What is it about the 
Shishmaref case study that appeals to outsiders? What is it about the media that benefits 
Shishmaref residents? And is media attention lowering vulnerability in Shishmaref?
For the media, the Shishmaref case study creates a distant, but visible, victim of 
climate change. For Shishmaref, local leaders have told me they engage the media 
specifically to “get their story out,” and to combat apathy from state and federal 
lawmakers to the increasing erosion problems in the community -  this was particularly 
true in the early half of this decade. The extent to which political attention followed 
media attention is difficult to measure, but certainly Weyiouanna’s awareness campaign 
for the recognition of flooding and erosion problems in Shishmaref was successful. A 
2008 report from the IAWG states, “These problems [flooding and erosion leading to 
relocation], which primarily affect small, isolated communities, are difficult to address 
and due to this are easily ignored” (IAWG 2008:4). Media attention makes it increasingly 
difficult for political entities to “ignore” small, isolated communities.
The experiences and high emotions that emerge when the Shishmaref case study 
is discussed are sometimes overwrought with empathy, as with the student at Boise State,
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and at other times are surprisingly disdainful. Discussing Shishmaref with a broader set 
of scholars, I’ve been struck by the sweeping statements made concerning climate change 
and Arctic residents, particularly Shishmaref residents. In a meeting in Finland, a 
prominent Arctic anthropologist told me, “Climate change is strangling Arctic 
anthropology.” I’ve been told by a fellow Shishmaref anthropologist, “I’m not interested 
in climate change at all, unless you’re talking about discourse.” These negative 
statements also seem disproportionately impassioned. Disdain for the Shishmaref case 
study seems to have the cache in some social networks to imply a certain knowingness, a 
demonstrative performance that one is above the “hype” of the media. I’ve been asked 
more than once some variety of the strikingly insensitive question, “have they fallen in 
yet?”
As Shishmaref becomes a metaphor for outsiders through media, the specific 
details of development, history, climate, and geography recede. This is not the narrative 
Shishmaref residents tell. In the following news pieces about Shishmaref, local narratives 
are measured and grounded while the description of Shishmaref given by journalists are 
more catastrophic and emotional.
Thousands of years ago, hungry nomads chased caribou here across a 
now-lost land bridge from Siberia, just 100 miles away. Many scientists 
believe those nomads became the first Americans. Now their descendants 
are about to become global warming refugees. Their village is about to be 
swallowed up by the sea.
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"We have no room left here," said 43-year-old Tony Weyiouanna. "I have 
to think about my grandchildren. We need to move." (original emphasis, 
Verrengia 2002.)
As another example:
When the arctic winds howl and angry waves pummel the shore of this 
Inupiat Eskimo village, Shelton and Clara Kokeok fear that their house, 
already at the edge of the Earth, finally may plunge into the gray sea 
below.
"The land is going away," said Shelton Kokeok, 65, whose home is on the 
tip of a bluff that's been melting in part because of climate change. "I think 
it's going to vanish one of these days." (Sutter 2009).
In the next example, the author comments explicitly that Weyiouanna is unemotional 
about his statements, that Weyiouanna speaks with “the indifference of an engineer.”
“I don’t think we have much choice now,” he tells me on the eve of the 
new ballot. “Some might vote no—people so tied to the island they don’t 
want to leave. We’ll just have to make adjustments.” Like a wholesale 
migration to the mainland, an adjustment he discusses with the 
indifference of an engineer, not someone who’s lived here all his life 
(Wallach nd).
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In these examples, the quotations from residents are: “I don’t think we have much of a 
choice now,” “The land is going away,” “I think it’s going to vanish one of these days,” 
“There’s no room left” and “we need to move.” These are all experiential statements of 
erosion that are grounded in physical realities. The authors insert the catastrophic 
language of “wholesale migration, angry waves, edge of the earth, and swallowed by the 
sea.”
Media attention in Shishmaref may have brought needed political attention -  not 
just to Shishmaref, but to all villages in rural Alaska who have experienced problems 
with erosion and flooding. This attention is controversial within the village and the 
narrative told by intermediary journalists uses more catastrophic language than local 
advocates and residents use -  changing the narrative that is exported from Shishmaref 
into a fable about an anthropomorphized environment. Catastrophic narratives about 
climate change refugees and environmental refugees in Tuvalu have been analyzed as an 
exploitation of Tuvaluan citizens -  using Tuvaluans as “ventriloquists for climate change 
narratives” by Farbotko and Lazrus (2012). Similarly to discourses by Shishmaref 
residents, Tuvaluan narratives are often less catastrophic and are framed by ideas of 
global citizenry and human rights (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012) instead of being framed by 
helplessness and victimization.
5.4 A Discussion on Relocation
The history of infrastructure development in Shishmaref is a history of 
negotiation between action, inaction, and reaction by state and federal agencies and
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action, inaction, and reaction by local communities. Relocation discussions are a new 
chapter in these negotiations. The tools and strategies needed to adapt to erosion and 
flooding risks today are embedded in complex social networks, bureaucratic mandates 
and funding, how outsiders imagine and respond to ecological circumstances on an island 
in the middle of the Chuckchi Sea, and how Shishmaref residents respond to the sites 
deemed feasible by engineering firms. “We, as American people, deserve the attention 
and help of our fellow Americans,” Weyiouanna testified to the U.S. Senate.
This dissertation has created an ethnographic account of vulnerability. The 
components of history, culture, infrastructure changes over time, local knowledge and 
colonial projects, and finally relocation planning since 1974 all work in concert to reduce 
vulnerability in some cases and increase vulnerability in others. Why Shishmaref 
residents live on an island exposed to flooding and erosion risks, and why they cannot 
easily relocate off of the island to mitigate the risks of these floods and prevent loss of 
life and property and diaspora is a function of history, climate, colonialism, and cultural 
mandates. Like all disasters, vulnerability is a function of social systems interacting with 
ecologies -  of risk entering into stratified social, political and economic systems.
Shishmaref vulnerability can be traced in part to being a marginalized, minority, 
and colonized community. During early development, local knowledge was ignored 
because of racist and paternalistic ideologies.6 In meetings today, slow technology in the 
village, power differentiation in local vs. bureaucratic vernaculars, and meeting sites in
6 Sheldon Jackson attended the same college as, and appears to have been influenced by, 
Lewis Henry Morgan, an architect of “social evolutionary theory” (Ellana and Sherrod 
2004:71).
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Anchorage privilege non-rural, non-Alaska Native decision-makers. Decision making 
that is explicitly outside of Shishmaref control and under jurisdiction of a rotating cast of 
agency workers also disadvantages Shishmaref residents. Early reports from the IAWG 
explicitly state that these rural villages are easy to ignore (IAWG 2008:4). In the future, if 
Shishmaref cultural values are “ignored” in favor of engineering feasibility studies of site 
selections, then the cultural viability of Shishmaref as a sea-based people may be at risk.
The history of development and infrastructure in Shishmaref has created 
circumstances in which an ideal location for highly mobile hunters translated into a poor 
location for permanent infrastructure and development. Vulnerability to erosion was 
created almost immediately on Sarichef Island, as residents settled permanently onto the 
island and immobile infrastructure was developed and integrated into daily lives. Today, 
risks that stem from erosion, flooding, and the infrastructure trap are exacerbated by 
anthropogenic climate change. These circumstances push the need to relocate as an 
adaptive strategy to changing social and ecological conditions. In order to relocate the 
millions of dollars of infrastructure developed in Shishmaref over the last 100 years, 
residents are required to petition state and federal agencies for aid. Alaska Native 
residents have particular histories with these agencies leading people in Shishmaref to 
trust and distrust certain agencies and to demonstrate significant distrust in government 
intervention to provide a successful solution before a major disaster. Adaptation to 
flooding and erosion in Shishmaref today, therefore, rests on the ability to create a 
convincing narrative of risk for outsiders and funders. Since at least 2001, Shishmaref
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relocation advocates have petitioned state and federal representatives for aid and have 
launched a media campaign to “get the story of Shishmaref out.”
The narratives that surface around Shishmaref relocation and climate change are 
only partially controlled by Shishmaref residents. In some cases media attention may 
very well have worked to counteract government apathy for small, rural communities. In 
other cases narratives about Shishmaref in the media recapitulate stereotypes about 
Inupiaq victims and seem eerily similar to the exaggerated stories Sheldon Jackson told 
about starvation on the Seward Peninsula at the turn of the last century -  narratives no 
doubt justified once again by a desire to “help.” Other narratives about relocating 
communities- such as comparisons drawn between Newtok and Shishmaref -  can 
misinterpret local power-sharing in organizations (The Shishmaref Erosion and 
Relocation Coalition) as a lack of organization.
The data presented at the very beginning of this chapter elucidates what this 
experience feels like. It is tedious and redundant to residents who feel misunderstood and 
must constantly explain and translate their experiences to new state and federal agency 
workers. This is sometimes explicitly the result of high turnover among agency workers 
or the lack of grounded experience by decision-makers. Sometimes frustration and 
misunderstanding is a result of cultural and ideological differences.
The burden of constantly explaining oneself is a mark of structural racism and a 
marker of the lack of true biculturalism (Johnsrud and Sadao 1998:321). The burden of 
explanation and cultural translation often falls on Shishmaref residents -  for example, 
defending the need to located on or near traditional subsistence territory. Also at play is
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an urban/rural divide and unorthodox community planning structures. In Shishmaref, the 
participatory structure of the Erosion and Relocation Coalition -  which largely represents 
multiple family groups -  can be less successful in agency meetings than a single, clear 
village representative. In Newtok, Stanley Tom is a singular clear voice of relocation. 
Shishmaref residents seem very dedicated to keeping their own power-sharing decision­
making structure, but adherence to this cultural mandate may disadvantage them.
The newest iteration of government organization for relocating communities has 
two significant advantages. First, the ACCIMP is working on developing a protocol for 
villages considered in imminent danger. Second, the two agency workers in charge of the 
ACCIMP have a longer tenure than anyone working on relocation issues in Alaska 
outside of village residents themselves. This is a significant step forward. Still, there are 
steps that can be taken to acknowledge the inequities that created risk in the first place 
and to reduce inequities still present in decision-making processes.
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Chapter Six: The Tenacity of Home
Collocating or merging with other villages may be cheaper than relocation, but the risk 
is high that the village’s lifestyle and culture will be lost. With these estimates, the 
Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition decided to continue with their relocation 
efforts.
(Climate Adaptation and Knowledge Exchange 2010:2)
Shishmaref residents voted to relocate to the mainland Seward Peninsula in 2002. 
In interview data collected by Schweitzer and Marino (2006:67) from 2004 to 2006, 
Shishmaref residents described their intention to maintain a discrete village, not to merge 
with a pre-existing village, not to merge with the larger regional hubs of Nome and 
Kotzebue, and not to move -  as a community or as individual households -  to Anchorage 
or Fairbanks. One hundred percent of 54 individuals interviewed between 2004 and 2006 
responded that they would prefer not to relocate to a larger urban area. As the quote 
above reiterates, a consensus of Shishmaref residents agree that to abandon traditional 
Tapqagmiut territory would mean losing the village’s lifestyle and culture. Despite the 
varied opinions that men and women in Shishmaref have about relocation -  which 
relocation site on the mainland is preferable, how and when relocation should be carried 
out, who should lead the relocation effort, how government representatives have handled 
relocation planning so far -  there is the collective belief that Shishmaref should remain as 
a discrete community within the traditional Tapqagmiut area.
Original government infrastructure investment in Shishmaref as a sedentary 
community on Sarichef Island was justified by the ideological belief that modernization, 
Christianization, and civilization would benefit Alaska Native tribes. This effort was 
consistent with a global colonizing project ideologically grounded in ethnocentric visions
fostered during the Enlightenment, and predicated on the exportation of infrastructure and 
institutions throughout the world (Spybey 1992:100-118). While worthwhile debates may 
rage about the merits of modernity, technology, and human “progress,” it is undeniable 
that in the wake of widespread attempts at assimilation, Alaska Native and American 
Indian communities have suffered tremendous upheaval. Indeed, one of the leading social 
scientific explanations for the extensive physical, mental, and behavioral health 
disparities suffered by indigenous peoples (in North America and elsewhere) is the 
overwhelming stress of cultural change, including cultural disruption and lifestyle 
changes due to forced acculturation (Condon 1987; Dinges and Joos 1988; Dinges and 
Duong-Tran 1993; Duran and Duran 1995; Quintero 2002; Walters and Simoni 2002). 
Shishmaref residents currently make the argument that to remove them from traditional 
subsistence territory or to refuse to create a safe village on traditional Tapqagmiut 
territory is to promote cultural disintegration. Figure 6.1 (below) is the banner from the 
Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation website. In the banner, Shishmaref residents present 
the argument that they are “worth saving.”
This tenacity of home is not result of a cost/benefit analysis, but neither is it 
irrational or solely ritualistic. “Attempts by Alaska Natives to protect and prevent the loss 
of their lands have taken place since the 19th century” (Anders 1989:286). The strength of 
this commitment to subsistence territories and subsistence practices can surprise non­
Native peoples. This chapter investigates the tenacious relationships that Shishmaref 
residents have to place and practice. I begin with information about subsistence practices 
in Shishmaref and an ethnographic account of putting away black meat -  the experience
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of subsistence practices. Following, the chapter discusses land tenure as a risk 
management strategy. Next, we consider habitation as a choice or an obligation and 
introduce the concept of land and landscape within a interpersonal conceptualization of 
the self. Finally, we discuss whether or not Shishmaref residents have a “right” to 
traditional subsistence territory.
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SERC Shishmaref Erosion & Relocation Coalition Links | Contact Us
Our Culture Our P light Take Action Photos & V ideos M eetings D o nors New sletters
We Are Worth Saving!
Environmental Warming, Flooding and Erosion. 
To not act.... represents the annihilation of our 
community by dissemination.
TAKE ACTION!
Figure 6.1: Erosion and Relocation Coalition banner
6.1 Subsistence Practices in Shishmaref
In 1985, Sobelman reported that Shishmaref residents obtained 75 to 80% of their 
total caloric intake through subsistence proteins, fats and vegetables -  defined as locally 
procured resources (Sobelman 1985:4). In 1990, Conger and Magdanz reported that the 
average Shishmaref household took in 2,637 pounds of edible weight in subsistence 
foods during the year, or 663 pounds per person (1990: 29).
Marine mammals accounted for 69.4 percent of the total harvest, three 
times as much as any other resource category. The next largest component 
of the harvest was land mammals (15.6 percent), followed by fish (6.4 
percent), plants (3.4 percent, salmon (2.6 percent), birds (2.0 percent), and 
shellfish (.07 percent) (Conger and Magdanz 1990:27).
Subsistence practices in Shishmaref are integrated into all aspects of life. The annual 
cycle and daily activities of a household revolve around subsistence practices and the 
school day. To residents, the word subsistence refers to more than just the products 
derived from labor, but signifies a way of life and an orientation to and relationship with 
the landscape. Different expectations for sharing revolve around subsistence activities, 
relative to cash exchanges or other market activities. John Sinnok of Shishmaref says that 
subsistence constitutes a “we” world, and is fundamentally integral to an Ifiupiaq way of 
life. As Thomas Thorton writes,
Every year tens of thousands of Alaska Natives harvest, process, 
distribute, and consume millions of pounds of wild animals, fish, and 
plants through an economy and way of life that has come to be termed 
“subsistence.” Collectively, these varied subsistence activities constitute a 
way of being and relating to the world, and thus comprise an essential 
component of Alaska Native identities and cultures (1998:22.3)
The following is an excerpt from my field notes and reflections on days spent working 
with women to put away the ugruk from the spring hunt.
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July 2008 has been a rainy season.
Rachel postpones putting away the black meat that Dennis and 
other family members got from hunts in the spring. Her racks made of 
driftwood are covered. Stink hams (shoulder meat from bearded seals) are 
drying under tarps. Trashcans at the family’s racks on the southwest, 
unprotected side of the island are full of seal blubber rendering into oil, 
butchered strips of thin, dried ugruk meat, and tightly wound intestines 
and stomachs. All the different parts of the ugruk are separated and each 
has their own trashcan.
Finally, there is a break in the rain, Minnie (Rachel’s sister in-law), 
Rachel and I go to the racks on Rachel’s four-wheeler to put away the 
meat and to make buckets to be distributed to friends and family who live 
in Shishmaref and in other parts of Alaska.
Rachel sits the radio up on an old oilcan and flips a white, five- 
gallon bucket over as a seat. She pulls the trashcans of blubber, dried 
black meat, stomachs and intestines, and the rendered oil out from where 
they were stored. Minnie sits next to Rachel. The two women divide the 
meat into smaller, white, five-gallon buckets that are cleaned and prepared 
each year for this purpose.
The men have already hunted and begun to butcher. The women 
have finished butchering and divided the meat into these cans, so that the
July 2008
only thing left to do is to further divide the animal into 5-gallon buckets 
and submerge the dried meat with seal oil. A handful of stomachs and 
intestines go into a bucket, along with some thin strips o f black meat, 
panaaluk, thicker cuts of black meat, and then the bucket is filled with seal 
oil, opaque and yellow.
While we do this, the radio plays Casey Kasem’s weekly top 40 
and we all drink orange crush from cans. Rachel and Minnie don’t talk 
much, but this is still a social event and there’s an ease about the work.
The rain has finally let up and we can see the ocean and the mainland.
Like many times before, I’m at a loss to explain the nuances of 
distinction that mark experiences with Inupiaq women as different from 
experiences with other women in my life. There is, of course, the work 
itself: we are putting away ugruk meat, meat from the large bearded seal.
There is the setting, this amazing, windswept sliver of an island.
There is the repetition of the work itself -  put in stomachs, 
intestines, panaaluk, seal oil, close bucket, repeat -  and how obvious it is 
that Rachel and Minnie have done this work before; that their ancestors 
have been doing something like it for thousands of years.
And there’s the orange crush, the plastic five-gallon buckets, and 
radio pop music that show how nonresistant to change people in Shish 
actually are. Putting away black meat is ritual. It is a practice in cultural 
expression; but it is not a reified Inupiaq activity. It is not part of a living
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museum. Putting away black meat is what women do. It is both ritual and 
pragmatism.
This is the ugruk that Rachel’s daughter Kate ate when she was pregnant and had 
morning sickness. This was the ugruk that Rachel’s other daughter brought with her to 
Shaktoolik where she lives now with her husband and two sons. This is the ugruk that I 
would eat for the next week. This is the ugruk that Minnie would take home to her 
husband who does not hunt as much since his snow machine accident. It’s the ugruk that 
would be distributed to family and friends and would be used for special occasions and 
eaten when people didn’t have the money to buy store food.
6.2 Subsistence as Risk Management
Subsistence is integral to cultural existence in Shishmaref, tied explicitly to the 
interdependence of land, people, and animals. This interdependence is understood as 
essential not just for cultural existence and ritual, but also for the physical survival of 
both animals and the Inupiat. Shishmaref residents understand their lives to be predicated 
on the 2600 pounds of subsistence food that households eat every year, but the act of 
hunting and eating is also important to the animals themselves. John Sinnok explains how 
since Shishmaref people have stopped hunting squirrels the population has gotten 
smaller.
Interview with John Sinnok, July 18,2008
When we were kids my grandmother used to have me do a lot of squirrel 
hunting for her and she said, if you guys quit hunting squirrels they’ll
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disappear and now that we don’t eat as much squirrels as we used to, we 
don’t hunt them, and now there’s very little squirrels where there used to 
be a lot of squirrels when we were growing up because we hunted them 
for the skin and we ate the meat back then. Now we don’t do that and you 
hardly see any. I’m not sure if they over graze or what’s going on.
In other interviews people reported that the land needed people there or that the animals 
would go away. The ecological niche held by Kigiqtaamiut people within the territory is 
understood to be necessary for the survival and health of the land and animals.
Dependence on subsistence food is necessary for both cultural survival as well 
risk reduction among Kigiqtaamiut people. In the following excerpt, Raymond 
Weyiouanna ties subsistence to cultural survival; but then quickly talks about the ocean 
as the place to get food, a material necessity. His use of the word “survive” at the end of 
this excerpt reflects this convergence of physical and cultural survival through 
subsistence. The sea and land are literally food security for Shishmaref residents. 
Interview with Raymond Weyiouanna, July 16, 2008 
R.W.: Without subsistence, our lifestyle, our culture wouldn’t be held 
together, I suppose. Because we depend on the sea for a lot of our food.
The sea is like our supermarket -  when the ocean is nice we gather what 
we can. When the ice is broken up whether it be the bearded seal, the 
walrus, and then after the ice goes we try to gather as much fish as we can 
from the sea, you know because it’s calm, it’s like the store is open when
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it’s calm and like the supermarket is closed. Without that I don’t think 
we’d be able to survive.
Giddings noted that the Seward Peninsula has historically been a place of both 
continuity and change for millennia (1960). Likewise, anthropologists write about 
flexibility to changing conditions as an important Inupiat and Yupiit individual and 
cultural trait for dealing with fluctuating environmental and social conditions in the 
Arctic (Morrow 1990:154, Kingston 2008:158). The ease with which snow machines and 
other technology were incorporated into subsistence activities is emblematic of this 
flexibility (Pelto 1973). I found, however, that hunting and subsistence were also 
understood as a backdrop to change. When research participants spoke about dynamic 
change in the Arctic, about adapting to changing scenarios, changing ecological 
conditions, and even moving to new locations, hunting and subsistence practices were 
expected to be flexible, but abandoning subsistence territory and not having access to the 
ocean at all was characterized as the breaking point of this flexibility. Fred Eningowuk 
outlines this belief explicitly in the following interview passage.
Interview with Fred Eningowuk, September 25, 2009 
FE: And then, you know Eskimos have always adapted to their location 
and their way of life. Eventually we would have to adapt to a new 
relocation site. Whether it be changing our subsistence way of life. The 
majority of us, you know like me, would still need access to the ocean.
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Subsistence practices also carry a strong cyclical quality. Again, Raymond Weyiouanna 
says,
The most important thing is to teach them [his children] is the value of the 
food that we provide them and the livelihood of having to teach them to 
learn how to get the animals and basically pass down what has been 
passed down to me from my parents and that’s what I’m looking forward 
to doing to my children [my emphasis].
The importance of passing on subsistence practices to the next generation -  and the 
burden of responsibility to learn subsistence skills -  were present in many exchanges I 
had in Shishmaref. In another interview, Esther Iyatunguk said the following.
And my aunt, she would always give my mom and dad a little bucket. She 
shared. I don’t know if you met her, Sharon Nayokpuk, she was like an 
older sister. I noticed last year she was getting tired a lot when we started 
cutting and I helped her. You know I helped her cut last year and I’m 
going to help her this year because she helped our family a lot. You know 
it’s my time to help take care. It’s just our time to step up, you know?
Esther used this phrase, “time to step up,” frequently in reference to subsistence 
activities. Esther has a job with the school, has 5 children, and takes online classes 
through UAF’s Northwest campus. She never said she was “stepping up” when she talked 
about her work or education. Instead she used this idea of “stepping up” to talk about her 
brother learning how to seal hunt, to talk about her learning to making kuspuks after her 
‘gram’ passed away.
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Through passing these traditions on, subsistence hunting becomes the constant in 
a dynamic world, even if the form of that hunting changes. The strong generational 
component of subsistence hunting is present in Shishmaref -  and invades new social 
media and new social spaces. On October 20th, 2012, Kate Kokeok posted a photograph 
of her son’s first seal catch on Facebook. One hundred and forty-nine people “liked” it. 
Even as Ifiupiaq people prize flexibility and incorporate modem technology, 
infrastructure, and ideologies for their own use and expression, the constancy of 
subsistence can be seen as a rational strategy for mitigating the fluctuations in economy, 
politics, and social life that have marked a century of radical change.
Throughout the Seward Peninsula people, discuss the day when villages will have 
to be completely self-sustaining. This narrative never surfaced in interviews, but came up 
in personal and intimate settings. There is a strong belief that the white settler population 
will one day leave, as well as the airplanes, Department of Transportation money, 
subsidized electricity, etc. This day, residents understand, will be catastrophic -  as the 
dismantling of public infrastructure would be for any American community. 
Acknowledging and being mentally prepared for this is part of being prepared for a 
dynamic and changing world in which social and ecological circumstances are not 
entirely predictable. Being at home -  or at least having someone at home, in a place 
where subsistence can be carried out -  is a measure of food security, and a measure of 
security for the future of the family group.
Considering that subsistence practices have been a reliable (and preferred) food 
source for thousands of years, and that supermarkets have a much shorter history, this is a
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rational strategy of risk management and economic diversification. In Shishmaref, 
starvation times still exist in living memory, and supermarkets are still not a primary food 
supplier to most Shishmaref residents. Given these circumstances, being divorced from 
the ability to provide food for your family through subsistence is dangerous; being away 
from the ocean, as Eningowuk claims, is not an option.
6.3 Interdependence and Place in Shishmaref, Alaska
6.3.1 Where I live is not a choice
Nusugruk Rainey Hopson is an Inupiaq freelance writer, a blogger and an artist 
from Anaktuvuk Pass. Recently she engaged in a public discussion and debate with 
someone “from the outside” about living in rural Alaska, and about whether or not the 
expense of heating a house was “worth” living in the rural Arctic where heating oil is 
expensive.
L.R: I'm a "people of the lower 48" .....  Rainey has told me quite a bit
over the past few years about the harsh weather and the high cost of items.
It's a personal choice to stay living there as it is a personal choice for 
anyone to live in whatever state they live in. I hear Alaska has some pretty 
scenery, but I can hardly afford to heat my house through 10 to 20 degree 
winters. Though I imagine surely in -50 weather a fireplace doesn’t cut it.
N.R.H.: It's not a personal choice actually, which is hard to define to 
people because it's such a culturally defined decision. In our culture, how 
we are raised, what we see every day, ties us to this land. It's the opposite
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of the “independence and separation” type of culture found in most places 
in the lower 48. Here it's central, the connection with land and animal and 
family. I think when your family lives in the same spot for over 10,000 
years the culture surrounding that heritage makes your “personal choice” 
to live here or not null and void.
In the above passage, Hopson is frustrated. This tone is also present from interviews in 
Shishmaref surrounding issues of relocation and subsistence. Shishmaref residents 
expressed similar frustration when asked about why they needed to stay on traditional 
land and conduct subsistence practices. Annie Kokeok said, “it’s just our way of life, the 
subsistence way of life.” The frustration comes from, as Hopson says, being “hard to 
define to people because it’s such a culturally defined decision.” The value of a 
subsistence lifestyle is predicated on an Inupiaq orientation towards the world and differs 
quite profoundly from non-Inupiaq worldviews. Therefore, explaining the importance of 
maintaining small, traditional, rural villages and landscapes can create communication 
difficulties in cross-cultural settings. It is apparent that within an Inupiaq orientation, 
subsistence is necessary for maintaining personal meaning, cultural continuity, and 
physical security -  whether or not this translates into an outsider’s understanding.
During an interview with Brice Eningowuk, he comments that Shishmaref 
residents “cun’t get away" from hunting or subsistence practices, regardless of the 
uncertainty about the future or about various scenarios of relocation following a disaster. 
Interview with Brice Eningowuk September 24, 2009 
EM: “And what does the future look like for you?”
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BE: . ...W e’re [Kigiqtaamiut people] going to be hunting; we’re going to
be doing subsistence no matter what, I think. That’s one of those things I
feel we can’t get away from.
Consider also this statement from Raymond Weyiouanna: “without subsistence our 
lifestyle, our culture wouldn’t be held together, I suppose.” Subsistence in these examples 
is not something people choose, but rather something that people are -  something that 
cannot be “gotten away from.”
6.3.2 I don’t want to move, even if I move
In interviews conducted from 2004 to 2006, residents reported unanimously that 
they did not want to move to Nome or Kotzebue (Schweitzer and Marino 2006:67).
When I returned to Shishmaref in the late 2000s, I learned that some of these same people 
who were interviewed had moved to Nome. What was the cause for this discrepancy?
In the interview script constructed for the Army Corps of Engineers, one of the 
first questions asked of participants is whether or not they wanted to move to Nome or 
Kotzebue. The interview script assumed the individual as the basic unit of analysis -  but 
this is not what interviewees seemed to be answering if they responded “no,” only to 
move away.
In a classic essay on the nature of anthropological understanding, Clifford Geertz 
argues against assuming the primacy of the independent (or, individual) self in our cross- 
cultural endeavors:
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The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive universe; a dynamic center of 
awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive 
whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a 
social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a 
rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures. Rather than 
attempt to place the experience of others within the framework of such a 
conception, which is what the extolled “empathy” in fact usually comes 
down to, we must, if we are to achieve understanding, set that conception 
aside and view their experiences within the framework of their own idea 
of what selfhood is (Geertz 1974:31).
The emerging field of cross-cultural psychology continues in this vein, pointing out that 
many non-European based cultures construct the self and the agency of the self with a 
focus either on independent or on interdependent relationships (Fiske et al. 1998; 
Greenfield 2009; Triandis 1995, Markus & Kitayama 1991). While “every individual self 
carries elements of independence and interdependence” (Markus and Kitayama 2010), 
the degrees to which the former or latter provide underlying structures for organizing 
social behavior vary between cultures. In other words, there are both practical and 
cognitive distinctions between cultures in which independence is the basis for social life 
and cultures in which interdependence is a foundation for social life.
Applying this framework to the interview script and the answers we received to 
our initial interview question, we might say that the “I” that participates in the
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community of Shishmaref does not want to be relocated to Nome or Kotzebue, regardless 
of whether or not the individual “I” does actually move or desire to move to Nome or 
Kotzebue. Shishmaref residents need for Shishmaref to exist -  even if they live 
somewhere else. The individual is in part constituted by the existence of Shishmaref as a 
social unit -  thus agency is interdependent and the interdependent self does not want to 
relocate.
This interdependence may seem to ran counter to the importance of autonomy in 
Inupiat and Yupiit culture, and the taboo on telling anyone what they should do, both of 
which seem to indicate high levels of independence (Morrow 1991:65-69; Kingston 
2008:160) -  but this is not necessarily the case. Autonomy and relatedness, or 
interdependence, can be domain specific and socially situated (Luciano 2010:498). 
Culturally defined social practices, social performances, and material goods belong in 
different degrees to independent or interdependent domains of social life. Subsistence 
practices have specific interdependent characteristics, for example, while the cash 
economy is based more exclusively in individualistic domains.
This analytic tool of independence and interdependence sheds light on Hopson’s 
explanation that living in the Arctic landscape is “not a choice,” by which she may mean 
it is not an independent choice, but rather an interdependent one. It also may explain 
Iyatunguk’s statement that it was “time to step up.” Under certain conditions it becomes a 
responsibility and obligation of the individual to participate in the social structure of the 
village -  to align personal agency with participation of the group. So when asked, “Do 
you want to move to Nome or Kotzebue?” the answer is “no” as a functioning member of
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an interdependent Shishmaref in which a critical number of family members will “step 
up” and create this social world. We, Shishmaref people, need to be in Shishmaref -  
regardless if any particular individual moves to Nome, Anchorage, or California.
6.3.3 Extending interdependence to the landscape
The interdependence of personhood is understood in the literature of cultural 
psychology as a matter of culturally and socially defined relationships between people; 
but Ingold asks,
What makes a relationship social, and are such relationships confined to 
human beings? Why should it be supposed that we encounter the 
nonhuman components of our environment -  animals, plants, inanimate 
objects -  in their sheer materiality? What do we mean by saying that our 
relations with these components are material relations? Or to put the 
question in its even stronger, converse form, what does it mean to say that 
these relations are not social? (1986:184).
Trying to understand why tenacity and an abiding dedication to the landscape is such a 
prominent feature of Shishmaref social life, exacerbated during this episode of high risk, 
necessitates investigating fundamental assumptions about people’s relationships with 
their environment. Northern indigenous scholars often report that many ethnic groups 
attribute agency to non-human things including animals, landscape, and weather 
(Nadasdy 2007; Ingold 1986). Animism in this context is not the imbuing of spirit into
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animate things, but rather is a conception of the material world as being inseparable from 
what we may term spirit.
Animacy, then, is not a property of persons imaginatively projected onto 
the things with which they perceive themselves to be surrounded. Rather -  
and this is my second point -  it is the dynamic, transformative potential of 
the entire field of relations within which beings of all kinds, more or less 
person-like or thing-like, continually and reciprocally bring one another 
into existence. The animacy of the lifeworld, in short, is not the result of 
an infusion of spirit into substance, or of agency into materiality, but is 
rather ontologically prior to their differentiation (Ingold 2006:10).
This is true in Shishmaref as well. Josh Wisniewski writes about anjzugaksrat 
iniqtigutait, the set of rules and laws used in Shishmaref that govern right action in the 
world and have particular salience for hunting luck and success. Under anjzugaksrat 
iniqtigutait or “Eskimo Law,” sila, often translated as weather, is actually conceived of as 
the “environment, the organization of the world, consciousness, and weather without 
implying a differentiation between these conditions of the world” (Wisniewski 
2011:141). Sila, under this translation is animate, as understood by Ingold in the passage 
above. The world is imbued with agency prior to differentiation into humans, animals, 
and landscape. If relationships among sentient beings -  including humans, animals, and 
landscape -  are what interdependently construct agency and personhood, then the 
landscape and relationships with the landscape literally, not figuratively, are definitive of 
Kigiqtaamiut people and culture. If relations are what “bring people into existence,”
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according to Ingold, then we can understand the tie between Kigiqtaamiut people and 
landscape a mutually constitutive relationship.
Translating these cultural imperatives into bureaucratic frameworks is extremely 
difficult. Subsistence occupies an uncomfortable terrain in agency reports concerning the 
relocation of Alaska Native villages that are exposed to erosion and flooding. Subsistence 
is not quite defined as an economic imperative -  though it competes with market labor 
and is in some ways a function of the economy -  and it is not quite solely symbolic or 
recreational either.
A report from the IAWG contrasts “jobs” with subsistence opportunities: “BLM 
firefighting, construction work, and other seasonal jobs often conflict with subsistence 
opportunities’’ (my emphasis, 2009:18). In this case, subsistence is distinct from 
economies, but still exists within a worldview in which an individual may take advantage 
of “opportunities.” In the next passage from the IAWG, the report identifies Alaska 
Native peoples as interested in culture and tradition. Culture and tradition presumably 
includes subsistence. “Remote Alaska villages typically are largely native, have a 
significant interest in culture and tradition” (my emphasis, IAWG 2009:91). Shishmaref 
residents, as demonstrated by the preceding interviews, make much stronger statements 
about the importance of remaining on traditional land and having access to subsistence 
territory. The banner for the Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition is the strongest 
indication that the connection among people, animals, and land is more vital than an 
“opportunity” or an “interest.” The banner reads that We are worth saving [my emphasis].
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6.4 A Conclusion: Taking Indigenous People Seriously
In the article, The Gift o f the Animal, Paul Nadasdy writes that there would be a 
radical shift in anthropological theory if anthropologists accepted as an actual, not merely 
metaphorical, truth that humans and animals could have social relationships with one 
another.
In short, we must acknowledge that they are not just cultural constructions 
and accept instead the possibility that they may be actually (as well as 
metaphorically) valid. For the most part, however, we have refused to do 
this. In this article I take seriously the possibility that northern hunters’ 
conceptions of animals and human-animal relations might embody literal 
as well as metaphorical truths (Nadasdy 2007:26).
This idea of taking people seriously applies in the Shishmaref case study as well. For 
Kigiqtaamiut people, complete removal from traditional lands constitutes culture loss and 
disintegration through the eradication of social relationships that include interdependent 
relationships with the landscape. Agency planning should begin with the first imperative 
of Shishmaref residents themselves, “we must have access to the ocean,” and access to 
traditional subsistence lands. While there are no current plans to move Kigiqtaamiut 
people off of traditional land, and the ACCIMP is actively working to develop a site for 
relocation on Kigiqtaamiut territory, relocation and consolidation of indigenous groups 
throughout the circumpolar North has been a consistent trend for the last 100 years 
(Schweitzer et al. forthcoming). Shishmaref residents know this, and express significant 
fears that diaspora, dispersal, and integration into a larger community will be the outcome
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for their own village. The threat of removal, diaspora, dispersal or integration becomes 
particularly looming because of the geographically widespread flooding and erosion risks 
being experienced by Alaska Native communities today. If we accept that Shishmaref 
residents must (as they say) remain on traditional land, then answers to complicated 
logistical and economic questions stem from this local imperative.
A case for Shishmaref residents remaining on subsistence territory should not, 
therefore, be framed in terms of a cost/benefit analysis -  predicated on percentages of 
subsistence foods that make up household caloric intake or the amount o f transfer 
payments versus household financial independence. Rather, solutions to the expense of 
service delivery and risk mitigation can be analyzed by first considering whether or not 
Alaska Native peoples have a right to traditional territory, a right to rurality, and a right to 
subsistence. Solving complex problems can take place under this rubric.
This chapter addresses the tenacity of home -  why it is important to take 
Shishmaref residents seriously when they say they need to stay near the island and near 
their traditional land base. Most significant in this chapter is the call to take Shishmaref 
residents seriously, whether or not the theories presented have ultimate explanatory 
power. Unanimously, Shishmaref residents who were interviewed said that they did not 
want to merge the village with a larger community -  but wanted instead for Shishmaref 
to remain a discrete village within traditional territory. Whether or not this cultural 
imperative is understood through theories of interdependence and animism is secondary 
to the fact that this imperative is explicit and decisive. This demonstrable decisiveness is 
enough to make remaining on Tapqagmiut territory a bureaucratic mandate.
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Chapter Seven: Shishmaref, Colonization and Climate Change: Concluding Thoughts on
an Ethnography of Vulnerability
One might be tempted to say that these resettlement projects fail because o f the shortage 
o f resources and skills that plague developing countries. Let us not forget how resource- 
rich countries such as Canada and the United States have disrupted their marginalised 
‘native’ populations through resettlement projects. I f  North America can’t make it work, 
you might ask, what hope do third world countries have?
-Chris De Wet 2001:4642
It is difficult for those o f us professionally involved in Indian policy to comprehend the 
level o f unimportance that Indian law and policy has occupied on our scale o f national 
priorities.... It is particularly ironic that despite a generally low level o f national 
attention, a great many people not only claim familiarity with but readily volunteer 
answers to questions concerning Indian affairs.
- Rennard Strickland 1979:217
That under the ice netting has been going on for years and years. Not nothing new. We 
have a system, a way o f doing it.
-Clifford Weyiouanna Interview on July 21, 2008
7.1 A Summary of the Shishmaref Case Study
This research is an ethnography of vulnerability -  a sketch of the complex factors 
historically and contemporarily that create vulnerability and low adaptive capacity in 
Shishmaref to erosion and flooding. Merging historical data (including data from the oral 
and written records) and contemporary experiences of vulnerability (through 
ethnography, interview, and survey) is a way to capture in the present the individual, 
community, and global movements of history, society, and environment as they play out 
in one particular location. This is grounded, case study research. Creating a research 
project to engage this scope and perspective on vulnerability is unique to anthropology -  
and in the end this research is a holistic study in the creation of a moment in time where
Kigiqtaamiut people and other Shishmaref residents wait for what will happen next -  the 
study, the storm, the organized relocation, or the emergency evacuation.
The Seward Peninsula has been inhabited for at least 4000 years, by dynamic and 
flexible cultures that adapted to changing ecological conditions, adopted new 
technologies, moved around, and moved on. Today in Shishmaref, continued erosion and 
flooding and the ineffective long-term viability of shoreline stabilization make migration 
off of the island and resettlement elsewhere the only reasonable solution.
Migration itself is not a maladaptive strategy to ecological shifts -  conversely, for 
millennia migration has been a successful strategy to ecological shift (Kelly and Todd 
1988; Erlandson et al. 2008). However, the last 100 years o f displacement and 
resettlement are a mostly failed experiment in government organization which resulted in 
the further impoverishment and social disarticulation of moving populations (Cemea 
2000; De Wet 2006; Oliver-Smith 2006b, 2009; Hugo 2011). In light of these 
resettlement failures, it is critical to understand the actual outcomes residents are trying to 
avoid. Vulnerability in Shishmaref is not exposure to rising waters and falling bluffs, but 
is rather, that, subsequent to rising water and falling bluffs, Shishmaref residents will 
experience negative outcomes. In the event of a large storm, Shishmaref residents are 
likely to be threatened with loss of life and loss of property. In the long term these risks 
must be mitigated through relocation.
If a major flooding event results in emergency evacuation and relocation or if 
Shishmaref residents are relocated out of traditional hunting areas, the literature suggests 
that residents will be at risk of increased impoverishment, landlessness, homelessness,
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and social disarticulation (Cemea 2000). Cemea writes that “impoverishment of 
displaced people in the central risk in involuntary population resettlement” (1997:1569). 
Underfunding of displaced and resettled populations has been a central feature of 
resettlement failures throughout the 20th century, and underfunding during resettlement 
can translate into generational poverty and the inability of resettled populations to make a 
living or reconstitute important social structures (Hugo 2011:275). Throughout the world 
-  whether climate change related migrants relocate into urban environments or whether 
villages are recreated in close proximity to where they have been -  in order to prevent 
widespread negative outcomes to migrating populations; governments, outsiders, and/or 
institutions will need to dedicate large amounts of funding. “To resettle those families 
and communities displaced by climate change will be expensive” (Hugo 2011:275).
Diaspora and dispersal out of traditional subsistence territory is the single greatest 
fear of residents I have interviewed in Shishmaref. The literature suggests that diaspora 
and resettlement outside of subsistence territory could lead to negative financial and 
social outcomes for residents. Kigiqtaamiut people themselves see removal from 
subsistence territory as a mechanism of cultural disintegration and the possible 
disintegration of the landscape as well. There is a complex relationship among people, 
society, and landscape in Shishmaref, as discussed in chapter six. Regardless of the 
academic understanding of this relationship, it is unequivocal that residents see the 
dispersal of Shishmaref residents as increasing risk to themselves and their cultural 
heritage. This position should be taken seriously. Recurrent throughout American Indian 
and Alaska Native/US policy is the imposition of outsider ideologies through
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infrastructure and institutions, which either failed to create any sustained improvement in 
the lives of American Indians and Alaska Natives, or made the quality of life worse. As 
Rennard Strickland writes, “a recurring historical fact is that Indian policy makers have 
believed, or acted as if they believed, that Indians did not know what was good Indian 
policy (Strickland 1979:214).” Today, Shishmaref residents believe that reconstructing 
the village on the mainland is the best solution in order to mitigate risk and remain on 
traditional subsistence territory.
7.2 Rapid Ecological and Social Change
The decision Shishmaref residents are making to stay close to home occurs 
against a backdrop of dramatically changing social and ecological conditions. Climate 
and ecological changes are taking place in Shishmaref today. While it is difficult to parse 
out how climate, development, and natural processes of erosion combine to create risk of 
flooding, it is clear that ecological changes are occurring in the area and that these 
ecological shifts create uncertainty, both ecologically and psychologically, and contribute 
to the growing threat of disaster on the island.
Even more significant to creating risks of flooding are the social changes that 
have occurred in Shishmaref over the last 100 years. In the past, mobile infrastructure 
made high mobility an adaptation possibility for Tapqagmiut people. Today, life in 
Shishmaref has integrated modem infrastructure into the seasonal round of the village, 
the daily activities of people in place, and the basic service needs of community 
members. Shishmaref residents rely on the school for (part of) their education, bulk fuel
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tanks to store fuel for boats and snow machines used in subsistence hunting, the gym for 
community events, sports (basketball), and potlatches, the clinic for basic health care 
services, the washateria for washing laundry, the church for worship, weddings, baptism 
and funerals, the runway and barge landing for importing goods and people into the 
village, and communication technology (internet, phone lines, cable) for participating in 
long-distance relationships, running businesses, and to facilitate information 
consumption. The integration of immoveable infrastructure into daily life is the process 
of sedentarization, which is a mark of the state project (Scott 1998).
Modernity, particularly modernity expressed through infrastructure, is also an 
extension of the colonial project (Spybey 1992:100). To acknowledge that colonialism 
impacts contemporary life in Shishmaref does not negate Kigiqtaamiut agency. As 
infrastructure, Western institutions, and new technologies have become integrated into 
daily life in Shishmaref, decisions made by US politicians, by local leaders, by school 
teachers, by school children, by the Shishmaref Native Corporation, and by multitudes of 
others have shaped and reshaped the ideological and cultural contours of contemporary 
life on the island, and shaped the use and disuse of infrastructure and technology, as has 
been demonstrated in previous chapters.
The infrastructure that has been integrated into the daily lives of the Kigiqtaamiut 
was expensive to build. This was true in 1901 and remains true today. Sheldon Jackson 
was required to petition outsiders for additional funding for school projects on the 
Seward Peninsula because federal funding was inadequate even at the turn of the century. 
Original infrastructure investment in Shishmaref was justified by the ideological belief
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that modernization, Christianization, and civilization would benefit Alaska Native tribes 
-  and was part of a global colonizing project that occurred throughout the world. These 
projects have created risk and vulnerability among colonized communities. Anthony 
Oliver-Smith says,
Increasing vulnerability to hazard continues relatively unabated today, 
largely because of the undermining of indigenous adaptations, based on 
long term experience in local environments, through direct government 
policies or political economic forces creating production systems 
inappropriate to local culture and environmental conditions (1996:315). 
Subsequent infrastructure and/or service delivery in Shishmaref, such as an airport, 
electricity services, and a barge landing were built and/or subsidized by the government 
as standard practice for rural service delivery in the United States (Warner 2009:3).
Delivering the services of high modernity is expensive in rural Alaska. The 
institutions, civilization, and modernity that early missionaries, educators, and politicians 
worked to create in rural Alaska now require funding to protect and continue -  this is a 
colonial trade off. From an economic perspective, however, colonization is typically cost 
effective for the colonizers (Spybey 1992).
For the last 113 years, the infrastructure and technology (including shoreline 
stabilization) built on Sarichef Island has cost millions of dollars. Now residents need 
millions of dollars more to protect or relocate that infrastructure to a location on the 
mainland. Roughly, rebuilding the village would cost $100-200 million US dollars 
(USACE 2006:6). Shishmaref residents do not have the financial capacity to fund these
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infrastructure projects internally. Even cost sharing projects for state and federal 
development are difficult for small, rural communities. One recommendation by the 
government accounting office regarding villages experiencing flooding and erosion was 
to waive federal cost-sharing requirements. “The Corps currently imposes a cost-share of 
between 25 and 50 percent of project planning and construction costs. These sums, which 
are generally in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, are difficult for villages to 
generate” (USGAO 2003:44).
Shishmaref residents do not have the financial resources to undertake large-scale 
infrastructure projects such as building an airport or barge landing on the mainland. This 
is the infrastructure trap. Traditional adaptation strategies to flooding are, to a certain 
extent, rendered obsolete while modem adaptation strategies that are built around the 
protection and replacement of infrastructure (FEMA intervention, Army Corps of 
Engineers protection through levees, shore stabilization) are expensive, and therefore 
more difficult to justify for small populations.
7.3 Village Viability
An underlying issue for villages that need to relocate because of climate change- 
related erosion and flooding is whether or not Alaska Native rural villages are viable in 
the 21st century. As the number of villages exposed to erosion and flooding increase, and 
as cost estimates for relocating a single village top 200 million USD, it often seems that 
the unspoken question is why these villages, some as small as 80 people, exist in the first
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place. Urbanization into larger economic hubs can seem like a rational plan for small 
villages without running water that face increased risk.
The urbanization of Native American peoples is a consistent trend in federal 
policy. The termination and relocation policies following WW II were successful in 
moving large numbers of American Indians out of reservations and into urban areas. This 
was explicitly a federal response to assimilate and increase employment among American 
Indians (Snipp 1996:66). Eventually these policies were “widely attacked, especially by 
American Indian advocate groups” (Snipp 1996:66) and most policies were halted or 
reversed by 1975. In the Arctic, consolidation of Alaska Native and Siberian Native 
settlements occurred through both Soviet and American government projects (Schweitzer 
et al. n.d.).
A real question is not whether climate change and flooding risks will be a catalyst 
to force Alaska Native peoples to urbanize or to relocate out of traditional land; but 
whether climate change and flooding risks will be the next catalyst for forcing Alaska 
Native people to urbanize and relocate out of traditional land. With this historical 
grounding, it is exceedingly clear that Alaska Native villages and settlements have been 
fighting against disintegration and fighting for recognition as “viable” entities since the 
colonial project began in earnest.
7.4 The Vulnerability Model
This brings us to the vulnerability models discussed in chapter three. This 
research fits most squarely into the political ecological model of vulnerability because it
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established that colonial history and access to institutions were key variables to 
explaining vulnerability. However, the pressure and release model also helps to explain 
how changing climatic conditions can affect, but not singularly create, risk. In the end, 
this dissertation argues that understanding risk requires historical analysis. This is due in 
part to the influences history has on creating vulnerability and exposure in the first place, 
and because of the ways in which history continues to play out in the daily lives of 
individuals.
Vulnerability in Shishmaref is tied explicitly to colonization projects and 
development -  and risk exposure today is a function of original infrastructure that was ill- 
suited to a fluctuating sand island and, subsequently, the inability today in a market- 
driven economy for small populations to control and rebuild critical infrastructure when it 
is exposed to risk. Thus, we see colonization not only creating high-risk environments but 
also inhibiting adaptive capacity. The variables that contribute to risk in Shishmaref are 
linked to these issues of colonialism, cultural misunderstanding, and marginalization. 
These are characteristics embodied by disaster victims all over the world.
These issues are cross-cutting, complex, and embedded in daily interactions and 
larger cultural worldviews. In Chapter Four I discussed how original development in 
Shishmaref did not appear to take local ecological knowledge into consideration when 
selecting a site that was suitable for permanent, sedentary infrastructure. This is 
demonstrative of inequitable colonial engagement -  but it is even more demonstrative of 
the inequitable outcome distribution of poor choices, in that it is the descendants of the 
Kigiqtaamiut, not the descendants of the educators and missionaries, who have to deal
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now with the possibility of fatalities due to a large storm or cultural disintegration 
through diaspora.
In chapter five, I provided an ethnographic account of a phone meeting with the 
Immediate Action Working Group. The failure of that meeting to foster real 
communication was not a failure of Kigiqtaamiut people to be savvy to bureaucratic 
processes. Rather, it was a failure of poor organization and timing of the meeting agenda, 
slow technology, a failure to match needs with organizational mandates, and a failure for 
Alaska Native peoples and local leaders to be equally represented in comparison to 
agency workers in bureaucratic settings.
These situations are rife with issues of social justice and the continued marginality 
of minority and rural populations, and demonstrate that vulnerability is the product of 
systems o f inequity -  not characteristics inherent to a single community. What 
vulnerability models should also be able to demonstrate are systems of inequity -  not 
only simple characteristics of vulnerable communities. Vulnerability models need to 
incorporate not only impoverishment, for example, but systems that promote both 
impoverishment and wealth.
7.5 Why the Public Should Care about Shishmaref
This research set out to address the issue of vulnerability to flooding and erosion 
in Shishmaref; but equally important to this primary focus are the inevitable questions 
that follow. Namely, what can be done about vulnerability and risk in Shishmaref; and 
why should anyone outside of Shishmaref care? The answers to what creates
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vulnerability and what can be done about it are inextricably linked. By understanding the 
social, ecological, and infrastructural building blocks that create vulnerable communities, 
we can understand how best to build resiliency and adaptive capacity and lower 
vulnerability in at risk communities. The answer to the second question is both more 
challenging and more critical. In this case, the limits of scientific inquiry intersect with 
the beginnings of an ethical dilemma that will likely not be answered satisfactorily with 
research and ever more bits of data and information (Callison 2010).
Climate change itself presents a monumental ethical dilemma to global residents. 
From what we know about disaster and vulnerability we can predict that marginalized 
and already vulnerable populations are more likely experience negative outcomes of 
climate change than their resilient counterparts -  research so far has predicted this to be 
overwhelmingly true (Thomas and Twyman 2005; Commission on Climate Change and 
Development 2009; O’Brien and Leichenko 2000; Adger et al. 2006; Ribot 2010). These 
communities are also the least likely to have produced the majority of greenhouse gas 
emissions that cause anthropogenic warming. Even in cases like Shishmaref -  in which 
climate change is only a part of complex ecological, social, and infrastructural 
interactions that create flooding and damage from flooding -  the burdens of moving are 
linked to changing ecological conditions, and this raises questions about how burdens of 
anthropogenic warming are and will be distributed.
Shishmaref also raises profoundly ethical questions about Native American rights 
to traditional homeland. In the continental United States, indigenous land issues are often 
the result of removal policies and subsequent long-term land tenure of areas by non-
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Native peoples. In Alaska, Alaska Natives often hold title to their land through the 
corporation system that was developed through ANCSA. Do Alaska Native people, 
subsequently, have the right to real and realistic access to these land claims and the right 
to remain on traditional territory?
Based on the information and analysis presented in this case study, I believe the 
answer is yes. The history of Shishmaref demonstrates the rapid social changes that have 
occurred in the last 100 years. From development and colonization to boarding schools, 
Alaska Native peoples have been outstandingly flexible to rapid social shift. This 
flexibility has limits. Both formally and informally, Shishmaref residents make these 
limits explicit -  saying that removal from traditional land is equivalent to cultural 
disintegration. Failure to respond to take seriously the threat of cultural disintegration 
among Alaska Native peoples because of risks associated with colonial development and 
ideology is unethical. Real and realistic access to traditional territory -  a requisite 
condition for Shishmaref residents to maintain cultural identity -  should be an inherent 
right for the Kigiqtaamiut. Within these mandatory constraints policy makers and 
Shishmaref leaders can discuss futures of Shishmaref that incorporate risk management 
and promote social, cultural, ecological and economic sustainability.
7.6 Suggestions Moving Forward
In general, vulnerability studies like this one help to elucidate the outcomes of 
political and social choices, so that we can act on the ethical dilemmas we face 
concerning climate change and disaster with more full awareness and understanding. In­
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depth ethnographies of vulnerability and disaster are still rare in anthropology. Future 
research should be directed at filling this gap. Only with robust comparative case studies 
will be able to conduct meta-analysis on disasters and vulnerability. In Alaska, the next 
research agenda may be an investigation of what creates resiliency in Shishmaref -  a 
methodological project designed around what to foster and how to build capacity in 
communities that need to relocate, instead of those social variables that help to create 
risk. For now, I offer six suggestions moving forward.
1) Climate change demands new disaster response protocol
The governance structure for disaster response in the United States through 
Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is ill 
equipped to handle changing ecological conditions. Because disaster response to date is 
based in protocol that emphasizes rebuilding in place, this does not allow for flexibility 
when ecologies and landscapes change. With the onset of climate change outcomes -  
options should be developed for individuals and communities that can provide disaster 
relief or disaster mitigation while making structural changes (such as rebuilding on new 
sites) that also mitigate future disaster risks. This builds flexibility into disaster relief.
2) Create a central agency for relocation planning
This research found that the turnover rate was extremely high among agencies and 
agency workers who were tasked with the relocation of Alaska Native Communities 
linked to increased erosion and flooding risks. This high turnover rate raises serious
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questions about institutional memory at the state and federal level. Shishmaref residents 
experienced multiple iterations of ‘government help’ and become fatigued by 
inexperienced workers. This leads to miscommunication and inefficiency.
Protocol for relocation in cases of increased risk and flooding associated with 
climate change needs to be developed at a state or federal level (Bronen 2011). A central 
agency or program should be developed to avoid redundancy, improve efficiency, and 
give structure to ad hoc relocation efforts happening today in multiple communities. The 
ACCIMP could possibly fill this role -  but that has yet to be determined.
3) Work closely with local institutions
“ A clear finding of the literature on resettlement has been that too often the process has 
been a ‘top-down’ one in which the involvement of those being displaced has been 
limited” (Hugo: 2011:279).
Top-down planning has been a significant failure of government relocation efforts 
for the last century. This research found relocation planning at the state level was often 
not coordinated with planning at the local level. Schematically these situations mean that 
at different scales of intervention (local, state, federal, international) -  institutions are 
working against one another. Local participation also becomes compromised when 
decisions are made in Anchorage and/or Juneau and not made in conjunction with local 
leaders.
Shishmaref residents express a strong desire for self-determination with regards to 
relocation planning. This is a highly valued priority. Any successful and efficient
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relocation planning requires joint efforts from multiple institutional levels; but 
specifically requires meaningful local participation. To assure meaningful local 
participation there should be a priority on in person communication among local, state 
and federal leaders. Meetings and information sharing events should take slow 
technology, non-English speakers, and untraditional institutions (such as the elders 
council) into consideration.
4) Develop mechanisms to encourage personal cross-agency relationships
This research suggests that the most successful way to accomplish cross-agency 
communication and multi-scale efficiency and understanding is to encourage long-term 
personal relationships among agency workers and local leaders. These long-term, 
personal relationships are the best mechanism for fostering progress by encouraging 
efficient, culturally-appropriate communications, avoiding redundant research and 
planning, lengthening multi-scaler institutional memory, and finding creative solutions 
for moving forward. Developing long-term personal relationships may broker the gap 
between the realities of village life and the lives of agency workers in Anchorage and 
Juneau and could satisfy Shishmaref residents’ requirements that bureaucrats “see for 
themselves” the risks rural communities face.
3) Outline risks and outcomes in explicit terms (while recognizing culturally 
divergent value systems)
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In Shishmaref, relocating residents away from flooding risks is not enough to 
constitute a successful adaptation. Instead, Shishmaref residents need to avoid the 
outcomes of fatalities, loss of property, social disarticulation, and cultural disruption 
through loss of access to traditional hunts and ugruk preparation areas. Keeping 
discourses about relocation explicit in terms of what to avoid and what to accomplish is 
crucial in creating real, long-term adaptations to changing conditions. In the case of 
Shishmaref, relocating residents to a site on the mainland; but one that does not offer 
practical access to the coast during the spring or offer access to coastal conditions for 
preparing bearded seals will not produce a successful relocation.
All “sites” are not equal. What constitutes an appropriate subsistence site and an 
appropriate site from an engineering perspective may differ. In order to avoid the 
mistakes of the past such as ignoring local knowledge -  communication among agencies 
and local residents must be sensitive to differences in value systems and site 
requirements. Compromises that may have to be made regarding an appropriate site will 
be difficult -  communication among agency workers and local residents must be as 
meaningful and precise as possible. Explicitly outlining risks, outcomes, and goals is vital 
in these communications.
6) Acknowledge a Alaska Native right to traditional subsistence territory
While climate change and other ecological shifts present new, risky conditions, 
this is not the first time risk has been used as a catalyst to move Alaska Native people off 
of traditional lands and/or to consolidate Native villages into larger towns or cities.
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Historical relocations and urbanization of American Indians and Alaska Natives have 
been a central feature of the Indian/US policy and have frequently been unsuccessful -  
leading to urban poverty, loss of a land base, and cultural disintegration. Today the 
literature demonstrates community and individual health benefits to cultural coherency 
and the maintenance of long-standing cultural traditions.
Promoting healthy Alaska Native and American Indian communities in a post­
colonial United States means state and federal agencies must work closely with local 
tribal leaders and take people’s assessment of their own health and well being seriously. 
In Shishmaref this means taking seriously the claim that removal from subsistence 
territory will lead to cultural disintegration. Following, the state should acknowledge an 
Alaska Native right to realistic and sustained access to traditional subsistence territory 
and property claimed through the ANCSA process. Formal acknowledgement to a Native 
right to access traditional land could act as a starting point in planning the relocation 
process.
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